We need to beware of too easy 'gesture diplomacy'

The Iraq adventure may end badly for the two leaders who took the responsibility for launching the invasion of that country

The Iraq adventure may end badly for the two leaders who took the responsibility for launching the invasion of that country. This is not very surprising.

As I suggested in this column in February and March last year, it was hard to see much good coming from an Iraq war which would generate a lot of evil, including giving encouragement to new al-Qaeda monstrosities.

Moreover, given the uncertainty that must surround the manner in which the Pentagon was likely to address the task of post-war civil administration, even a short war that was not too costly in human life and that secured a positive initial response from the peoples of Iraq, could land the occupying forces, British as well as American, into a lot of trouble.

For Iraqis, however glad they might be to see the back of Saddam Hussein, would became restless about a period of US military rule.

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All that was foreseeable. What few foresaw was the scale and persistence of incompetence and lack of discipline on the part of US forces, which has been such a striking feature of the past 12 months.

There seems to have been a problem with some British troops also, but the British, at least, seem to have thought through the liberation/occupation process, and to have made a serious attempt to carry it out in a purposive way.

Some at least of the problems they have faced in the Basra area have been attributable, not to their own actions, but to the impact of US military behaviour on Iraqi opinion.

Ireland was among a number of Security Council members who made clear at the time their view that Resolution 1441 did not provide authority to invade Iraq and that a further resolution would be needed for that purpose.

In deciding to claim such authoritry from this resolution, George Bush and Tony Blair seem to have been motivated by a sense of certainty about their judgment, of the kind that religious belief can sometimes induce in fallible human beings.

Others in the US administration may have successfully exploited this vulnerable element in George Bush's character.

And Blair then trapped himself into what is described as a partnership, but is really a subordinate role that has involved accepting a measure of responsibility for US actions without the power to influence them.

In this process the British Prime Minister has been seen as following through the logic of Britain's post-second World War - or perhaps one should say post-Suez - commitment to an alliance with the US, as did Margaret Thatcher.

But, as Michael Howard has just pointed out, even Margaret Thatcher was capable of taking a more objective view of US policy, as she did when she protested against the US invasion of a British Commonwealth country, Grenada, ("They were worse than the Soviets. Garret," she told me), and indeed also when she refused Ronald Reagan's request to join him in backing the Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis.

The question now is to what extent these events may lead to some second thoughts in Britain about the US "special relationship". I would not count on this happening. There is no evidence that Tony Blair's likely successor in office, Gordon Brown, is any less wedded to the US than Tony Blair has been, and there is certainly some evidence that he is less European.

Moreover if, as is now possible, George Bush were to lose the election in November, the emergence in the US of a Democratic president who has latterly been questioning aspects of the Iraq war would facilitate the restoration of what at present for many people in Britain is a fairly bruised connection.

The Irish-US relationship does not seem to have been damaged either by the negative views of most Irish people on the Iraq war, or by the principled stance of the Government on Resolution 1441 in the Security Council, of which many Irish people seem still to be unaware.

There are two reasons for this.

First, we were content to record our position on this issue at the Security Council without making a song and dance about it, just as we did consistently on the other eight issues in relation to which we found ourselves at odds with the US during the two-year period of our membership of that body. (We also found ourselves at one point or another in conflict with each of the other four permanent members).

Obviously our stance on Iraq in the Security Council did not influence the US or Britain in their decision to launch a war, any more than did the similar position taken by Germany, France and Russia.

But, as shown in this column a year ago on other issues where we disagreed with the US, such as the fate of the former Spanish Sahara, and aspects of US policy with respect to Afghanistan, our consistent policy of quiet, principled diplomacy certainly did make a difference.

The second reason our stance on Iraq at the Security Council did not evoke US hostility was that the Government, rightly in my view, refused to capitulate to elements in public opinion demanding that on this occasion we should abandon a 50-year-old neutral stance on the use of Shannon Airport by commercial flights of military significance, whether Russian or American.

The reversal of long-standing Irish policy on this issue, in order to satisfy public clamour, would, of course, have had no practical effect on the war in Iraq, for there are other staging points such as Prestwick that could have been, and indeed were being, used.

Too often our public debate about foreign policy relates to what I call "gesture diplomacy"; demands that we, the virtuous, denounce other countries for any behaviour of which we disapprove.

Such denunciations make us feel good. And there are times when such action is, of course, appropriate and may even, albeit in rare cases, yield a positive result. For example, it may well be that vocal international criticism of the Burmese military regime will help to restore democracy in that country

But where gesture diplomacy will clearly be ineffective and may weaken our capacity, with other like-minded states, to exert useful influence on other issues, it is best avoided; especially if, as well as being ineffective, it is judged likely to damage the interests of Irish people.

While respecting the motivation of those who wanted the US to be refused access to Shannon, I support the Government's stance on this issue.