Worldview: There are reasonable objections to guerrilla war, such as the US faces in Iraq, but occupied people may not be reasonable, writes Col E.D. Doyle
Traditionally, guerrilla warfare has been excoriated by the Great Powers. But those powers employ it when they find it useful.
Rapidly and ruthlessly, Britain propagated guerrilla warfare in Europe, when it briefly found itself in the position of a small country in 1940. Winston Churchill ordered, "Set Europe ablaze." Maj Gen J.F.C. Fuller said that Churchill "poured down from the skies thousands of tons of weapons in order to foster guerrilla warfare . . . brutality begot brutality".
The Special Operations Executive (SOE) was set up to raise, train and equip European resistance movements. Guerrilla actions were seen as just another form of warfare. Gen Donovan's "Office of Strategic Services" (OSS) - later became America's equivalent to SOE.
British officers, some with Irish experience, planned guerrilla warfare in the late 1930s. Some resistance preparations for an occupied Britain would be called terrorism - if used against British occupation elsewhere. Informers and collaborators were to be eliminated. It will be said that resistance by any means to Nazi occupation was justified. Yes, but if the occupiers were St Michael and his angels, British resistance would still be ruthless.
The various special forces pioneered by Britain and copied elsewhere -commandos, SAS, SBS, Chindits, Independent Companies, Popski's Private Army, etc. - were all trained for raids, ambushes, sabotage and assassinations, i.e. guerrilla tactics.
Saddam Hussein's capture may eventually affect guerrilla morale, but guerrillas have often been resilient after serious losses. The French and Polish Resistance survived the losses of Jean Moulin and Gen Rowecki in 1943 (not that I am equating them with Saddam).
Iraqis have some tradition for their current guerrilla actions. In 1920 a small rising spread quickly, aided by a Sunni/Shia rapprochement and despite the efforts of 60,000 British troops. RAF planes were used but the rising lasted four to five months, costing Britain 2,000 casualties and about £100 million. The newly acquired oil justified everything.
Internal politico-tribal trouble in 1935-36 saw less British involvement. Several aircraft were lost and the RAF bombed and machine-gunned "tribesmen" in 1920-32 on average once per month.
Towards the end of the Vietnam War, books like The War of the Flea appeared, arguing that guerrillas were undefeatable. This is not necessarily so - conditions had to be right - and were indeed in Malaya.
In the 1970s, the Norwegian Conflict Studies pioneer, Johan Galtung, suggested some objections to the use of guerrilla warfare at the International Peace Academy in Vienna:
It puts arms in irresponsible and, perhaps, untrained hands, and can foster lawlessness.
It sets a precedent for changing governments by force.
It brings out the worst in occupation forces.
These are reasonable points, but an occupied people may not be reasonable. There was a conflict studies argument that long-standing, if fairly minor, injustices built into a system could provoke an explosion similar to that resulting from imposed, short-term harshness. Many thought guerrilla actions inevitable when occupied or threatened people cannot resist by conventional means.
Before Saddam's capture, Iraqi tactics and co-ordination improved. This continues, though the number of attacks - an important statistic - seem to have decreased.
Some years ago, after study and discussions on resistance during the second World War, this writer concluded that "given modern communications, propaganda and intercept measures, given the ruthlessness of modern torture and brain-washing techniques, accepting the weakness inherent in the materialism of our age, no centralised control of a nationwide resistance effort is likely to survive in a small country". (An Cosantoir, August 1956).
But resistance is still possible. Scattered, autonomous guerrilla bands or control from outside have disadvantages, but have worked.
Iraq's terrain provides little Vietnam-type cover, even among the date palms and vegetation near the great rivers. Beyond these areas there is desert with no cover and murderous sun - up to 50 degrees Celsius in July and August.
Iraq's urban population more than quadrupled in 1960-1990 and Saddam's policies expanded the middle classes. Much action occurs in urban areas.
Private homes are often bungalow-types with considerable distances between them. Really high-rise blocks are uncommon - those with about 10 storeys are more usual. Government buildings are also separated by wide spaces with gardens, guard rooms, etc. Guerrillas could quickly be isolated if attacking or defending such separated structures.
Iraqi resistance organisation is unclear. Is there a cell system?
Bor-Komorowski, the Polish leader, described that system well: "We instructed our people to form groups of five. Each member of a group was allowed to know only his four fellow members, each of them in his turn creating a new group of five.
"In this way the pyramid, with me at the top, was constantly growing. The use of real names was forbidden. We always had to reckon with the danger that any secret might at any moment be revealed under torture."
Polish resistance started early, although poorly supplied and supported from outside. In some ways it was the most successful in Europe. Some centralised control did survive there because Poland was large, with a brave, determined people.
Modern man has outdone the Dark Ages in probing the defences of human dignity and integrity more deeply than ever before. Torture is established, and routine in many countries. The torturers ply their trades, draw their retirement pensions and live out their lives, unhaunted by screams in the dark. And there is always money . . .
Eleven pages in Nigel Hamilton's biography of F.M. Montgomery record the British failure in Ireland, including Maj Montgomery's part in it - and resignation to it. He regretted that the methods of "Oliver Cromwell or the Germans" were no longer acceptable.
Vietnam was largely fought by drafted troops (conscripts). War was never declared. Peacetime conscription is always difficult to sustain in a democracy that has no tradition of it.
Regular troops now operate in Iraq. The war means service to their country, promotions, opportunities to use their training and bigger military budgets.
Apart from internal political effects, a Vietnam-style failure would do immense damage to the US and its army's prestige. The US establishments, civil and military, know this. A premature withdrawal is unlikely.