Europe Letter: When it comes to policy on China, ‘the West’ does not exist

The shortcomings of “the West” as a term, the rough shorthand used to mean the United States and its allies particularly in northwestern Europe, became apparent following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The need for a way to refer to the broad alliance of countries that united in imposing sanctions on Russia led its expansion to “global West”, losing all geographical coherence as it drew in Indo-Pacific countries such as Japan and Australia, coming to mean wealthy liberal democracies more broadly.

Chinese diplomats sometimes assume the mantle of speaking for the supposed antagonist to this West, the “global South”, a disparate grouping encompassing South America, Africa and parts of Asia that is roughly united by an ambivalent attitude towards Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The rhetorical idea of the global South does not fit with the reality of China as a relatively northerly and wealthy superpower, and it masks significant complexity within the grouping, such as Beijing’s often tense relations with its neighbour and central “global South” member India.

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When it comes to policy towards China, the West as an idea does not really exist. There is no common approach towards China within Europe, let alone a shared one between Europe and the United States.

Prior to the invasion of Ukraine, countries including Germany and Ireland primarily saw China largely as an economic opportunity and their policy was formed around the central interest of opening its large market to their domestic companies.

The invasion of Ukraine transformed attitudes by highlighting the risks inherent in economic dependencies that can be disrupted in times of war – or indeed during pandemics, as Covid-19 showed.

[ China is becoming a tougher place for European companies to do business in ]

[ EU determined to resist US efforts to use trade and technology council as joint platform to target Beijing ]

European countries realised that if Beijing were to decide to invade Taiwan, or take a step towards doing so such as a blockade, their profound trade and economic links with China would be exposed, particularly through the economic retaliation of Washington.

The lack of transatlantic unity is reflected in the pressure from the US to adapt policy towards China, with the argument that European countries should not make the same mistake of creating economic dependencies as was made with Russia.

However, the economic ties with China are much deeper than with Russia – it has been Germany’s biggest trade partner since 2016. Though the mood has now transformed, there remain deep divergences on the issue between EU member states, ranging from friendly Hungary to hawkish Lithuania.

Meanwhile, China prefers to deal bilaterally with the EU’s largest members, France and Germany, a method that has long worked to create inconsistencies between member states by keeping the focus of the relationship on purely national interests.

This week, the European Commission unveiled its latest effort to change this by releasing a proposal for a common EU strategy towards economic security.

China was not mentioned by name in the document but it is the overriding context. Though in theory it could be applied to any country, the strategy is aimed to reduce Chinese leverage over European economies, and to stop EU companies from exporting sensitive technologies that could give Beijing an advantage, particularly if they have military uses.

Yet the struggle of uniting all 27 countries was immediately underscored as there was diplomatic pushback from some member states against going too far to disrupt the economic relationship even before the strategy was unveiled.

[ EU attempts tough balancing act on China ]

[ Macron’s Taiwan remarks expose EU divisions on China ]

Simultaneously, Chinese premier Li Qiang arrived for talks with chancellor Olaf Scholz in Berlin, underlining that the bilateral approach is going nowhere.

“We have no interest in economic decoupling from China,” Scholz said following the meeting.

The chancellor, who is dovish towards China compared to his more hawkish Green coalition partners – there is no common China position even within the German government – also used avoided using the term “de-risking”.

This phrase was popularised by European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen, and refers to developing a more cautious approach towards China that is nevertheless less hardline than that of Washington.

Broadly, de-risking is taken to mean reducing dependencies on China, particularly for critical raw materials, while encouraging companies to diversify their supply chains and avoid Chinese ownership of critical infrastructure such as ports and 5G networks. It can also refer to avoiding the transfer of critical technology to China, though this is more contested.

Even if Europe succeeds in forming a coherent approach towards China, it will still be distinct to that of the United States. The homogenous “West” will remain elusive.

As the EU’s chief diplomat, Josep Borrell put it in an interview with the Irish Times in 2020: “We have to be like Frank Sinatra, no? My way.”