Martin Barry (plaintiff) v Fintan Ginnity, Bernard Allen and Nicholas Brennan (defendants); Desmond Rogers (plaintiff) v. Fintan Ginnity, Bernard Allen and Nicholas Brennan (defendants)
Sports law - Disciplinary procedures of Gaelic Athletic Association - Suspensions - Whether breach of contract - Whether application of procedures was fair.
The Circuit Court (His Honour Judge Bryan McMahon): judgment delivered on April 13th, 2005.
The law is willing to allow sporting bodies a good deal of autonomy in regulating their own affairs. Courts recognise that governing bodies of such associations are in a better position to determine how their affairs are to be run and how their disciplinary matters are to be conducted. Care must be taken to ensure that the heavy hand of the law does not weaken the operation of such voluntary bodies or undermine the considerable benefits they bring to society.
A club or association cannot suspend a person who is not a member of a club or of the association.
The Circuit Court so held in dismissing the claims of both plaintiffs for an injunction and damages for breach of contract.
Aaron Shearer BL for the plaintiffs; Michael O'Connell BL for the defendants.
His Honour Judge McMahon began his judgment by outlining the background to the case. By letter dated November 6th, 2003, the plaintiffs were officially notified that they were suspended by the Meath County Board, for 48 weeks and 96 weeks respectively. The decision followed an investigation and a recommendation by a Special Investigation Committee into allegations regarding incidents which came to a head in the players' dressing-room immediately before the All-Ireland Junior Football championship in Nenagh, in July 2003. The suspensions were made under rule 140 of the Official Guide 2001. An appeal by the plaintiffs to the Leinster Council under rule 151 of the Official Guide of the Association was unsuccessful.
The plaintiffs commenced the instant proceedings by way of separate Equity Civil Bills in May 2004. The defendants in both actions were the chairman and secretary of the Meath County Board and the chairman of the Leinster County Board sued in their official capacities. A full defence was filed in each case. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants acted in breach of express or implied terms of contract, in failing to conduct the disciplinary proceedings in a manner that was fair and in compliance with the requirements of natural and constitutional justice. They further claimed that the proceedings were in breach of the association's own rules and by-laws.
Mr Barry had been appointed manager and Mr Rogers appointed selector and physical therapist for the Meath Junior Football team for the season 2002-2003. Mr Rogers was to receive €60 for every team training session he attended. Mr. Barry alleged he was to receive £1,400 for his role but the defendants contended he was to receive expenses only which amounted to €1,400 for the season. These agreements were not in writing. Although all the exact terms may not have been established, the court accepted that the agreements existed and that in so far as the plaintiffs were members of their respective clubs, the rules of the association formed part of the terms.
It was accepted that during the football season concerned a problem arose when some players, including a son of one of the plaintiffs, were named in the panel, when, according to the county board, they were ineligible under the rules as not having played for their club. The decision of the board was made known to the plaintiffs. The defendants allege that an undertaking was given that Mr Rogers's son would not be named on the panel, and that his name would not appear on the official programme for the All-Ireland semi-final. The first and second named defendants attended in the dressing room with the official jerseys before the game and proceeded to distribute the jerseys, refusing to give them to players who were ineligible. Tension began to mount, voices were raised and abusive language was directed towards the first and second defendants. The chairman was pushed to the ground.
The Special Investigation Committee was set up to investigate. A meeting was set up and adjourned on a number of occasions. The committee made its recommendation on October 4th and this report eventually led to the suspensions by the county board. The plaintiffs claimed that the procedures were unfair and not properly applied, and that this was in breach of their contractual terms.
