The central question this book sets out to answer is "What is it that continued to make the Northern Ireland problem apparently so intractable for so long?" The authors' conclusion is that it was not until the 1980s that shifts in the approaches of the British and Irish governments provided a different context for both communities in the north. A psychological withdrawal by Britain and a redefinition by nationalists of conditions for achieving Irish unity meant the claims of the "parent" states ceased to be irredentist.
The authors claim this introduced a new flexibility into the situation. Furthermore Farren and Mulvihill believe that until the late 1980s there was little work done on the issue of identity, what they call "the psycho-cultural" analysis of the conflict that enabled redefinitions to take place.
Both these views are questionable. By 1980 the two governments and their officials were fully aware that they were dealing with a complex conflict of identity and allegiance, not merely a religious war, not merely the IRA against the British, not a British attempt to retain a colony. The British white paper of spring 1982 had a chapter entitled "The Two Identities" which asserted: "This difference in identity and aspiration lies at the heart of the `problem' of Northern Ireland." The New Ireland Forum in 1983 devoted considerable time to the same issue. By then it was widely accepted there could be no security solution nor one produced by tinkering with internal structures in the north.
The real problem for Ireland was finding a way to have the British government address the real problem instead of addressing side issues for political reasons. The book sticks rigidly to academic analysis of political theory and resolutely ignores the political realities which prolonged the agony. This is surprising given that one of the authors, Sean Farren, has been involved in SDLP politics for more than 20 years and is now Minister for Higher and Further Education, Training and Employment in the Northern Executive.
The book follows the standard academic procedure of presenting various hypotheses and refuting each except the preferred one, the identity conflict. Unfortunately the authors intersperse amongst the political theory and sociology a potted history of the North beginning in the 17th century. The effect is jarring.
Despite Farren's authorship there is not a single revelation about the peace process. Their explanation for the delay in ending the conflict takes no account of Realpolitik. It ignores the inertia of 18 years of Conservative government, the role and personality of Margaret Thatcher and her sentimental unionism, John Major's tiny majority and, most obvious of all, the central fact of IRA violence that took a decade to stop after their leaders decided the campaign was futile.
The result is that the book is neither fish nor fowl. As political history of the peace process it falls far short of the standard Mallie and McKittrick set in their 1996 account. As an academic work it adds nothing to the specialist works of McGarry and O'Leary in London and Todd and Ruane in Cork, who provide superior analyses of the political and sociological theory involved.
Brian Feeney is an Irish News columnist and co-author of Lost Lives: the stories of the men, women and children who died as a result of the Northern Ireland Troubles published last autumn