Thirty years after the 1994 ceasefire, loyalist paramilitary groups continue to exist in Northern Ireland today, which raises two immediate and fundamental questions: why do they so, and what needs to be done to bring such groups to a close?
The final part of the loyalist paramilitaries’ statement issued on October 13th, 1994 is important, too, for the hopes, aspirations and dreams that it set out for a new and better society to follow in place of decades of pain.
Northern Ireland was then, it said, “on the threshold of a new and exciting beginning with our battles in future being political battles, fought on the side of honesty, decency and democracy against the negativity of mistrust, misunderstanding and malevolence”.
Together, the generations who lived through the Troubles, and those who came after them would work together to “bring forth a wholesome society in which our children, and their children, will know the meaning of true peace”.
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For the majority of loyalists, the hopes that were then evident in their communities about an expected new world have failed to materialise. And the loyalist paramilitary organisations still remain.
In 2018, the loyalist groups who signed up to the 1994 statement – the Red Hand Commando, the Ulster Freedom Fighters, the Ulster Defence Association and the Ulster Volunteer Force – returned to the stage with a new public declaration.
Seeking much-needed social transformation, the groups recommitted to the creation of “a Northern Ireland that enables all to realise their potential and aspirations”, believing that they could be “advocates for change” in a society “at ease with itself”.
The loyalist transformation statement, as it was known, was serious in both its tone and its intent, pledging to be at the centre of that change. Since then, however, little has changed.
Loyalist paramilitaries refer to concepts such as ‘demobilisation’, ‘civilianisation’ and ‘transitioning’ but the terms seem problematic, since it is unclear if an attempt to remove a military ethos would support the end of these organisations.
Furthermore, given that recruitment is still going on, the language of transformation might be seen to support the continuation of the paramilitary presence, rather than helping to end it 30 years after the ceasefires.
Loyalist paramilitarism has sustained criminality and coercion in some places, but we recognise that the groups have offered reassurance and perceived protection against external and internal threats at other times.
We acknowledge the good work being done by a range of groups in loyalist areas, many of them with paramilitary roots, in community development, education and in building communal and individual responsibility.
Ending paramilitarism is more likely when communal confidence is strong enough to support change. Without conviction that the union has a future it is unlikely that paramilitary groups will dissolve
However, any benefit they impart is outweighed by the criminal activities and coercive practices that are associated with, or given cover by, those same paramilitary organisations in those same communities.
Our position is firmly rooted in the belief that paramilitaries cannot continue to exist in a progressive, decent, post-conflict society and that properly-funded support and change is necessary to bring their end about.
A clear distinction between ex-combatants, community workers and criminals is needed to bolster loyalists who are trying to move on, and to distinguish between them and those who want to use fear to maintain their own reputations and self-serving advantage.
Declining confidence in political unionism does not help, since feelings of loss and perceptions of defencelessness and vulnerability in loyalist communities intensify, with the presence of paramilitaries offering reassurance.
Ending paramilitarism is more likely when communal confidence is strong enough to support change. Without conviction that the union has a future it is unlikely that paramilitary groups will dissolve.
With dwindling faith and confidence in political unionism among loyalists, it is perhaps unsurprising that anxiety, tension and anger have increased and that the forces of tribalism exert influence more forcefully.
Such anxiety, uncertainty and anger works against the eradication of paramilitarism. Confidence and creativity are needed to dismantle the structures of violence. When both are lacking, the possibility of change is lessened.
Indeed, anger and anxiety can spur new fears.
Political unionism is not to blame for the continuation of loyalist paramilitaries, but we suggest that a more confident and progressive political unionism would help to bring about circumstances that would lead to their end.
Political progress is integral to ending paramilitarism, not incidental to it, and an emphasis on political co-ordination across party lines is important for shaping consensus and agreement on steps towards change.
Social stability rather than communal strength will help to bring about an end to paramilitarism and its development is integral to effectively countering negative representations of loyalism that feed anxiety and fear.
More education outside of schools is needed, along with more integrated schools. More vocational courses, especially ones starting at an earlier age, would improve young men’s prospects.
Every effort should be made to encourage study by adults, including subsidised adult education programmes to generate and sustain a culture of learning within loyalist areas to encourage ambition and aspiration.
Any criminal activity undertaken by those affiliated to loyalist organisations should result in the expulsion and isolation of those involved from those organisations, along with swift police action leading to effective punishment
Meanwhile, criminality and individuals within loyalist paramilitary groups using the reputation of those groups to inflict misery and exploitation must be addressed, requiring better relations between the police and loyalist communities.
Decisive police action to counter criminality is vital to overcome paramilitary repression and coercion and it is important that the Police Service of Northern Ireland gets significantly more money to tackle this.
Any criminal activity undertaken by those affiliated to loyalist organisations should result in the expulsion and isolation of those involved from those organisations, along with swift police action leading to effective punishment.
Currently, too many individuals are being given suspended sentences when they are brought the courts, or being released without charge and this is undermining efforts to deter criminal activity.
Ending loyalist paramilitarism is a complex problem requiring action political, social, economic, communal and organisational levels. Without this, we do not believe that the ending of loyalist paramilitary organisations is likely.
Equally, progressive loyalists must strive to build constructive and productive relations and encourage movement away from the insular tendencies that loyalism has come to rely upon.
Loyalist leaders must initiate dialogue and contact with others, asking for help and support where it is needed. Equally, they should now make explicit what they require to bring about an end to their organisations.
There can be no more prevarication. Change must be unambiguous and demonstrate intent to finally end the paramilitary structures that continue to exist some 30 years after the CLMC ceasefire statement.
