Iraq's constitution-making exercise hangs between nation-building and legitimising a foreign occupation after the national assembly extended its deadline by one week last Monday. There have been several small miracles of clarification and consensus-bargaining which contain the promise that eventual agreement can be found on the issues which profoundly divide its people. And yet the negotiations have been conducted against a background of deepening military resistance - 54 people died yesterday - and in the midst of an utterly dysfunctional regime at the level of everyday economic and social life.
Until these problems are tackled it is understandable that the constitutional effort should be so widely regarded as a way to give the Bush administration cover in its desire for a legitimate transfer of power to a new Iraqi government. As the months go by, it is becoming more and more apparent that the US-led invasion and occupation create and recreate the resistance rather than successfully destroy it. To recognise this is not to diminish or dismiss the constitution-making exercise. But it is to say that artificially-imposed deadlines coming before the basic political and infrastructural conditions which would allow it to proceed are unacceptable. More time is needed for all these tasks. A much clearer commitment and timetable by the US and its allies to disengage and withdraw from their occupation of Iraq would help to create such conditions.
Without this the constitutional drafters face a mammoth task over the next five days to complete their deliberations so that their document can command legitimacy across contending groups who are arguably on the verge of civil war. Nonetheless, the extent of their reported agreement is impressive, showing a definite desire to avoid that outcome. Working by consensus, they have agreed that the country should be called the Republic of Iraq; that Islam should be one source, but not necessarily the sole one, of its laws; that the ethnic, national, linguistic and religious identity of the respective groups must be recognised in the document; and that the country should have a parliamentary rather than a presidential system of government.
Four fundamental issues are unresolved, although the prolonged discussions have clarified and finessed what is at stake. Should Iraq be a federal or a unitary state? What should the precise role of Islam be in legislation, notably in respect of the role of women? Is Iraq an Arab state or a multi-national one? And how should national resources, including oil and water, be distributed?
Federalism is the most difficult of these. While the Kurds demand it to protect their autonomy and while the southern Shias want control over their own region, Sunnis vehemently oppose a system they believe would deprive them of power - all the more so if economic resources are also decentralised. The danger is that, given these cleavages, a deal reached prematurely would unravel and provoke the civil war it seeks to avoid.