Journalists are not famous for their instinct of self-criticism. So, when John Keegan, one of Britain's foremost military commentators, admitted last week on the pages of the Daily Telegraph that he was wrong about his comments on the Balkan war, he caused a stir in NATO circles.
Keegan's apology is straightforward: he, together with many other commentators (including this writer), predicted that air strikes alone would not be able to achieve NATO's objectives in Yugoslavia. But exactly the opposite appears to have happened.
After 72 days of sustained bombing, the ruler in Belgrade seemed - at least in principle - to have caved in on all the demands made by the alliance. Assuming that the stalled talks restart successfully, NATO has scored a complete victory from the air, the first clear example in military history of a country which was bombed back to the negotiating table.
The debate about NATO's Balkan campaign is not a sterile academic exercise for, if the idea that air strikes alone can force governments to change their behaviour, an entire new international world order will ensue. Air power can be quickly deployed around the world. Much of the force which hit at Yugoslavia took off from aircraft carriers in the Adriatic Sea, vessels which can quickly be redirected elsewhere.
Highly precise munitions, guided by a world-wide satellite tracking and positioning system, can hit at specified targets anywhere, as the US proved in its attacks on Sudan and Afghanistan recently. NATO, now vindicated by its Balkan victory, remains the most potent military alliance in the world, including no less than three out of the world's five declared nuclear powers.
The alliance has successfully mounted a campaign without explicit authorisation from the United Nations, a thorny issue in any previous war. Add to this Russia's military impotence and China's incomplete status as a world power, and a new global security regime could ensue, in which every dictator will have to think twice before starting to murder his own people.
Grand extrapolations from one single campaign - however successful - are the oldest mistakes military planners can make. Yet such mistakes are often irresistible, since they are appealing to politicians seeking immediate re-election, but also because they tend to telescope history: once the final outcome of a war is known, it is tempting to highlight the correct military decisions, while ignoring the persistent blunders. A closer inspection of the conduct of the Balkans war quickly reveals that, in the end, it was not air power as such which ultimately tipped the balance.
The production of high-precision weapons, such as cruise missiles and "smart" bombs, has clearly been driven by the information revolution and other technological advances. But it was also dictated by the haunting images of the Vietnam war, and the US military's conclusion that ordinary Americans will not tolerate large numbers of casualties. In future confrontations, the Pentagon decided, troops will be kept back, while the entire might of US technological superiority is deployed.
On the whole, these military developments were beneficial for international security. Washington's staggering investment in new technology was critical in persuading Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet leader, that his country would never win an arms race with the west and that the Cold War should therefore be concluded.
The ability to hit any target anywhere around the world also strengthened democracies. Dictators who never cared about human lives were traditionally at an advantage: they could remain in power in the usually safe knowledge that democracies will never have the courage to stand up to them.
Air power and precision weapons have now changed this equation. Theoretically, democracies no longer need to be truly cornered before going to war. They can hit at murderous regimes early, with little fuss and no risks to their own populations. Even if the Yugoslav campaign ended in total failure, Mr Milosevic did not have the ability to export the war to western Europe - air raid sirens were guaranteed to sound in Belgrade, but never in London or Berlin. But this is only a small part of the story.
The reality is that, even for a relatively cost-free operation such as that against Yugoslavia (at least in western human lives), a great deal of consensus-building was necessary. The crisis started in earnest in February last year. Many mediation efforts ensued and many promises were accepted from the same Mr Milosevic whom everyone knew to be a liar and a cheat. Air strikes were first threatened in September last year, only to be aborted by a last-minute frivolous deal which none other than the Americans - those great exponents of air power - negotiated.
Ultimately, 13 months of diplomatic wriggling, hundreds of NATO Council meetings, scores of UN Security Council resolutions and two "peace" conferences were required before the west went to war. Theoretically, cruise missile launch buttons can be pressed at will. In practice, democracies still need consent and public support, and in larger quantities than military planners may assume.
The threat of air strikes did not persuade Mr Milosevic to accept a compromise; the deterrence effect of air power has therefore been negligible. The air campaign was launched in order to avert a humanitarian disaster. Yet again, a failure. Although NATO cannot be blamed for what Mr Milosevic did to his own citizens, it is a fact that air strikes unleashed the biggest humanitarian disaster Europe has known since 1945. "Ethnic cleansing" could not have been bigger if NATO did not intervene; NATO's involvement merely meant that this disaster happened much more quickly and that, at least theoretically, it is now reversible if the refugees chose to return home. The former is hardly an achievement anyone would boast about; the latter may be an achievement in the months to come.
Nevertheless, NATO still argues that it was the damage created by air strikes which ultimately forced Mr Milosevic to accept a deal. Hardly, for the Yugoslav dictator's decision was based on completely different calculations. He realised that this bombardment became the lowest common denominator around which NATO countries maintained their consensus, and could therefore be continued indefinitely. He also noted that preparations for a ground offensive were intensifying, and that soon the west would have all the troops necessary to prise Kosovo from Yugoslavia's control.
Finally, the Russians realised that, if a ground offensive was launched, Moscow will have no influence in the region. President Yeltsin therefore abandoned Mr Milosevic, thereby forcing Belgrade into a deal. In short, the air campaign worked precisely because it was backed by credible diplomacy and the threat of a ground offensive, exactly what all the military commentators, including John Keegan, always argued.
The Yugoslav episode may make democracies more ready to confront future dictators. But they will be foolish to assume that such a confrontation can be conducted only from the air, and that it carries no risks.
The author is Director of Studies at the Royal United Services Institute in London.