Momentous decisions ahead for both Scotland and the United Kingdom

A cloud of uncertainty hangs over the United Kingdom as Scotland decides on independence next year, followed by a further decision on whether the (remaining or intact) UK will stay in the European Union. The calendar is pregnant with political linkages. On the outcome hangs Britain's future international role and influence. As its closest neighbour, Ireland has a huge interest in what happens.

The latest polling shows a 50:30 margin against independence and a surprisingly larger 74:26 one against among Scottish teenagers as 16-year-olds prepare to vote for the first time. But many are undecided and demand more information with 15 months of campaigning to go. The Yes side is confident it can close the gap and is sure an insensitive London-centred No campaign will help.

Difficult questions
Advocates of independence have many difficult questions to answer. Most concern economic issues like the currency, pensions and interest rates. The Scottish National Party wants to keep sterling and hopes to negotiate a currency union with London. This would give it greater flexibility than simply accepting the imperatives dictated by England's scale and Conservative policies, which it rejects.

The treasury vehemently opposes such a union, mindful of the euro’s difficulties. While the political and economic logic of independence might drive Scotland towards euro membership, current preferences would not allow it win the referendum that way. So sterling joins the lengthening list of links an independent Scotland would keep to the “rest of the UK”, alongside the monarchy, the BBC and a general culture of Britishness the SNP says it is part of.

Agreed separation
Independence has many other implications, as became clear at a recent Ditchley Foundation conference involving senior Scottish, British and international participants. Legally much depends on whether the rest of the UK is the continuity state and Scotland a new one or if continuity is shared. But politics would trump the law, in that an agreed separation between Edinburgh and London, as both claim to want if Scottish voters do, would be accepted by most international partners.

EU membership would be sought by Scotland and Brussels could be pragmatic faced with such a consensus. But all member states would have to agree, including a Spain facing Basque and Catalan demands for independence, though it could lose access to Scottish fishing grounds if it vetoed. An intriguing scenario if Scots vote No might be the reinforcement of demands – possibly led by a UK now committed to deeper devolution – for a stronger regional voice at the EU table.

This is assuming the UK remains in the EU if Scotland stays in the UK, another great uncertainty. Polling shows a roughly 50/50 split on withdrawal, with a large swing group depending on negotiating outcomes. The uncanny resemblance between the unionist case for keeping Scotland in the UK to preserve access and influence and the case for the UK staying in the EU has been too little aired. Polling in Scotland shows a swing group moving to vote Yes if they think the UK will leave the EU.

The calendar shows the anti-EU party Ukip doing well in next year's European Parliament elections, three months ahead of the Scottish vote. The UK general election in May 2015 will still give Scottish MPs a role in forming a government – even after a Yes vote. And if it is a No, a UK vote on EU membership in 2017 would reopen the independence question.

Defence is a huge issue. The SNP wants to stay in Nato, but not to keep the UK nuclear submarine fleet in Scotland. That may change; but the US is worried by the inevitable weakening of its main ally after a Scottish Yes; emerging powers would then demand the UK’s permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

Structural change in the UK’s internal and external relations could dramatically reconfigure Ireland, North and South, by putting unification on the agenda in quite unexpected ways. This would not respect the current public preferences in both parts of the country for the status quo of a highly porous border and Northern powersharing. A UK without Scotland and out of the EU would be much less likely to stay together because England would be less willing to sustain transfers to Northern Ireland and Wales.

All the more reason why a self-interested official Ireland still recovering from financial crisis might want the UK to stay in the EU, London continue to subsidise Northern Ireland and see an independent Scotland as a potential competitor for investment more than a Celtic soul-sister.

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