The first official statement from the Israeli Prime Minister's Office, issued shortly after the death of President Hafez Assad was confirmed, was carefully worded. Unlike President Clinton, who expressed his sadness at the passing of the Syrian dictator and sent condolences to the grieving relatives, there was no warmth in the words from Jerusalem. Israel merely "understood" the sorrow of the Syrian people, the Prime Minister, Mr Ehud Barak, said - understood it, but, not surprisingly given the three decades of Syrian-Israeli enmity in the Assad era, didn't share it.
Mr Barak's statement went on, however, to note that Israel had tried in the past to make peace with Syria, and was ready to resume the quest with Mr Assad's successor. Shortly afterwards, Israel's Justice Minister went on television to elaborate. Israel, Mr Yossi Beilin said, was "ready to pay the price for peace".
Not any price, he intimated, but a reasonable price.
Would that it were so simple. Israel and Mr Assad's Syria appeared to be on the brink of a full and final peace treaty at the start of the year, with Israel having elected a government that had indicated willingness to relinquish the entire Golan Heights. But although a tentative treaty was drafted, the talks broke down - in argument over the final demarcation of the international border, with Mr Assad holding out for access to the Sea of Galilee, and Israel intent on maintaining its hold over its main natural water source.
Now, with Mr Assad's death, another opportunity for peacemaking has passed. In America, President Clinton, who was ready to offer unprecedented personal involvement in the effort, will be leaving the White House shortly. His successor may have less time and inclination for foreign affairs.
In Israel, Mr Barak is preoccupied with the Palestinians, who are threatening to declare statehood in September whether or not a full peace accord has been attained by then. His coalition is trembling, his popularity faltering. Two weeks ago he safely withdrew the Israeli army from Lebanon, and given that this border has been relatively peaceful since, and that the Israeli-Syrian border is calm, Israelis now feel no particular need to surrender the prized Golan Heights, captured from Defence Minister Hafez Assad in the 1967 war, in return for a peace deal.
And in Syria, an unproven new leader, not even his father's first choice for the job, will have his work cut out holding on to power, keeping the rivals at bay, stabilising a country in trauma, quietening the voices in Lebanon urging that Syria give them back their independence.
Mr Peter Hain, the British Foreign Office Minister who met Assad the Younger in Damascus just a month ago, said in television interviews at the weekend he was "very closely committed to the peace process" with Israel. If so, that would tie in with the image of Bashar as the forward-looking, reformist leader.
But even if true, and even if Bashar can sooner or later free himself from the daily rigours of maintaining domestic control and turn his attention to peacemaking, negotiating an accord will be extraordinarily complex. Most importantly, he will have to somehow demonstrate to his people, and to a closely watching Arab world, that he has engineered a deal no worse than his father could have achieved - a tall order, given that Hafez Assad's maximalist stance meant that an accord was always elusive.
Since Hafez Assad was unwilling to settle for anything less than the entire Golan, right up to and including the north-eastern shores of the Sea of Galilee, Bashar Assad would leave himself vulnerable to massive criticism were he to agree to anything less.
And yet, if he does not agree to something less, he plainly will not reach a deal with the current Barak government in Israel - a government that might not win approval in parliament or from the public were it to cede partial control of the Sea of Galilee.
Bashar's every move will be scrutinised intensely by the guerrillas and political leaders of Hizbullah in Lebanon, and their masters in Iran. Assad snr shrewdly used Hizbullah to fight a war by proxy against Israel. He carefully controlled the flow of Iranian arms to the guerrillas via Damascus, and reined in Hizbullah attacks on Israeli soldiers when appropriate, nodded assent for greater activity when deemed necessary.
By pulling Israel's troops out of Lebanon two weeks ago, Mr Barak shattered the status quo, and the pressure will immediately be on Bashar Assad to formulate a new strategy. In the short term, he will have to decide: does he prevent Hizbullah attacks on Israel, or encourage them, deepen Syrian ties with Iran, or weaken them?
Unsure of his own position, keenly watched by neighbouring states with leaders far more experienced and skilled than he is, confronting a shaky Israeli government, and with the US shifting between presidents - for Bashar Assad, this does not add up to a prime circumstance for peacemaking. The much-vaunted "window of opportunity" for Israeli-Syrian reconciliation, for now at least, would appear to have closed.