THE SUPREME Court has rejected the State’s appeal against a High Court decision in 2004 that a section of the Mental Treatment Act 1945 is unconstitutional.
The entire 1945 Act has since been replaced by the Mental Health Act 2001 and the issues in the appeal were described by the Supreme Court as “historic”.
The Supreme Court was giving reserved judgment on the State’s appeal against the finding of unconstitutionality of Section 260 of the Mental Treatment Act 1945.
The issue of unconstitutionality was raised in proceedings brought by Louis Blehein, who was involuntarily admitted to a Dublin psychiatric hospital for periods in 1984, 1987 and 1991.
Mr Blehein (66), from Portumna, Co Galway, described yesterday’s judgment as “a vindication of my right to dignity and to be treated like a human being”.
The struck-down section prevented people challenging acts carried out under the Mental Treatment Act unless the High Court decided there were “substantial grounds” to support a claim that acts were carried out “in bad faith” or “without reasonable care”.
In previous hearings, Mr Blehein had claimed he was held against his will and that there was a conspiracy involving the doctors who certified him, gardaí and the hospital, to secure his admission.
In 1984 he was diagnosed as having paranoid schizophrenia and as suffering from paranoid delusions about his wife’s fidelity. Two general practitioners agreed with this conclusion.
The Supreme Court in previous hearings had held that none of the grounds put forward by Mr Blehein in challenging his admission to hospital were “substantial”.
However, in 2004, the High Court upheld Mr Blehein’s argument that Section 260 was unconstitutional, and the Supreme Court yesterday upheld that finding.
Giving the court’s judgment, Ms Justice Susan Denham agreed with the findings of the late Ms Justice Mella Carroll that the limitation of access to the courts on two specified grounds, as provided for in Section 260 – that a person had acted “in bad faith or without reasonable care” – was an impermissible interference by the legislature in the judicial domain, contrary to provisions of the Constitution relating to separation of powers and administration of justice in the courts.
The terms of Section 260 were arbitrary and unfair, she said.
At issue was the liberty of Mr Blehein, an important constitutional right, the judge said.