Taiwan is a part of China and not a protectorate of the United States.
THERE is much to parse and analyse in this remark by the Chinese Foreign Minister, Mr Qian Qichen, this week, following the announcement that the US is to send a second aircraft carrier to the waters off Taiwan. His words draw on the most important tradition of Chinese foreign policy - how to escape from the "century of shame and humiliation" in which the country was the victim of western, then Japanese, colonial and imperial occupation and exploitation.
The year 1949 is still arguably best understood primarily as a highly successful nationalist revolt against such conditions, rather than as a thoroughgoing communist revolution.
In that case it is easier to understand the deep rooted feelings concerning Chinese unity and sovereignty over Taiwan and the resentment felt against outside interference in what is seen as an internal Chinese matter. Many commentators discern a marked revival of popular nationalism following the falling away of communist ideology and legitimacy as Deng Xiaoping's four modernisations approach maturity.
Chinese foreign policy is popularly perceived as anti hegemonic, against the exercise of big power politics, alliances, spheres of influence and sanctions. The US is perceived to have a policy of containing China, trust rating its emergence as a world and political power in its own right and intent on separating it from Taiwan.
Most worrying for the ruling Communist Party, it is believed that the new Congressional right wing agenda in the US includes rolling back the Chinese revolution after the collapse of the USSR and its east European satellites. Were this to happen it is feared that China itself would break up, with dire consequences for its Asian neighbours and regional stability.
There is sufficient evidence to feed such a paranoiac view, for those who might expect to suffer most were it to happen. They include the military especially, but also important layers of the party leadership and bureaucracy who have taken the initiative since the new Congressional majority forced Mr Clinton's hand in approving President Lee Teng hui's visit to the US last year.
Analysts believe those who take this "oppositionist" view have prevailed against a more "co operative" policy formerly pursued by the foreign ministry and those most committed to China's economic opening up to the rest of the world, If this is so then there is more at stake in the China Taiwan dispute than meets the eye.
Questions of pride and face predominate where matters of sovereignty and outside interference ratcheted up. The Malaysian Prime Minister, Mr Mahatir, said this week that "I have always maintained that if, you say a country is your future enemy, it is your present enemy."
If sanctions or military measures are threatened it becomes more difficult for the Chinese to manoeuvre their way back from a confrontation that would be disastrous for their economic opening up to the world. The reported assurances that they have told the US they have no intention of invading Taiwan is reassuring but still very tentative.
It may help the Clinton administration to reinstate its policy of "comprehensive engagement" with China, according to which it is best to encourage dialogue and negotiation across the range of issues, even where there is deep disagreement, as on human rights or nuclear and missile proliferation. It is a difficult assignment, because of the find US conviction that "we have got to get China to change", in the words of Mr Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
US China relations have gone through cycles of engagement and hostility over many decides. They have tended to coincide with another cycle within China itself, of centralisation and decentralisation associated with successive economic initiatives. The profound economic and social changes over the last 15 years have put extreme pressure on China's political structures, latterly on the role of the Communist Party itself.
It is not surprising, therefore, that many of its leading cadres should be suspicious of outside - interference at such a sensitive moment of transition.
Historically, bringing a new power into the international system has always proved one of the most difficult tasks of political management. Britain's emergence from Dutch and Spanish hegemony in the 17th century, Germany's emergence in the 19th and 20th centuries, and that of the US, Russia and Japan to their world roles in this century have all been accompanied by major wars.
It is not, therefore, altogether alarmist to point to the disturbing historical parallels when analysing China's ambition to increase its wealth and power. It has been accompanied in recent years by a vigorous ants race in Asia, which has seen the region overtake the Middle East in volumes and quality of sales. especially of weapons that project power externally.
It is all too easy to extrapolate economic growth and increased interdependence through trade and investment in Asia into a benign political scenario for the region. It is indeed developing very fast and creating a new identity in the process. But many security problems are emerging too, as the power games follow the wealth games.