His Honour Judge McMahon said that the Court was only concerned with examining the procedures established by the GAA. in respect of disciplinary hearings to see if they represented an acceptable standard and to see if the rules and regulations were followed and properly applied in the case. Judge McMahon stated that the law is willing to allow sporting bodies a good deal of autonomy in regulating their own affairs. The courts recognise that governing bodies of such associations are in a better position to determine how their affairs are to be run and how their disciplinary matters are to be conducted. Judge McMahon said that there are occasions, however, where the law will intervene to ensure that justice is done, and that minimum standards of fair procedures are observed. If the decision, for example, would have serious consequences for the player or member, the courts are prepared to intervene to prevent an injustice and to insist that an appropriate standard of fair procedures is observed. Clearly, if a player's livelihood is at stake, or if he/she is deprived of the opportunity of competing for a high honour which opportunity might not present itself again or will only be available at some distant date, the court might well be moved to entertain a complaint. Further it should not be thought that the court's vigilance will be activated only when the member's right to earn a livelihood or other economic interest is threatened. "Significant" or "serious" should not be defined only in terms of economic values.
Judge McMahon said that the law will demand a level of fair procedures which are sufficient in all the circumstances to ensure justice for the player or member affected by the decision.
Where an association makes provision for fair procedures and has rules and regulations governing disciplinary action, one can assume that that association acknowledges, ab initio, the seriousness of its disciplinary exercises and the importance of ensuring fair procedures. The association will, of course, be expected to adhere to its own procedural standards in making disciplinary decisions. Failure to do so would be a breach of contract, where a contract exists between a member and the association to which he/she belongs.
Judge McMahon stated he was satisfied that on the facts the decision of Meath County Board was made in a contractual context and was a serious one for the plaintiffs. Having referred to the distinctive features of the GAA, in particular its ethos, aims and objectives and its amateur status, Judge McMahon turned to examine rules 137 to 155 of the Official Guide of the GAA, which deal with disciplinary matters. Judge McMahon found that the rules and regulations governing disciplinary procedures were adequate and satisfactory. There was no inherent deficiency which rendered them inadequate, and they satisfied any contractual term that may be implied that the association would apply fair procedures in dealing with disciplinary matters. The rules provide for sufficient notice to be given of the alleged offences, for an oral hearing and for the parties to call evidence and confront their detractors. Judge McMahon then proceeded to check as to whether the procedural rules were observed by the county board, the special investigation committee and the provincial council.
From the evidence before the court, Judge McMahon said he was satisfied that the procedural requirements were properly observed. The initiating motion to carry out an investigation was properly proposed and passed by the relevant committee. At the first meeting of the special investigation committee the first and second defendants, who were ex-officio members of the committee, indicated that they could not participate, which was clearly a recognition of the principle of nemo iudex in causa sua. Notice was sent in a timely fashion to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs contended they were unaware of the nature of the charges levelled against them. Judge McMahon commented on a letter summoning the plaintiffs to the special investigation committee meeting. He said that while the letter was somewhat clumsily formulated, the letter indicated the matters of concern, the background to the dressing room incident and the dressing room incident itself. As written, it appeared that the special investigation committee was at least going to be concerned with the dressing room incident and it was arguable that that was to be its only concern. Rule 140 of the official guide was specifically mentioned in the letter, which covers "any breach of discipline, for conduct considered to have discredited the association, or for breaches of the association's guidelines or directives". Clearly what was at issue was the refusal of the plaintiffs to obey the county board's directives relating to including the two players considered ineligible in the panel, allegedly failing to honour undertakings given in that regard and confronting two or more senior officials of the county board in a physical and abusive way in the dressing room.
Judge McMahon said he was of the view that there was sufficient specificity in the circumstances. It should be noted that the committee had originally scheduled the meeting for September 1st and that a number of postponements were made at the request of the plaintiffs. In requesting the postponements, the plaintiffs expressed no concern relating to the specificity, or lack of it, of the matters to be investigated. At the meeting on September 29th, the plaintiffs brought with them some players who were also in the dressing room on the day in question, indicating that both plaintiffs clearly appreciated that the dressing room incidents were of major concern to the committee.
The plaintiffs also complained that when they attended on September 29th their solicitor was not given a fair hearing. It is clear from the rules that members attending hearings of the committee are entitled, under rule 142(a) "to be accompanied only by a full member of his club/unit". The rules do not permit legal representation as such at these hearings. This was the reason the meeting broke up on that occasion. Notice of the third meeting scheduled for October 13th was served on the plaintiffs on October 3rd. Mr Rogers said he sent a letter on October 10th seeking a further adjournment. However, the chairman said he first saw the letter at the meeting on the October 13th. The chairman said in evidence he felt Mr Rogers was playing games with, and trying to disrupt, the work of the committee. In the circumstances the meeting went ahead.
