Before the planes hit the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York on September 11th, 2001, much of Ireland’s national security apparatus was virtually defunct or non-existent.
The National Security Committee (NSC), intended as the main conduit of critical intelligence to Government, had not sat in many years. A National Civil Aviation Security Committee (NCASC) existed but was also gathering dust, while the main military committee, the Council of Defence, had not met since 1987.
In the hours and days following the attack, officials had to quickly resurrect the two committees as well as draw up plans for a new Office of Emergency Planning to prepare Ireland for a worst-case scenario.
This reactive approach to intelligence and national security was nothing new. The NSC itself had been hurriedly set up in 1975 in response to the Dublin-Monaghan bombings before later falling into abeyance.
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And it was only in 1938, with war clouds gathering over Europe and taoiseach Éamon de Valera concerned about the presence of foreign spies in Ireland, that the Defence Forces was assigned responsibility for counter-intelligence.
The history of intelligence in Ireland is one of reactive bursts of activity in response to immediate threats, with the government of the time invariably slipping back into a state of false security once the threat has passed.
Bureaus and committees have been opened in response to world events and then largely forgotten. The result is a confusing map of agencies with overlapping functions and no unified strategy to guide them.
Now, three years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and amid deepening concerns over the United States’s wavering commitment to European security, there is a fresh push to reinvigorate Ireland’s national security and intelligence structures.
However, it remains unclear if this will be another temporary fix or a sea change in Ireland’s approach to security.
There are five bodies within Government with the words “national security” in their title, not including An Garda Síochána and the Defence Forces, which are responsible for most activity in this area.
Yet Ireland lacks a single dedicated intelligence agency and a Cabinet-level committee responsible for national security.
According to interviews with security and Government sources, Ireland’s ad hoc approach to intelligence, has resulted in confusion between agencies over who is responsible for what.
At its worst, it has also resulted in agencies refusing to share information with each other due to personality clashes and fears of leaks.
Most intelligence gathering starts with the Garda National Crime and Security Intelligence Service and the Defence Forces’ military intelligence section, known as J2.
Neither organisation operates foreign agents, meaning for anything happening overseas, they are completely reliant on friendly intelligence services. The Garda has close relationships with MI5, the FBI and Interpol as well as other European intelligence agencies. It is also a member of the Club of Berne, a semi-formal intelligence sharing forum consisting of most EU states.
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The Defence Forces mainly liaises with other military intelligence agencies such as the UK’s Defence Intelligence, but also receives information from the European Union Intelligence and Situation Centre and Nato’s Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System.
A big issue that has arisen repeatedly over the years is a lack of clear delineation of responsibility between the Garda and J2.
The Garda has primacy for intelligence and State security, with J2 mainly tasked with ensuring the security of Defence Forces personnel at home and abroad. However, like the Garda, J2 plays a role in counter-espionage and surveillance of national security threats, such as Islamists terrorism.
A national security strategy clearly stating each service’s role was due to be published in 2021. Four years later, it remains a work in progress. “Establishing clear lines of communication and collaboration between these two Irish services is imperative” said veteran Garda intelligence officer Donal O’Driscoll recently.
These agencies, along with Revenue and the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and other Government departments, all feed information in the National Security Committee.
Situated in the Department of An Taoiseach, the NSC is chaired by the secretary general to the Government John Callinan, and consists of the secretaries general of the departments of Justice, defence, foreign affairs and communications, as well as the heads of the Garda, Defence Forces and the NCSC.
It meets several times a year- it refused to release the exact number of meetings it holds. Its job is to consider “strategic, rather than operational, security issues,” it says. In practice, this means listing potential threats, such as terrorist attacks or maritime security risks, and stating the associated threat level.
The security services never share raw intelligence with the NSC and briefings tend to be short and to the point. For example, the meeting may be told the threat level from Islamists terrorism has increased slightly while the threat from dissident republicans remains static. “No one likes to get into lots of detail,” said a source.
The security services are also tasked with sharing intelligence with the National Security Analysis Centre (NSAC), which is also part of the Taoiseach’s office. NSAC was set up in 2019 on foot of a recommendation from the Commission on the Future of Policing in Ireland. Its function is to analyse intelligence reports before they go up the line for a decision.
Despite its grand title, NSAC’s capabilities are limited. It has a staff of just 12, several of whom also have other responsibilities, and its functions were significantly cut back during the Covid-19 pandemic.
Garda intelligence officers are often reluctant to share intelligence with the NSAC, particularly that shared by external agencies, due to security concerns. “[Gardaí] are given an intelligence product from a foreign agency with specific instructions on how it should be shared,” said a source. “They can’t be seen to breach that trust or it may result in that intelligence flow being cut off in future.”
Much of this distrust can be attributed to Ireland’s lack of a formal security clearance process. In theory, security clearance is handled by the National Security Authority (NSA), which was set up to comply with basic EU intelligence handling standards.
Situated within the Department of Foreign Affairs, the NSA has a minimal staff and no ability to carry out the deep vetting required for a functioning security clearance system, sources said.
Intelligence processed by the NSC and NSAC should in theory be passed up to the Cabinet subcommittee responsible for national security. However, since 2020, no such committee exists. That means it is up to the Government secretary general to brief the Taoiseach on security matters, or the heads of individual security services to brief their relevant ministers.
These briefings tend to be mainly concerned with urgent operational issues rather than broader strategic overviews or “horizon scanning for threats”, says Ed Burke, Assistant Professor in the History of War at UCD.
The lack of a functional security clearance system also means there is no way of briefing ordinary Oireachtas committees on potential threats, even in broad brushstrokes, as happens in the UK and US. For similar reasons, there is no mechanism for the Oireachtas, the Policing Authority or the Garda Ombudsman to carry out oversight of the most sensitive work of the security services.
However, as in 1938, 1975 and 2001, world events are forcing a rethink in Ireland’s approach.
In the wake of the controversy last year over allegations that an Oireachtas member was secretly working for Russia, then tánaiste Micheál Martin let it be known he was unhappy with some aspects of the State’s intelligence apparatus.
“I think there are issues in terms of an accountability chain to the Oireachtas and the Government of the day,” he told the Dáil. “We have to take a more substantive and mature role.”
Shortly afterwards, he released Fianna Fáil’s election manifesto which contained some of the most ambitious reforms to national security in State history, including the establishment of a stand-alone National Security (Intelligence) Agency which, for the first time, would unify intelligence gathering under one roof.
This proposal did not make it into the Programme for Government. However, the programme did undertake to set up a new Cabinet level committee on national security (also, confusingly called the National Security Committee) and to carry out a review of national security structures within six months.
It also promises “a ring-fenced security budget” for the Garda, so intelligence officers will not have to compete with regular policing bureaus for resources.
Reforms are also planned to the NSAC, including making some its functioning more transparent.
Burke says, all of this is needed to “get out of the State’s cyclical deficiency” towards national security. “Because we really do have to remodel.”
