THE July 1993 bombardment of south Lebanon villages had less justification than the current action. It was to eliminate Hizbullah by putting 300,000 civilians on refugee roads. Pictures showed "terrorist" houses destroyed to prove the "clinical precision" claim.
An International Red Cross report showed 800 houses destroyed and 2,400 damaged, including 16 dispensaries or clinics. Were there Hizbullah terrorists in all those 3,200 houses and clinics?
A few weeks after the 1993 ceasefire eight Israeli soldiers were killed in the Israeli occupied zone. The Jerusalem Post said "under the ceasefire rules, attacks by Hizbullah inside the security zone are considered legitimate since the Israeli army is deemed to be an occupying force". These new rules, imposed by the United States, were never publicised in the west.
Even today the Israeli media does not use the term "occupied zone", preferring "security bone" or "buffer zone". Even RTE uses the Israeli euphemisms. In the name of peace occupying powers often manage to convince themselves they are not occupiers at all.
Under the 1993 US brokered accord, if Israeli troops were attacked inside the occupied territory, Israel could make retaliatory strikes outside it - but only against military targets.
The Litani River is perhaps another factor that goes unmentioned. It has the sweetest (least saline) water in the Middle East.
As far back as 1904, far sighted Zionists "began to press for the inclusion of the Awali and Litani Rivers within their territorial conception" of what Palestine should be, according to Thomas Naff, a hydrologist from the University of Pennsylvania.
But Litani water is also essential to the Shia farmers of South Lebanon. Conveniently, the area occupied by the Israelis includes the Litani and some of its watershed. And Israeli troops thoughtfully stole the Lebanese Hydrological Survey documents from Beirut in 1982.
As regards the present operation, the question arises: why was artillery used at all on so sensitive a target as Qana? Were the target designators not trained in hi tech, air environment equipment? Were the gunners adequately trained? Could the firing have been deliberate? Why did they not use a (normally) more accurate - helicopter gunship?
One wonders if the conditioning of young soldiers was a factor. The ill treatment of West Bank Arabs used to be highlighted by the Jerusalem Post in its great days. Some Israeli parents worried about the corrupting effects of occupation and, to their credit, some of the soldiers themselves were vocal about it.
A helicopter destroyed an ambulance last Saturday. How could the pilot identify a Hizbullah driver but not see the women and children in the back?
Russian Katyusha multi barreled rocket launchers (MRLs) first appeared in the early 1940s. They need large vehicles. Such bulky targets could not have survived air attacks in south Lebanon. At best the MRL is an "area weapon", inaccurate and, until recently, with a short range. The single launchers are even less accurate. They are sometimes fired by timers while the gunners make their escape.
So far we do not know what MRL is in use. The original Katyusha, with its 7 km range, is now obsolete.
Nevertheless, it is surprising that the occupation troops and their helicopters cannot find more launchers.
Hizbullah is undoubtedly armed and financed from external sources - but less lavishly than Israel's South Lebanon Army.
The Israelis were slow to develop artillery; the tank was supreme in their early wars. In the 1973 war, Egyptian soldiers stood in the open and destroyed Israeli tanks with wire guided missiles. Tank gun ranges are short compared to artillery.
The deficiency was soon remedied. Israel used the L3 155mm gun/Howitzer to some extent in the 1973 war. It has been modified several times and United States 109s are also available.
We do not know the type used in the present conflict. Ranges are up to 28 km, dependent on the ammunition fired. Shells weighing, say, 95 lb are devastating against houses, as the pictures from the Qana compound show.