KOSOVO/Analysis: NATO's current mandate in Kosovo, despite the fact that it defies both logic and local realities, is crucial, writes Jonathan Eyal.
NATO and other European contributing nations have managed to restore a modicum of stability to Kosovo, after the worst bout of ethnic violence since the war in that former Yugoslav province ended five years ago. Yet the events of last week will leave deep scars, and they should serve as a grim reminder of the unfinished business in the Balkans.
Under a UN mandate set up in 1999, the international forces stationed on the ground have achieved a great deal. The persecution of the ethnic Albanians - who form the largest part of the local population - has stopped. Extreme nationalists have been partially marginalised and a relatively peaceful election for a local assembly has taken place. Aid is pouring in, and the administration of Kosovo has noticeably improved. Finally, a local police force came into existence, partly in order to clamp down on the wanton criminality which plagued the territory and partly in order to absorb the various paramilitary organisations which operated during much of the last decade.
But the list of unresolved problems is just as long, and clearly much more important. First, there has been little progress on the return of ethnic Serbs and Roma minorities, forcibly evicted from the province by the Albanians in the immediate aftermath of the war. Furthermore, under the original UN mandate, the international force stationed in Kosovo was meant to facilitate a political dialogue between Albanians and the central Serbian government in Belgrade, to which Kosovo still legally belongs. Nothing of the kind happened, and the result is a curious mixture of fact and fiction. Kosovo is still officially part of Serbia, despite the fact that nobody ever believes that the province could ever return to Belgrade's control. The Kosovars are technically independent, apart from the fact that nobody recognises their legal status. And all pay lip service to the concept of a multi-ethnic Kosovo, while the bulk of the evicted Serbs continue to languish in refugee camps outside the province, and the remaining minorities are subjected to almost daily intimidation. It was this air of unreality which was shattered by the riots of last week.
Kosovo erupted when ethnic Albanians blamed Serbs for the drowning of two children. Albanians set fire to Serb homes and churches. Serbs, in turn, torched Albanian homes and mosques. And violence briefly spread to Serbia proper itself.
It is now evident that the province's worst week in years was partly the result of an orchestrated campaign by extreme nationalists, and partly an outcome of NATO's own mistakes.
The North Atlantic Alliance, which leads the international force on the ground, has simply grown too complacent. It has ignored repeated intelligence warnings about a rising level of tension between Kosovo's communities, and it turned a blind eye to the reappearance of road blocks around isolated Serb hamlets. As a result, NATO was surprised by the eruption of violence and, for at least a day, the province was back in the hands of mob rule. Furthermore, some of the old emergency plans for reinforcing the international contingent have clearly become rusty: although NATO swiftly regained control, it took days before additional troops started pouring in.
Graver still was the fact that, despite a heavy international presence, little was done to control extremist propaganda from the local media. The Albanian-affiliated local television station repeated the lurid tale of the children's murder at the hands of Serbs despite the fact that no evidence of Serb responsibility was ever produced. And the Serb-controlled media quickly replied in kind. In neighbouring Bosnia, where NATO fulfils a similar mandate, great care is taken to ensure a balanced and race-free coverage by the local media. Nothing of the kind was attempted in Kosovo, and the results were predictable.
It is by now pretty clear that the riots, which cost the lives of approximately 30 people and led to the displacement of around 3,200 ethnic Serbs, were largely orchestrated by extremist Albanian elements. Their aim is evident: to force Western governments - and particularly the US which is now much more concerned with Iraq and other global issues - to concede independence for Kosovo.
This is easier said than done. The UN mandate, which still assigns Kosovo to Serbia, cannot be changed, if only because the Russians and the Chinese have only recently reiterated their opposition to the province's independence. Splitting the territory between Albanians and Serbs is equally impossible, without risking further bloodshed and the possible disintegration along ethnic lines of Bosnia and Macedonia.
So, NATO is destined to continue with its current mandate, despite the fact that it defies both logic and realities. Yet this has been the fate of many operations in the Balkans. The least that can be expected is that NATO will perform its job better, and that - at the very least - people will stop dying violently. This narrow task may be frustrating or unglamorous for an alliance which has recently been toying with the idea of policing Iraq, on top of its current operation in Afghanistan. But Kosovo is a reminder that NATO's primary business remains that of providing security in Europe itself.
The author is director of studies at the Royal United Services Institute in London