What happens when the Man from Del Monte says No?

There was a well-known advert for a global fruit company running on TV for many years. It opened with soft-pan shots of an idyllic fruit farm in South America with the workers preparing their luscious produce for an important visitor.

And then he arrived. European of course. Colonial. Distinguished. Aristocratic. Wearing a white linen suit and a Panama hat. He tasted the fruit, smiled, and then nodded his head in approval.

Cue spontaneous celebrations from the peasants who shouted: “The man from Del Monte says Yes!”

But what happens when the Man from Del Monte says No? This weekend will see Syriza accept what was always a Hobson’s choice for it. Over the course of the last fortnight the awful gravity of the alternative became clear – the closed banks, the shortages of medicines, the cash rations, were only a foretaste of the purgatorial hardship that would ensue.

You have to feel some sympathy for Alexis Tsipras and Syriza. They were not responsible for the shambles inherited in January. The party had a mandate to end seven years of austerity policies.

But then it needed to take a bite from a reality sandwich. Governments are never elected into a vacuum. It’s not as if you can take out the clapperboard, shout “take two” and start everything afresh.

Like Barack Obama’s “hope” slogan and stump speeches, and Eamon Gilmore’s exhortations on “Frankfurt’s way”, Syriza did not take into account the facts on the ground. In summary they were: the Man from Del Monte says No.

There are complicated arguments for and against what Syriza has sought. The IMF has said its debts are unsustainable and some form of relief will be required. The leader of the current EU presidency, Poland's Donald Tusk, has said as much this week in perhaps the most mollifying contribution (and concession) from the EU leadership to the Greek case.

On the other side there are former Soviet bloc countries in the EU who have a lower standard of living than Greece. They resent being asked to stump up more to keep it afloat. There are governments elsewhere who are threatened by political movements similar to Syriza: any major concession would have deleterious consequences for them.

Besides, while Greece did achieve a small primary surplus last year, its structural reform programme was long-fingered and patchy, to say the least.

There is a real problem with tax compliance (and it’s not just the rich oligarchs; it extends to every level ). There is a culture of corruption that makes Ireland look like the place it was in the 7th century when we had only saints and scholars.

The country may no longer be cooking the books like it did until 2009 but there are major deficits in its public administration, its efficiency ( the VAT system is labyrinthine), and governance. There were also over-generous deals for the public service during years of profligacy.

Overplayed its hand

In some senses Syriza was guilty of doing what Gilmore and Kenny did in 2011. It overplayed its hand by over-promising what could be achieved without giving due regard to the adversary it would face in the ring. Sure, it got overwhelming support for its stance in the referendum only last weekend. Yet that irresistible force soon met an immovable object which was this: the prevailing political climate in the EU is the polar opposite to that of Greece.

If a deal is to be agreed it will be seen as a betrayal by some Syriza supporters. At this juncture, some form of split seems likely, the consequences of which remain to be seen.

In extremis, there was one other alternative for Greece. Already it is being advocated by some left-wing politicians and commentators – such as Paul Murphy of the Socialist Party. Already they have excoriated Syriza's leadership and demanded rejection of the deal and, consequentially, default. I read one commentator describing such a move as a brave jump into the unknown. It's no such thing. There's no unknown about it at all. It's a plunge into the inferno.

There are many examples of what happens in a default scenario. Often the consequences for its population have been similar to the effects of a civil war.

Argentina defaulted on its debts in 2001, leading to riots and a state of emergency, including several people being killed during demonstrations. It led to hyperinflation and a massive devaluation of its peso. With an employment rate of 25 per cent, tens of thousands could be seen scavenging on the streets of Buenos Aires at the height of the deep depression that ensued. Argentina has slowly emerged from it but it has been a tortuous process that has taken years.

Humility

As the American academic and campaigner Scott Long (who is sympathetic to the views of Syriza) blogged this week in

The Paper Bird

: “The vicarious victory party now sending the British, or American, or even Spanish left into ecstasy – these revels where you laud starving others for audaciously doing what you didn’t dare to – ought to be tempered by a smidgen of humility and sorrow. After all, these are people who, unlike Greeks, know their ATMs will give them cash in the morning.”

Sinn Féin has strongly backed Syriza. The compromise has created headaches for it. As of now, the party looks like it will back the climbdown and knows it will take a hit for it. It dilutes its rhetoric. Gerry Adams can no longer claim with legitimacy that Sinn Féin could tell the troika to go and take a hike.

Sinn Féin sees itself as a prospective party of government and that means there are times when you must take the responsible option. And in this case it means saying a reluctant yes to a deal it does not like when the Man from Del Monte says No.