An elderly former Roman Catholic priest has won a Supreme Court order restraining his trial on 28 charges of indecent assault.
Giving the unanimous judgment of the three-judge court, Ms Justice Susan Denham said a prosecution "is not an exercise in vengeance".
The case of this man, now in his late 80s and in poor health, was one of those exceptional cases which justified the making of an order prohibiting trial.
The court's decision was based on several factors, including the fact it was an old case with the alleged offences relating to dates between 1965 and 1970, the man's age and his state of health, the judge said.
It was also based on the fact it took 28 months from making a formal complaint in May 2002 to mount a prosecution although, the judge stressed, the court did not find there was blameworthy prosecutorial delay in the case.
Ms Justice Denham also made clear that the decision to grant a prohibition order in this case did not mean a person might not be prosecuted for a crime committed many years ago or that a person in their 80s or in ill-health would not be prosecuted.
"A prosecution is not an exercise in vengeance," Ms Justice Denham said. "It demeans a system of justice if its process is one of vengeance, or has such a perception. It evokes concepts of primitive jurisprudence. The people of Ireland under the Constitution require that there be due process in the justice system.
"The courts are required to protect the integrity of that system, which may mean that in exceptional circumstances, a prosecution should be restrained. It is a question of proportionality."
She was giving judgment rejecting an appeal by the DPP against a High Court order restraining the man's trial. The High Court restrained the trial on the basis that the delay between the making of the complaint to gardaí by the church authorities and the mounting of the prosecution amounted to blameworthy prosecutorial delay.
While rejecting the High Court finding of blameworthy prosecutorial delay, the Supreme Court accepted arguments on the man's behalf that it would be unfair to put him on trial.
Ms Justice Denham referred to a previous Supreme Court decision in the H case where the court set out a test for establishing whether delay had prejudiced a person's right to a fair trial on charges of child sex abuse.
That test required that the delay must have created a real and serious risk of an unfair trial but did not exclude "wholly exceptional circumstances" where it would be unfair or unjust to put an accused on trial. This was such a wholly and exceptional case, Ms Justice Denham said.
The relevant factors were that this was an old case with allegations relating to events 37-42 years ago, that an interval of time had lapsed between the church authorities being told of the allegations, the formal complaint, the charging of the man and the return for trial, the fact the man was in his old age, his poor health and the fact the charges have had a detrimental effect on his life.
While the man had not shown that the delay in the case created a serious risk of an unfair trial, the court believed, in all the circumstances, it would be unjust to put him on trial.
