AS THE sound of gunfire recedes around the Georgian separatist enclaves of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the diplomatic salvoes exchanged by Russia and the US are getting louder. While President Bush was condemning Kremlin "bullying and intimidation" of Georgia yesterday, his counterpart in Moscow, Dmitry Medvedev, was hailing the withdrawal of Tbilisi's troops from both provinces as proof that Russia was the only guarantor of stability in the strategically vital Caucasus region.
And as Mr Medvedev was declaring that South Ossetians and Abkhazians were unlikely ever to be ruled by Tbilisi again, Mr Bush and EU leaders were insisting that the territorial integrity of Georgia was inviolable.
A resurgent Russia has just shown that it will not bow to anyone in its own "backyard". By helping local militia drive Georgian troops from South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and roaming at will across much of Tbilisi's territory, Russia's armed forces made several key points to western capitals on behalf of their political masters. They showed that Kremlin warnings about the wider implications of Kosovo's independence were more than empty rhetoric; that Nato would be entering dangerous territory if it made Georgia a member; and they highlighted the risks of trying to reduce US and EU reliance on Russian energy, by dropping bombs close to a crucial pipeline carrying Caspian Sea oil to Europe via Tbilisi.
It is now impossible to envisage South Ossetians and Abkhazians agreeing to be ruled by Tbilisi. Most South Ossetians want to unite with their ethnic kin in North Ossetia, which is part of Russia. Many Abkhazians, however, demand independence, not union with Russia, and complain they have been forced into Moscow's embrace by the refusal of the EU and US to deal with them or listening only to Georgia's views.
By playing too passive a role in the resolution of the conflicts, and backing to the hilt the often impetuous Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili in all that he did, Washington and Brussels fuelled resentment and reliance on Russia in both breakaway regions. Whoever started the fighting, Georgia has lost and its western allies have surrendered considerable diplomatic and military ground to Russia. Moscow has bloodied the nose of its most troublesome neighbour and sent a clear warning to the world at no cost to itself.
Russia knows that the EU will not stop trading with its main energy partner, and ties with Washington are already poor, especially with plans to build a US missile defence shield in Poland and the Czech Republic nearing completion. But Moscow's game is dangerous and paradoxical. It has supported separatists in Georgia to undermine Mr Saakashvili and his plans to join Nato. However, Russia's fears that Kosovo would create a precedent for other independence-minded enclaves remain, and nowhere more strongly than in the Caucasus.
If Moscow helps Abkhazia and South Ossetia redraw the borders of this volatile region, can it be sure that separatist elements in its own restive Caucasian republics - Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan - will not intensify their own struggle to escape Kremlin rule?