Like a 19th-century colonial scramble in Africa, the race is now on between NATO and Russia about whose troops will enter Kosovo first, and under what conditions. Both sides are trying to avoid a direct confrontation. But, almost regardless of how the dispute between Moscow and the West is resolved, it is clear that the fight for control over the Balkans is just beginning.
NATO may have won the war - it could still lose the peace.
From the start of the operation, Western governments knew that they were likely to encounter stiff Russian opposition. NATO's calculation was that this could be overcome: faced with an accomplished fact, Moscow may huff and puff but, especially since the Russians remain in dire need of Western financial assistance, not much else was likely to happen.
Until now, the West's assumptions were vindicated. Apart from a brief moment when President Boris Yeltsin referred to the possibility of a "third world war", the Russians have understood that their best chance to influence events in the Balkans is by co-operating with, rather than confronting, the alliance. The snag was that the Kremlin wanted to wrest some compromises on issues in which NATO governments saw no room for manoeuvre.
Away from the media's limelight, therefore, a complicated diplomatic pirouette developed. The rules of the game were rather simple. At every stage, the West made a compromise on paper, got the Russians to agree on a common position, and then startled Moscow immediately thereafter by maintaining that Russia simply caved in to NATO's demands.
The alliance's war aims were unacceptable to President Yeltsin. They were watered down into a joint communique from the foreign ministers of the G8, and the moment Russia accepted them the communique was presented in the West as nothing more than enshrining NATO's original position.
Russia's objections on the international force which will police Kosovo received a similar treatment. First NATO insisted that it should be the only provider of troops in the province.
The alliance then relented by accepting that the Russians and other nations also had a role to play, provided the force was to be commanded by NATO. After long discussions the principle was accepted that NATO would provide the "core" of the Kosovo operation under a unified command, but operating within the framework of a UN resolution.
Yet the UN Security Council resolution was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which authorises enforcement measures in the Balkans. NATO quickly interpreted this resolution as a blank cheque allowing the alliance not only the sole command of the force, but also the ability to change the mandate at will, by imposing particular conditions on the Yugoslav military's withdrawal and threatening to resume air strikes if these were not met.
NATO's negotiating tactic was initially successful. However, it has clearly underestimated Moscow's determination to influence Balkan events. Viktor Chernomyrdin, the Russian special negotiator for the region and a former prime minister, was bitterly criticised at home for giving in to Western demands.
He defended himself by suggesting that what Russia had failed to obtain formally, it could still get in practice. The various fudges and double-talk contained in almost any diplomatic document signed over the last week only encouraged Moscow in this belief.
By far the most important Russian interest is to secure a specific patch of Kosovo's territory. As far as Moscow is concerned, the creation of a Russian sector in the province offers two strategic advantages.
First, it would mean a Russian command, which could work alongside that of NATO's, but not be answerable to the alliance. The Russians would therefore be treated as equals, rather than a mere appendix to the alliance operation.
Furthermore, once a Russian sector was created, the option of granting independence to Kosovo without Moscow's approval was precluded; the Russians were therefore guaranteed a say in whatever happens on the ground in the future.
For NATO, however, the creation of a Russian sector will be a disaster. Even if Moscow is co-operative, Albanians would refuse to return to any area controlled by Russian troops, but ethnic Serbs in the province may well seek refuge there.
The result could be a de facto partition of Kosovo, precisely what every Western government pledged to avoid. But, since nobody wanted to refuse the Russian demand directly, NATO resorted to its traditional subterfuge.
Immediately after the UN Security Council resolution was adopted, the alliance announced that it was dividing the province into sectors (or areas of operations), all commanded by its key member-states. The Russians were offered the option of joining any one of these, but on NATO's terms and without the ability of controlling any particular region.
In retrospect, it is now clear that NATO's tactic was misconceived. By publishing a map of its deployments before consulting the Russians, the alliance hoped to present Moscow with an accomplished fact. For Moscow, however, this was the last straw.
So, what appeared only 24 hours ago as a great triumph in East-West co-operation swiftly turned into a military standoff of the kind so familiar in Berlin during the days of the Cold War.
The Russians are still willing to compromise. Despite their surprise move yesterday through Yugoslav territory to the border of Kosovo, they do not have the necessary resources to occupy a zone of the province while risking attacks from the KLA, the Albanians' guerrilla organisation. But the Kremlin is determined to be heard this time, and to dictate the terms of its participation.
The difficulty for NATO is that any deal concluded now will be interpreted either as a climbdown for the alliance, or as a humiliation of Russia. And the danger of a territorial division is real. For the moment, however, the biggest beneficiary from this entire game is President Milosevic of Yugoslavia. He may be militarily defeated, but he has managed to play his favoured Russian card.
And the dictator in Belgrade has shown, yet again, that he can engineer a few surprises.
Jonathan Eyal is Director of Studies at the Royal United Services Institute in London