Des O’Malley was defined by his struggle against armed republicanism

Des O’Malley had many achievements, and some failures, to his name over a long career, but on the day of his funeral it should be noted that his entire political life was defined by his struggle against armed republicanism and an unwavering defence of the democratic institutions of this State.

His political outlook was forged in the maelstrom of the arms crisis of 1970 and as recently as last month he engaged in a public dispute with RTÉ over Gunplot, a new documentary and podcast series, which he regarded as a serious misrepresentation of what happened during those fateful days over half a century ago.

O'Malley was just 30 years-old when he was appointed government chief whip by Jack Lynch in 1969 and he had a ringside seat at the cabinet table as the taoiseach and his ministers attempted to respond to the escalating violence in the North. Lynch struggled to control some of his more aggressive ministers, particularly Neil Blaney, who regarded the outbreak of the Troubles as an opportunity to realise the goal of a united Ireland, by force if necessary.

Lynch took a very different line, emphasising in public and private that unity by consent was government policy. O’Malley strongly backed his leader’s approach and set his face against any co-operation, overt or covert, with republicans or their allies who regarded the use of violence as legitimate.

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The details of the arms crisis are too complicated to rehearse here and are still strongly contested as the controversy of the recent RTÉ series demonstrated. Suffice to say that O'Malley backed Lynch's policy of conciliation and consent to the hilt and was appointed minister for justice in the wake of the dismissal of Charles Haughey and Blaney from the cabinet.

It was the most dangerous time for the State since the Civil War and O’Malley spoke in later life not just of the IRA death threats against him but of his fears that the island could descend into widespread communal violence if the wild men had their way.

One of the reasons it did not happen was that as minister for justice he took decisive action against the IRA, establishing the three-judge Special Criminal Court to avoid the intimidation of juries. The gardaí feared an assassination attempt and O’Malley and his family were given around-the-clock protection. It was an experience that stayed with him for the rest of his life.

Haughey's victory in the Fianna Fáil leadership election of 1979 stunned O'Malley and his ally George Colley. Their fears for the security of the State were so great that they only agreed to serve in his government as long as they had a veto over who would occupy the departments of justice and defence.

From outside O'Malley played a huge part in changing how his old party viewed the world

O’Malley’s departure from Fianna Fáil began in 1984 when, in response to the report of the New Ireland Forum, he rejected Haughey’s vision of a unitary state as the only solution that would bring peace to the North. His refusal to follow the Fianna Fáil line against liberalising the law on contraception in February, 1985, flowed from that approach and led to his expulsion from the party for “conduct unbecoming”.

The decisive move that led to the founding of the Progressive Democrats was his decision to vote in favour of the Anglo-Irish Agreement negotiated by Garret FitzGerald in November 1985 which had been rejected by Haughey as unconstitutional. Mary Harney joined him in that vote and was also expelled from Fianna Fáil. The road to the formation of the new party beckoned.

Incidentally, an important new book on the background to the Anglo Irish Agreement has been published this week. The Making of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 is a memoir of the negotiations by senior British official David Goodall who was one of the key figures involved. His account of how he and cabinet secretary Robert Armstrong persuaded prime minister Margaret Thatcher to arrive at the agreement, somewhat against her better judgement, is an important historical document.

At bottom, then, the decision by O'Malley and Harney to found a new party was based on their opposition to Haughey-style nationalism and their utter rejection of the republican agenda being pursued by the IRA and its political wing, Sinn Féin. When Fianna Fáil under Albert Reynolds and Bertie Ahern accepted the principle that Irish unity could only come about with the consent of the people of Northern Ireland, the PDs could claim with some justice that their analysis of the issue had been adopted by their former party.

The PDs remained a significant policy force for almost a quarter of a century and could claim a number of important achievements on social and economic policy during the party’s four terms in coalition. Ultimately, though, it was the party’s stance on the North that defined its identity and after the Belfast Agreement its primary objective had been realised.

O’Malley was often described as the best leader Fianna Fáil never had but from outside he played a huge part in changing how his old party viewed the world. His major contribution to Irish life was to stand by the democratic institutions of the Republic against those for whom they are nothing but a means to an end.