Mr Rogers further alleged that he was not given an opportunity on September 29th to tender other players in the dressing room as witnesses. The plaintiffs' solicitor went into the meeting and interacted stridently with the chairman and refused to leave the meeting. The chairman had no option but to adjourn the meeting. The plaintiffs on that occasion had brought other players to give evidence, but because of the disruption caused by the unauthorised attendance of the plaintiffs' solicitor, Mr Rogers lost his opportunity to give his own evidence and have his witnesses heard. Judge McMahon said that the missed opportunity was Mr Rogers's own fault.
Judge McMahon held that the rules of procedure set out in the official guide, governing disciplinary hearings, were properly applied in respect of the investigation and suspension of the plaintiffs. Judge McMahon said that one must expect that laymen applying the disciplinary rules will occasionally do so in a somewhat robust manner. Provided those administering the rules however, do so in a bona fide manner, giving each side a fair opportunity of participating, the onus on members who wish to challenge the findings and decisions is a heavy one. Judge McMahon said that one must be careful that the heavy hand of the law does not weaken the operation of such voluntary bodies or undermine the considerable benefits they bring to society.
Judge McMahon then dealt with Mr Barry's case. Towards the end of his evidence, Mr Barry, to the surprise not only of counsel for the defence but also his own counsel, when asked about his familiarity with the rules of the GAA responded that he was not a member of any club. He asked "How could I be suspended when I'm not even a member?"
Judge McMahon said that Mr Barry was right, the GAA cannot suspend a person who is not a member of a club or of the association, and if it purported to do so in the case of Mr Barry, it did so under a mistake of fact. It followed that the rules of the GAA, and the provisions relating to disciplinary proceedings in particular, were of no relevance to Mr Barry. There was no legal relationship between Mr Barry and the defendants. Mr Barry's contract, to manage the Meath Junior Football team, was merely entered into as a third party to provide a service to the county board for the 2002-2003 season in return for reasonably incurred expenses. The contract terminated by the passage of time when he issued the present proceedings. His whole claim was premised on the assumption that he was a member of the GAA and as such that he had the additional protection of its rules relating to disciplinary matters. Judge McMahon held that in the circumstances, Mr Barry's claim must fail. The only contract he had was completed, and he had been paid. Since he was not a member he had no other legal relationship with the defendants and there was no question of the defendants being obliged to show fair procedures to a stranger. Further, there was no question of damage in being suspended from an association he chose not to be a member of. Even if he were to argue that as a result of the "suspension" he could not now train other teams, he would be faced with the same argument, namely, that this opportunity was closed off to him, not because he was suspended, but because he was not a member. Judge McMahon said he would make a declaration that the county board's attempt at suspension had no effect since Mr Barry was not a member in the first instance.
Judge McMahon said that Mr Rogers's case was different. As well as having an agreement to act as a physical therapist, he was also a member of the GAA in good standing. In his capacity as a member he was entitled to claim that in contemplating disciplinary proceedings, fair procedures must be observed and that, at the very least, the defendants must apply its own disciplinary rules. Judge McMahon said that if Mr Rogers failed to give evidence or call witnesses, it was largely due to his own fault. The defendants tried to accommodate him by agreeing to several adjournments, but Mr Rogers unreasonably passed up the opportunity on September 15th and by bringing his solicitor in breach of the rules to the meeting on September 29th, causing the meeting to be further adjourned, again missed the opportunity to give evidence and call witnesses. Mr Rogers was fully aware of the issues being alleged against him and the reason why he was suspended. In the circumstances there was no breach of contract by the defendants.
Judge McMahon dismissed the claims of both plaintiffs.
Solicitors: Seamus Roe & Co. (Ardee) for the plaintiffs; Liam Keane & Co (Dunshaughlin) for the defendants.
P.J. Breen, barrister