In the coming days and weeks, activists in all political parties, North and South, will consider the implications of the peace deal agreed by the Northern parties under the tutelage of Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern at Stormont last week.
The language of the agreement is complex, at times Byzantine. Many people will find it hard to figure out who won and who lost. They may decide the game ended in a draw or that we have moved to a new plane where there are no winners or losers, just a common effort to achieve permanent peace and stability.
Unionists are already claiming victory on Articles 2 and 3 of Bunreacht na hEireann. The proposed Article 2 makes Irish nationality a matter of entitlement rather than implicit compulsion. The original bald definition of the national territory had overtones of the Italian nationalist Giuseppe Mazzini's assertion that first you must create Italy and then you can create Italians.
Some Northern commentators say that if you want to remove the unionist siege mentality then you must "lift the siege". This is effectively what happens under the new Article 2. Irish nationality becomes a matter of choice rather than duty.
This may alleviate the siege mentality of unionists but it will not enhance feelings of security among Northern nationalists. The quid pro quo for that section of the community is the North-South Ministerial Council and its subordinate implementation bodies.
That was the price Dublin sought for changing Bunreacht na hEireann. Critics would say, however, that the North-South bodies will be a mere footstool of the Assembly and unionists of various hues can unite to strangle this child at birth.
It's not quite that simple. The provisions in the Agreement ensure that the North-South bodies will at least come into existence. Whether they thrive or not is an open question and will probably be the focus of a huge political battle over the next few years.
The new Assembly will not be the same as the old Stormont. One analyst has said the difference would be the same as if Grattan's Parliament had reassembled in the 1840s, after Catholics got the vote.
Certainly nationalists will have a bigger voice in the Assembly's running than they ever had at Stormont. That and the various provisions in the Agreement will probably ensure the North-South bodies get off the ground, but it seems unlikely they can become engines for gradual advance towards a united Ireland unless a significant section of the present unionist community can be persuaded to take at least a neutral position.
That will be the test of those who say: "To end the siege mentality you must lift the siege."
The old Article 3 was a clear assertion of Dublin's right to rule the North and set down the reintegration of the national territory as a matter of unfinished business.
The amended version makes Irish unity a matter of "firm will" rather than a constitutional imperative. It amounts to saying, in effect: We want a united Ireland, but only by peaceful means and by agreement.
There is an ambiguity where the amended version states that this voluntary unity shall be brought about by a majority of the people "in both jurisdictions". It would probably be more comforting for unionists if the wording read "in each jurisdiction".
The amended Article 3 can be said to "claw back" some of the ground given away by nationalists with its provision that North-South bodies may exercise powers in respect of "all or any part of the island". There are also changes in British constitutional legislation.
Essentially, nationalists are giving up a theoretical and probably unrealisable territorial claim in return for the possibility of practical advance towards a position of joint sovereignty.
Since a majority in the North do not want unity, probably the only way it could be realised in practice would be by a policy of "ethnic cleansing" that would contradict the basic tenets of republicanism, never mind common humanity. There is another view: if Britain withdrew her forces, unionists would "see sense" and make common cause with nationalists.
This is a theoretical proposition, and there would be only one chance of testing it in practice. If it turned out to be wrong, the consequences would be disastrous, with thousands of deaths and widespread destruction. For that reason, many nationalists have opted for the "persuasion" model.
Mr David Trimble, writing in yesterday's Daily Telegraph, described procedures for cross-community decision-making in the new Assembly as "cumbersome", adding that they could lead to deadlock.
Cumbersome or not, these procedures were necessary to reassure nationalists that they would not be subject to "unionist domination". Just as nationalists will have to persuade unionists in the North-South bodies, so unionists will need to convince nationalists of their arguments if the Assembly is to be made work. Goodwill has not been the most obvious characteristic of Northern politics up to now, although there were signs that this frail plant was growing in the multi-party talks. It will have to grow a lot more to weather the storms ahead.
The SDLP wanted a powersharing cabinet; the UUP said all decisions should be made by the Assembly as a whole. We have ended up with a hybrid, closer to a cabinet than not. The question is: who will be on this "executive committee", as it is called?
Since seats will be allocated in proportion to party strength, Sinn Fein will without doubt be entitled to at least one seat and probably more.
This is not a prospect to delight unionist hearts, and here de commissioning rears its head once more, as a precondition for taking a cabinet post. Some unionists were unhappy with the provisions in the Agreement on this score and voiced their concerns about sitting down with Sinn Fein while the IRA was still in business.
To close any loopholes that might exist, Tony Blair provided a letter of comfort to Mr Trimble on the issue. Those of us who have been covering the talks for the past two years know decommissioning is an issue that is almost impossible to pin down. None of the parties that grew out of paramilitarism in the South ever decommissioned and now they are nearly all respected bourgeois democrats. The delegate who said "trust and rust" was the answer may turn out to be right.
The establishment of a British-Irish Council comforts unionists without discommoding nationalists. It will encourage and foster co-operation on an "east-west" basis but has no power to inhibit or interfere with the activities of North-South bodies.
Provisions for the release of prisoners within two years and the promotion of greater equality in Northern society are claimed as a "win" by members of Sinn Fein, whereas Mr Trimble asserted on television last Friday that his party had "saved" the RUC.
Policing is perhaps the most sensitive, complex and difficult of all issues. It has been long-fingered in the sense that a commission has been set up, but this body has to make its final report by next summer. Unionists understand there will be no member of the commission from the Republic. The governments and parties will "discuss" implementation of the report.
The present police service is said to be three times the size required if Northern Ireland were a stable and peaceful society. How to reduce that size while recruiting substantial numbers from the nationalist community seems like the ultimate "Rubik's Cube".
Whatever happens will be expensive and will be a difficult balancing act to convince nationalists that rapid change is in train without accentuating the fears and insecurities of the unionist community.
Engels defined the state as "bodies of armed men", and tackling this issue in a meaningful way will constitute a reshaping of the Northern state. The political fallout will be huge, and if any issue has the potential to bring about a renewal of widespread violence this is it.
The more one reads and studies the Stormont agreement, the more it seems like an interim settlement, the "best guess" of the parties and governments - for now.
There are many unresolved issues - decommissioning, policing, the precise role and function of the Assembly executive and the North-South bodies. The hope is that all these matters can be worked out in a non-violent manner and that, for once, power won't grow out of the barrel of a gun.
The essence of the agreement may have been summed up by one observer who declared: "Ulster is dead. Long live Northern Ireland."