Using the civilian population as a form of human shield and city streets forcover, the Republican Guard could force the US into bloody urban warfare,writes Dr Tom Clonan
'No president can easily commit our sons and daughters to war' - President George Bush, January 16th, 1991.
Could history be repeating itself? There is currently a major debate about a possible large-scale military intervention against Iraq by the US and its allies. Media speculation was heightened in July when a secret Pentagon report detailing invasion plans for Iraq was leaked to the New York Times.
The plans, purportedly outlining a land, sea and air assault on Iraq, implied the involvement of up to 250,000 US troops. This would indicate an offensive similar in scale to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm executed by Coalition forces in 1990 and 1991.
Hawks in the US administration are calling for a pre-emptive strike against Iraq on the basis that Saddam Hussein is developing and stockpiling weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). This fear was reinforced this week in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee given by Mr Richard Butler, former chairman of the UN weapons inspections mission in Iraq and Iraqi weapons expert Mr Khidir Hamza.
With access to the full range of WMDs including nuclear, chemical and biological agents, Saddam is considered a loose cannon with an arsenal of mass destruction. Doves in the US administration and in Europe advocate a strategy of containment and sanctions for dealing with Saddam.
However, based on recently acquired intelligence estimates, CIA Central Intelligence director Mr George Tenet has advised President Bush that the only decisive way to deal with Saddam is by means of a large-scale invasion. The CIA estimation of the situation rules out selective bombing, covert action or an internal coup as a means of resolution.
In terms of scale, the US would therefore seem set to commit up to 250,000 troops to Iraq. This would appear to contradict the notion of a smaller, more selective "inside out" invasion of which there has been some speculation in recent days.
This "inside out" operation would involve the use of lightly armed airborne troops to seize strategic objectives in major cities such as Baghdad and Basra. For such an operation to succeed, it would require the spontaneous collapse of Saddam's regime and universal support from the Iraqi civil and military authorities.
From a conventional military perspective, a large force with armour and close air support would be required to topple the regime and secure Iraqi territory "post-Saddam" until the establishment of an interim authority. In terms of timing, the present day scenario, a hypothesised invasion of Iraq, is similar in many ways to the situation facing the Bush administration in August 1990. It took the US and its allies approximately six months to concentrate their forces in sufficient numbers to take on the Iraqi military. This period of time would be required today for coalition building with potential allies and the evolution of a coherent system of command and control.
That would imply an offensive in the spring of 2003. This timescale would also marry with President Bush's possible desire to postpone any hostilities until after congressional elections in November. A sensitive problem facing the US and its allies lies in finding territories within which to concentrate and format an invasion force. The Arab League and King Abdullah of Jordan are among others this week to have voiced serious concern at rumours of an Iraqi invasion. The US may well look to Turkey for assistance in this matter. Earlier this year, the US military participated in a war-gaming exercise with the Turks.
The scenario was based on the invasion of a fictitious country called "Amberland" - a country neighbouring Turkey suspected of developing weapons of mass destruction. The US may also use Qatar as a staging point for invasion. It currently warehouses a full armoured brigade for the US and the Bush administration are at present spending up to $1 billion on developing an air command and control centre there.
In terms of the air war, the US and its allies will have almost total air superiority. This is due in part to the decimation of the Iraqi Air Force during the Gulf War. At present, the Iraqis are estimated to have approximately 250 attack aircraft of which about half are serviceable. Air superiority has also been assisted by the existence of the "No-Fly Zones" policed by the British and Americans over Iraq since 1991. These operations have generated a high operational and intelligence yield for the US. The constant patrolling of this airspace coupled with frequent "enemy" engagements since 1999 has afforded US and British pilots invaluable familiarisation and combat flight-time over Iraq. It has also seriously inhibited the deployment of Iraqi troops and equipment in these areas. These factors coupled with the serious degradation of Iraqi air defence systems in these zones has led to the creation of "battle space" or room for manoeuvre for any potential coalition force.
The regular Iraqi army has approximately 450,000 troops. It is believed that the vast majority of these are poorly trained and equipped. During the Gulf War, up to 80 per cent of regular Iraqi troops deserted in the face of allied forces. Current military planners would therefore be hoping for the early collapse of these forces in the field.
The main threat from Iraqi ground forces would come from the Iraqi Republican Guard - numbering approximately 100,000 troops. Having learned from the Gulf War - for the most part fought in open desert - it is likely the Republican Guard would be withdrawn into major cities to mount a last-ditch defence of Saddam's regime.
Using the civilian population as a form of human shield and city streets for cover, the Republican Guard could force the US and its allies into bloody urban warfare. This scenario would present a difficult prospect for both US troops and the civilian population. For the US military, the concept of urban warfare evokes unhappy memories of the disastrous running battles in Mogadishu in Somalia in 1993.
For the civilian population, the nature of urban warfare would mean large numbers of Iraqi casualties. This would seem all the more likely given Saddam's appetite for "human shields" and a total disregard for the welfare of the ordinary Iraqi population.
In the final analysis, the US along with allies such as Britain have the capability to concentrate forces for the invasion of Iraq. The question being asked in the US at the moment is: "Can we afford to invade Iraq?" The fiscal cost will be high for the US.
However, with a defence spend of up to $370 billion, or approximately 40 per cent of world defence spending, the US can afford such an operation. The human cost may be higher. In order to justify sending its "sons and daughters" to Iraq, the US will have to prove the potential threat posed by Saddam's weapons of mass destruction. Perhaps then, the US and its allies will be asking: "Can we afford not to?"
Dr Tom Clonan is a retired Army officer. He specialises in the Political Economy of Communication in the School of Media, DIT