The Public Accounts Committee report into the State's redress scheme for victims of institutional abuse tells in detail the background to the State's dealings with the religious orders in relation to their contribution to the scheme, and the indemnity they received in return.
As the work of the committee is confined to examining the work of government departments, its 18 findings and six recommendations are confined to work of civil servants rather than government decisions.
However, the evidence it gathered over the last 18 months, as outlined in the report, also raises questions about the wisdom of the government's decision to enter into the deal, given the information and warnings available to the cabinet at the time.
Specifically, the report published yesterday outlines details of how the government was warned by the minister for finance and the attorney general, before its decision in June 2002 to accept the redress deal, that the potential liability of the scheme was much greater than the €250 million to €500 million figure given by officials.
The government decision in 2000 to establish the redress scheme was based on the fact that the government had a liability to and a concern for the victims that they would not have to endure further suffering and delays in High Court cases.
The 18 religious orders that ran the institutions agreed in principle in late 2000 to contribute to a redress scheme, and negotiations between the State and the orders began in March 2001.
The report details the protracted negotiations between the religious orders and the State; how an initial offer of €60 million was rejected in June; how the negotiations collapsed in August following newspaper leaks and were resurrected following the intervention of senior department of education officials and then minister for education Michael Woods.
It finds that the key to this resurrection was an offer to include property already transferred by the orders to charities between 1999 and the signing of the deal, and to value it at more than €40 million, enabling the figure of €128 million to be used as the congregations' contribution.
Most of the report is devoted to the issue of how the department came up with an estimate of the State's and orders' potential liability when it began negotiations. It reached an estimate of €254 million to €500 million, which was based on 2001 figures of 2,000 cases at a potential cost of €128,000 each. This was never updated during the negotiations, despite information of a rising number of potential cases.
In comparison, it notes that the report of the Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) in 2003 came up with a potential number of claimants of more than 7,000. This was based on figures the department had in relation to freedom of information requests, coupled with figures from solicitors.
Based on these figures, the C&AG came up with a potential liability of more than €800 million, although it notes that the department is now estimating a potential cost of more than €600 million.
The report also goes into considerable detail on the absence of staff from then attorney general Michael McDowell's office during two key meetings to finalise the deal in late 2001 and early 2002.
These meetings were between the congregations, their legal representatives and the State, which was represented by two people, Dr Woods and the then secretary general of the department, John Dennehy. The attorney general wrote to the department on a number of occasions to try to establish the nature of the indemnity agreed to.
The report finds that while the attorney general's office was aware of the nature and extent of the indemnity being discussed as far back as March 2001, the department did not reply to his queries for two months, and that, when finally involved, the attorney general's office was able to alter details of the indemnity considerably to the State's benefit.
Findings and recommendations
Findings: The Department of Education failed to properly estimate the potential and likely cost of the redress scheme.
There was a serious confusion between the Department of Education and the Attorney General's office on the proposed indemnity deal.
Formal documentation on the negotiations was poor.
Recommendations:
Strength of the State's negotiation team should always be equal and training should be given to civil servants involved in such negotiations.
State's procedures for estimating major liabilities should be reviewed.
Detailed guidelines on AG's role in similar negotiations should be introduced.