EVEN after the IRA resumed its campaign with the first three bomb attacks in London, senior loyalist figures were hopeful that political efforts could bring about a resumption of the IRA ceasefire.
Their assessment of the IRA attacks in London, in the absence of any IRA activity inside Northern Ireland, was that republicans did not want a return to a war with loyalists. They appeared to believe the IRA was engaged in a "one off" attack to bomb its way to the negotiating table.
However, the IRA's admission that it planted the bomb in a litter bin at Earl's Court last Friday night has undermined that interpretation and may greatly threaten the security situation in Northern Ireland.
The fact that the IRA has apparently decided to continue its campaign despite the setting of a date for all party talks and the granting of a US visa to the Sinn Fein leader, Mr Gerry Adams, may have pushed the loyalists to the brink of resuming violence.
It would now appear that if the IRA does not pull back from its campaign, loyalist retaliation will be inevitable. If the loyalists restart their campaign a resumption of IRA violence in the North cannot he far behind.
The statement issued yesterday by the Combined Loyalist Military Command (CLMC) is the most strongly worded issued by the combined body, which represents the leadership of the two main loyalist paramilitary organisations, the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and the small, independent group, the Red Hand Commando (RHC).
Its language of a "telling response", of the loyalists being "poised and ready to strike ... blow for blow" is unlike any statement previously issued by the group. On the face of it, the statement appears to mark a clear move towards setting conditions for a resumption of violence.
Loyalists have continued "targeting" republicans in Northern Ireland. They also say they can launch attacks in the Republic and that they have bomb making capability.
The UVF, which was responsible for all but a few of the major loyalist bomb attacks during the 25 years of the conflict in Northern Ireland, showed it had the ability, at least, to deliver bombs to Dublin before the ceasefires were called in late 1994.
In the months before the IRA ceasefire, the UVF attempted to plant a large bomb in the Widow Scallans public house in central Dublin during a republican social function. It also planted a bomb on board the Belfast to Dublin train. Both failed to explode properly. However, technical examination of the last loyalist bombs showed they were improving their manufacturing skills and were beginning again to pose a serious security threat.
In fact, in the year before the IRA ceasefire, loyalists were responsible for a third of bombings in Northern Ireland.
This reversed the situation, which had held since 1977, when loyalists withdrew from bombings, or tactical rather than technical reasons. In the late 1970s, the UVF says, it decided there was no political gain to be made from bombing republican or Catholic civilian targets, and stopped.
Senior loyalists have admitted that one of the reasons it took them six weeks to call a ceasefire, after the IRA called its "cessation" on August 31st, 1994, was that young militant loyalist believed they had bombed republicans into ending their campaign. They believed they should continue to the point of bringing about complete nationalist submission on the territorial claim over Northern Ireland.
Loyalist political leaders and senior paramilitary figures had difficulty in bringing the younger, militant members to heel, but they eventually succeeded in mid October 1994. The loyalist ceasefire was only sealed with the firm statement from the loyalist figurehead and UVF founding member, Gusty Spence, that the Union was "safe".
The restarting of the IRA campaign and particularly the bomb after the setting of a date for all party talks appears to have reversed the moderating trends within loyalism.
The fear now is that the shift of influence and power to militarists, such has already happened in the republican movement, may be replicating within loyalism.