Familiar tests for new world order

WHEN FORMER US national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski floated the idea in January of a US-China Group of Two (G2) to address…

WHEN FORMER US national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski floated the idea in January of a US-China Group of Two (G2) to address the international financial crisis, tackle climate change, limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and maybe even engage jointly in the Middle East peace process, he gave a name to a theme that would come to be the leitmotifof 2009. It was a tipping point year in which the ascent of China economically and politically made it the indispensable partner. At times, however, it was a reluctant one, challenged to live up to its own Copenhagen mantra, a commitment to global "common but differentiated responsibilities".

As the year closed with Copenhagen’s deeply disappointing climate change agreement, the story of failure to produce a binding deal with clear deadlines was very much the result of the centrality – and the weakness – of G2. As Jake Schmidt, director of the US Natural Resources Defence Fund put it bluntly: “Coming into this conference, it was about 193 countries, and coming out of it, it clearly came down to a conversation between the leaders of those two superpowers”.

British foreign secretary David Miliband characterised the choice facing Europe: “Get our act together and make the EU a leader on the world stage or become spectators in a G2 world shaped by the US and China”.

Analysis of the summit’s failure reflected on that change in the global balance of forces, the disappointing lack of political will among states and deep frustration at the shambolic nature of the UN’s decision-making. That is an issue EU leaders will probably address at their spring summit and one to which the union, having agonised for so long over unblocking internal decision-making gridlock with the passage of the Lisbon Treaty, may bring some light.

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The challenge with which Ireland grappled for the second time in the June referendum – finally and resoundingly to the relief of our partners – is how to reconcile decision-making by unanimity with actually taking decisions. In the end, the partial pooling of sovereignty by embracing majority voting proved acceptable to Europe but is likely to be a step too far for the UN where reform has proved notoriously difficult.

Indeed, Copenhagen resembled in many ways the sorry annual December ritual of EU fisheries talks following which member states vie with each other to claim “victories” over catch limits which are intended to prevent the eradication of fish stocks. These so-called “victories” – or triumphs over science – amount to parochial pandering to special interests over common sense and the common good. China’s foot dragging approach at Copenhagen was precisely that, a thwarting of science and common action in favour of its own shortsighted perception of national interest.

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If 2009 saw the US sidling up to China as its preferred partner in global leadership, it also marked President Obama’s re-commitment of his country to what he called “a new era of engagement” between the US and the world. It was a welcome recognition of global inter-dependence and the limits of US power, exemplified also in his important speech in Cairo which was aimed at breaking the “cycle of suspicion and discord” between the US and the Muslim world. It was rewarded by a Nobel prize, not so much for his achievement as for creating possibilities, and also by a significant shift in popular attitudes to the US around the world.

The Cairo speech also saw an important acknowledgment of Palestinian rights that gave rise, as it proved, to disappointed hopes that the new US administration would prove tougher on Israel under the new government of hawkish Binyamin Netanyahu. The year had opened with Israel’s brutal operation in Gaza and concluded apparently no closer to talks.

Although able to wind down operations in Iraq, Mr Obama has found it necessary to step up US involvement in Afghanistan with an extra 30,000 troops for a war that is fast losing US public support. Widespread fraud in the elections there further undermined its legitimacy. The US appears also to be fighting a proxy war next door in strategically crucial, nuclear-armed Pakistan, with secret raids over the border from Afghanistan on Taliban and Al Qaeda bases, military operations inside Pakistan run by the CIA, and a massive $7.5 billion aid package in the pipeline.

On the nuclear front, the year has seen some progress on North Korea, with its reclusive leadership pledging to return to six-party talks. But the re-election of President Ahmadinejad in Iran’s rigged election has made the prospect of curbing that country’s nuclear programme more difficult. However, the persistence of widespread protests since the election suggests that the regime may be more vulnerable than appears. Mr Obama’s willingness to abandon Bush plans to locate missiles in Europe has given a new impetus to Russian-US talks on reducing missile stockpiles and bodes well for a new treaty.

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Elections in South Africa and Japan marked key transition points in the politics of both countries. Jacob Zuma carries the flag for the next generation of those who overthrew apartheid, while Yukio Hatoyama represents a break from the post-war hegemonic dead hand of the Liberal Democratic Party. A strong supporter of the idea of an East Asia Union, modeled on the EU, he has brought a new dynamic to the possibility of regional integration. And Zimbabwe saw the swearing in to office of Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai in a coalition cabinet involving President Robert Mugabe’s squabbling party. As the year ends, the revolution there remains unfinished.