Ireland must get in behind the Welsh guns

FRENCH NOTES:Ireland got it tactically wrong in the WRC quarter-final against Wales. They now have the chance to put things right, writes MATT WILLIAMS

A COACH instructing his team to move the defensive line up fast, with the first man tackling low and the second man contesting the ball, is hardly rocket science. Selecting a small player like Shane Williams, away from a big player, like Tommy Bowe, is also not a revolutionary concept.

Asking your team to put three wide passes on every attacking phase is also not original thinking. Yet those are the exact tactics Warren Gatland produced and Wales so brilliantly implemented in the Rugby World Cup quarter-final to defeat Ireland.

Genius? Nah. Innovative? Never. Smart? Abso-bloody-lutely.

A simple plan implemented with total commitment, passion and dedication is more effective than a detailed plan executed poorly.

What has not been highlighted in the recent analysis of Gatland’s effective plan against Ireland is the Welsh accurately predicted the attacking patterns of the Irish team.

One of the greatest military disasters of the second World War was the fall of Singapore to the Japanese. Tens of thousands of Australian troops, heading home from the war in Europe to defend Australia from Japanese invasion, were captured and subsequently killed on “death” marches to the Burmese Railway and the inhumane prison camps of Hellfire Pass.

The British guns on Singapore Island were pointed out to sea and by design were incapable of pointing inland. The Japanese simply predicted the British attack and came over land, behind the guns. The great fortress that was Singapore, deemed impregnable, fell in a matter of hours.

The plan predicted the opposition’s attacking strategy. It was simple, smart and executed with ruthless precision. If you want knowledge of tactics in sport, study battles. They have much in common.

The Irish player evaluation of the attack at the World Cup was that it lacked ambition. This may have been an incomplete assessment of what occurred internally in the team and what elements are required to build an effective attack system for the Six Nations.

Firstly, within the Irish coaching staff at the World Cup, Alan Gaffney did not get the opportunity to have his attacking principles applied to the team. Alan is now happily back in Sydney at the Waratahs, where he started with me all those years ago. However, it was obvious from both team selections and tactics that Ireland’s attacking philosophy and structures were confused. To me it was obvious there was more than one cook preparing the attacking broth. For clarity, the question needs to be asked of the management team: is Mervyn Murphy a video analyst or a coach? Mervyn is an excellent analyst. However, if he is not a coach why is he getting a vote on team selections and why does he have such a strong influence on the policies of the team? There is no doubt there was conflict in this area of the management at the RWC.

Les Kiss has since assumed the responsibility for the team’s “go forward”. Les is a great operator. If he is given free rein with no interference he is well capable of creating a very positive attacking system.

At the RWC Ireland chopped and changed the halves. There was no common philosophy of attack or selection of halves. To me, Eoin Redden and Jonny Sexton give you Leinster’s “go forward”. Conor Murray and Ronan O’Gara give you Munster’s. I can not tell you what is Ireland’s philosophy because it has changed from game to game. The selection of your halves should reflect the tactics of the team. No wonder Gaffers seemed frustrated.

A well-constructed attacking system provides the team with unpredictability, variety and a multilayered system of taking the ball towards your opponent’s try line. As readers of this column will know, in rugby you can only take the ball forward three ways: kicking, mauling and running. Putting it simply, a good system moves the defenders around by kicking behind them, mauling through them and using runners in a variety of ways, including changing the point of attack through exploiting the blindside.

Wales want to tackle your runners. They are the British guns. They can only point one way, so get in behind them. Don’t run into the guns.

Early in the game, deny Wales the opportunity to attack the Irish forward runners, like Stephen Ferris and Seán O’Brien. Take the fire out of the Dragons’ breath by turning the defence around with garryowens and keeping the forwards tied up with mauling.

In the opening minutes in Cardiff last year, Ireland mauled the Welsh pack 20m, before providing quality possession to the backs. Tommy Bowe released Brian O’Driscoll for an excellent try. Incomprehensibly, Ireland did not maul again until the 78th minute, when once again they shunted the Welsh 20m before releasing the backs. If Paddy Wallace passed to an unmarked Keith Earls the game would have been won by Ireland.

Anthony Foley’s coaching influence within the Munster team has brought back one of the most feared weapons in provincial rugby: the Munster maul. This needs to be frequently implemented into Ireland’s “go forward” plan.

Let me smash a rugby myth. “If a team mauls it means they don’t run the ball.” Rubbish. A good driving maul ties up eight defending forwards. The defending team requires a defender on the blindside of the maul, this leaves only five or six defenders across the park. At which point any attacking outhalf with half a brain, and six other backs with a clear plan in their collective minds, is screaming “Give me the ball”.

The only error in mauling is when the forwards hold the ball in the maul too long. If the scrumhalf takes the ball while the maul is still going forward there will be an overlap.

Attacking the blindside as an option has not been exploited enough by Irish halves in recent years. If there are three defenders on the blindside and 10 on the open, why run at the 10? To me, much of the Irish attacking problem has been it is always lateral, therefore predictable. In coaching terms if you can accurately predict what the opposition is going to do you can stop it.

In the latter years of Eddie Jones’s time as Wallaby coach, where their blindside winger stood determined the direction of the second-phase attack. If Lote Tuqiri stood behind Stephen Larkham at 10, they were coming back shortside. If the winger stood outside the centres they were going the same way. The Wallaby attack became predictable.

In the RWC quarter-final Wales predicted and stopped the Ireland’s attacking system.

Over the past 10 seasons, when Ireland have been at their best, pace has made their attack unpredictable. Counter-attacking is where this pace is most readily generated.

Think back to the England game at the Aviva last year when the guests were unable to cope with Jonny Sexton’s quick taps. Eoin Reddan and Sexton changed the point of attack while also kicking judiciously, turning England around. Donncha O’Callaghan’s brilliant chase from a kick put enormous pressure on Foden’s kick, that was fielded by Trimble, who commenced a counter-attack that was the origin of Bowe’s try.

Let’s get this very clear: Wales played really well at last season’s RWC. They should have made the final. They have earned all our respect. However, this week the media placed them on a pedestal, giving them too much credit for Ireland’s poor play last October.

Don’t believe Wales could only name a team until yesterday. If you believe Gatland has been unable to train and plan because of injury, you believe in the Tooth Fairy. Wales will be organised and have a strong plan, but remember what they are doing is not rocket science. A possible Welsh error may have been a recent trip to Poland.

Ireland must re-establish their “go forward” plan and philosophy. There must be a change in tactics, which were so wrong in the last outing against Wales. Let’s hope for an Irish performance of pace and variety to see a return to their unpredictable best.