Iraq's factions prepare to elect first full-term assembly

IRAQ: While turnout is hard to predict, voting is likely to be along ethnically divided lines, writes Michael Jansen.

IRAQ: While turnout is hard to predict, voting is likely to be along ethnically divided lines, writes Michael Jansen.

Iraq's voters go to the polls today for the third time this year.

This time, they are set to elect the first full-term national assembly since the fall of Saddam Hussein. More than 7,000 candidates grouped in 200-odd parties and coalitions are standing for 230 elected seats. Deputies will be elected by proportional representation in the country's 18 provinces rather than the single national constituency adopted for the election to the outgoing transitional parliament.

Voting is likely to be along ethnic and confessional lines, with most casting their ballots for candidates recommended by religious and tribal leaders. Forty-five deputies will be appointed to represent small parties which do not pass the threshold or large entities with mass support.

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Turnout is uncertain. Of the 15 million potential voters, only eight million cast ballots in last January's election for the transitional assembly. Few members of the Sunni community, 25 per cent of the populace, participated in that consultation. However, many did take part in the constitutional referendum in October, boosting the number of voters to 10 million.

Violence spiked during the final days of the hard-fought campaign. Candidates and party workers were killed and party headquarters set on fire in incidents which might have been committed by either rival camps or insurgents.

Insurgents attacked police stations and army recruitment centres. Muslim militants kidnapped 13 foreigners - six westerners, six Iranians and one Egyptian - and murdered two. Iraq's borders were sealed, universities and schools closed, and a curfew was imposed throughout the country. Salam Pax, the blogger who made a name during the post-war period, observed, "It's like we're going to war not to the ballot boxes", comparing the situation with the run-up to the 2003 US invasion.

This election is going ahead while Iraq is being torn apart by two wars. The first is a war between 40 anti-"occupation" factions and US-led forces and their Iraqi allies. The second is a civil conflict between Sunnis and Shias, on one hand, and Arabs and Kurds, on the other. These two wars, which are devastating Iraq and preventing reconstruction, are likely to be exacerbated rather than diminished by the election - whatever its outcome.

Anti-US forces are certain to step up attacks on the assembly and government to deny legitimacy to the US-backed regime while intercommunal rifts and tensions rise. The casus belli between the country's ethnic and sectarian communities could be Sunni and secular demands for amendment of the controversial constitution adopted by referendum in October.

The transitional parliament, dominated by the Kurdish bloc and the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) - a coalition of Shia religious parties - produced a document that met the demands of separatist Shias and secessionist Kurds for regional autonomy.

Sunnis, secularists, Turkomen and Christians protested these provisions and have been promised changes in the constitution once a full-term parliament is installed. How parliament deals with the constitution could determine if there will be all-out civil war or a tetchy modus vivendi between the communities.

The assembly's attitude could be determined by its composition and alliances formed by the competing blocs. Pundits predict the UIA will secure 110 to 115 seats, Kurds 50 to 55, Sunnis 55, former premier Ayad Allawi's party 30, and former US favourite Ahmad Chalabi's list five.

The UIA and the Kurds could once again get together, but this is not certain, particularly since the UIA has not only split but has also lost the blessing of Supreme Shia Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani - who expressed disappointment with the performance of the UIA-led transitional government.

The UIA is divided, on one hand between Dawa, the party of transitional prime minister Ibrahim Jaafari and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, which are backed by the US and Iran, and, on the other hand, the organisation of Muqtada al-Sadr, the rebellious Shia cleric who opposes the US presence and Iranian intervention in Iraq's affairs.

Mr Chalabi and other high-profile Shia figures defected and formed their own small parties. Mr Allawi, a secular Shia who may now have Washington's backing, is challenging both the UIA and Mr Chalabi.

Four Sunni blocs are competing - the Iraqi Consensus Front, the Iraqi Islamic Party (an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood), the Iraqi National Dialogue Front, and the Liberation and Reconciliation Front. Sunni tribal leaders say Sunnis are determined to both vote and fight to obtain their rights. The influential Association of Muslim Scholars is not fielding candidates but has urged Sunnis to cast ballots.

The Kurds are standing again as a single front but the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the parties that have run Kurdish politics for decades, have lost considerable popular support and could face a boycott by young voters.

If the assembly adopts a flexible stand on the formation of autonomous federal regions in the north and south, Iraq could avoid all-out civil war pitting federalist Shias and Kurds against those who want a unified Iraq.

Whatever happens US president George Bush and British prime minister Tony Blair are bound to proclaim the election a victory for democracy and begin to pull out some troops to assuage growing domestic discontent with the war.

Washington has signalled it will draw down from the current deployment of 160,000 to a basic commitment of 138,000, while Britain is withdrawing troops from the south so it can take over the Afghan military operation. The reduction, however, could hasten all-out civil war.

US-trained Iraqi forces - which are gradually assuming a lead role in fighting insurgents - consist of Shia and Kurdish militiamen loyal to communal parties rather than the state. A drive by these elements to impose Shia-Kurdish rule and regional structures on Sunni and other opponents is certain to sustain the cycle of violence.