IRAQ: Is it credible that Iraq could produce weapons of mass destruction quickly, as claimed yesterday? The evidence suggests Yes, writes Tom Clonan.
The report of the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) on the development of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) within Iraq comes at a very timely moment. President Bush and British Prime Minister Blair are at a critical juncture in their attempts to build a coalition of support for an invasion of Iraq. Indeed, some commentators have gone so far as to say the report may be part of a cynical attempt to sway public opinion in favour of military action.
Aside however from the dramatic timing of this report, its conclusions are measured and tempered with caution. The report does not contain any hysterical or extraordinary claims. It merely concludes that over time, with the correct components, the Iraqi regime could develop a viable nuclear weapon for use beyond its borders. This is not news to the international military community.
Over 10 years ago, in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) was set up to monitor and restrict the development of weapons of mass destruction within Iraq. Specifically, UNSCOM was tasked with investigating the development of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons within Iraq.
Iraq made a commitment to co-operate fully with UNSCOM in this regard and undertook to make a "full and final declaration" of its NBC capabilities.
Despite these stated commitments, the reality on the ground in Iraq for UNSCOM personnel was very different. To begin with, the Iraqi authorities never made any declarations in relation to their NBC capabilities. In addition, Saddam's regime attempted to frustrate UNSCOM's mandate in Iraq by denying its personnel access to suspect facilities.
The Iraqis also engaged in bureaucratic wrangling, concealment, deception and intimidation. It was only through the dogged determination of weapons inspectors that any progress was made. The progress made gave rise for grave concern in the west.
In relation to chemical weapons, UNSCOM personnel felt they had probably neutralised only 40 per cent of Saddam's estimated capabilities. Western intelligence estimates would still hold that stockpiles of nerve gas such as Sarin are at the disposal of the Iraqi military. In relation to biological weapons, UNSCOM personnel believed that Saddam's capabilities were only slightly retarded by their activities. This was due in part to the low-tech nature of such weapons, and the relative ease with which they can be resourced, manufactured, stored and concealed.
UNSCOM's findings in relation to Saddam's nuclear weapons programme were equally disturbing. Inspection teams sent to Iraq in the early 1990s destroyed a device known as a cyclotron. This is an apparatus used in the production of weapons-grade fissile material. In developing such a device, the Iraqi regime showed a high level of ingenuity and determination in their attempts to develop nuclear weapons. Inspection teams also uncovered evidence of active research into the manner in which home-produced nuclear weapons could be incorporated into domestically produced ballistic missiles.
Specifically, UNSCOM teams were concerned about modified R-11 (Scud B) missiles sold to the Iraqis by the former Soviet Union. Iraqi engineers had stripped down and re-built these Scud missiles, re-fabricating and enlarging component parts to create a weapon capable of a range of up to 650 km and with the ability to carry a large pay-load. Having test-fired one of these DIY "Al Hussein" missiles in 1987, the Iraqis had built six permanent missile sites by 1990.
All six were destroyed by allied air strikes during the Gulf War. The Iraqis claimed in the mid-1990s to have unilaterally destroyed all of the remainder of these missiles. However, they failed to provide any proof they had done so. UNSCOM's concerns were for the remaining missiles and their "al Waleed" towed launchers - capable of being dispersed and concealed countrywide. The fear among UNSCOM personnel was that such weapons could be used to deliver a WMD payload against targets throughout the Middle East.
With a range of 650 km, an "Al Hussein" missile would put Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey, Jordan, Iran and Kuwait within range of Saddam's suspected arsenal of WMDs. The missiles would be notoriously unpredictable. In the absence of a guidance system or homing devices, they would be simply launched on a given bearing and elevation in the general direction of the "enemy".
Irrespective, therefore, of the timing and content of the current IISS report, over the past decade or so, Saddam's regime has amply demonstrated that it is ready, willing and able to engage in the development and use of weapons of mass destruction.
A most worrying development that coincides with the current IISS report is the allegation that Iraq has attempted to purchase strengthened aluminium tubes for use in weapons development. If this allegation is true, it implies that the Iraqis are attempting to employ a gas-enrichment technique to produce weapons-grade uranium.
This would suggest that their nuclear weapons programme is advancing at an alarming pace. If the US and Britain can provide definitive proof that this is the case, it will greatly enhance their campaign for military action against Iraq. If they fail to provide this proof, Saddam may well provide it himself in the very near future - in ways too awful to contemplate.
Tom Clonan, a retired Army officer, currently lectures in the School of Media, Dublin Institute of Technology