Despite an intensive diplomatic phase, the outcome will still be a war against Iraq, probably at the end of this year, writes Jonathan Eyal. Iraq knows that a war is coming; only the actual shape of the operations is in doubt
Almost everyone inside the US administration has been leaking this week one supposed plan or another about the impending war on Iraq. Depending on the source, the US action would consist of either 10,000, 50,000 or even a quarter of a million soldiers or no soldiers at all. And, depending on whom one believes, the war would either start in October or in December or early next year.
As always on such occasions, the usual cacophony of retired military commanders and armchair strategists resurfaces: one day the war is guaranteed to be a disaster; the next day someone "proves" that it will result in the most brilliant and, of course, cost-free victory.
The reality however is much more prosaic: although President Bush is determined to remove Saddam Hussein from power, the method and timing of the military operation has not been decided.
Despite the martial tones now emanating from Washington, the White House is more concerned at this stage with waging psychological warfare against Saddam and with preparing the diplomatic grounds for the operation, rather than with the actual movement of troops and equipment.
Just like during the Gulf War a decade ago, Iraq knows that a war is coming; only the actual shape of the operations is in doubt. Yet, paradoxically, not having the benefit of a strategic surprise still gives Washington a key advantage.
The US does not need to hide its broad intentions; it merely needs to keep the Iraqis guessing as to when and how the attack would begin. Encircled and economically exhausted, there is a limit to how long the Iraqis can remain on high alert and there is precious little that they can do further to enhance their defences.
The steady stream of leaks from Washington drains Iraqi resources at little cost to the Americans. It also offers the White House two further benefits, by concentrating the minds of both allies and potential enemies on the impending struggle.
Contrary to the widespread view in Europe, Washington is not full of Texan sheriffs eager to shoot from the hip. The same administration painstakingly put together the coalition of countries for the war in Afghanistan and is acutely aware that a similar effort is needed today.
Much has already been achieved behind the scenes while the freelance strategists debated the war. In the last few weeks alone, the US tried to secure Turkey's crucial support for the operation by promising that no Kurdish state would be created from the rubble of Iraq, a critical reassurance. Washington also started talking to the Russians, and is engaged in an intensive discussion with the Europeans. Other, more concrete steps are also under way.
These include the chartering of various ships, prospecting military bases in a few Balkan countries bordering the Black Sea (for a potential movement of troops to Iraq's north) and a steady build-up of US strategic oil reserves, in order to ensure stability on the energy markets once a war begins. All these efforts are in their infancy, but the reality remains that the most substantive steps for the moment have been taken precisely in the diplomatic field.
Of course, the strategy of pretending that a massive military action is imminent does carry some risks. Bush fully expected the outpouring of criticism in Europe; he may have been surprised, however, by the fact that his own Congress and particularly the Democratic-controlled Senate has started formal hearings on the subject. He was also served another warning when the Senate failed last Thursday to approve his request to use emergency funds from the US budget for a future Iraqi war. Furthermore, the avalanche of leaks and contradictory statements from US officials can give ordinary Americans the impression that their administration is divided and hesitant, just as it has been over the current economic crisis in the US.
But even here, there are some advantages to be derived from the current bluster. For the first time since the UN inspectors were kicked out of Iraq four years ago, Saddam Hussein has now expressed a willingness to talk again about their return. Nobody in Washington is under any illusion that this Iraqi initiative is just a ruse, yet it may be a ruse in which Bush may well engage, while he continues preparations for the real operation.
The administration has now realised that its own chance of silencing its critics both inside and outside the US depends on dispelling the widespread perception that the campaign against Iraq is just a war of choice, rather than immediate necessity. No evidence has ever been produced about Iraq's links with Osama bin Laden or international terrorism.
Nor has the information hitherto released about Iraq's efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction been particularly persuasive. Few people in the world are enamoured with Saddam Hussein, but quite a few believe that Bush is unnecessarily obsessed with this man, and for no other reason than just a desire to avenge the supposed mistakes of his father a decade ago.
Dispelling these notions requires another major diplomatic effort from the US; simply put, the current leaks about war plans are designed to create the momentum for a political crisis, to be followed by a last-ditch mediation attempt and then the inevitability of war. In purely military terms, the US does not need the assistance of any other military power in the world. For political reasons, however, Washington would dearly like to have a few partners, and Britain is probably the chief candidate for this role. The British military contribution is likely to be small, but its diplomatic significance will be considerable.
A British refusal to contribute troops will be widely interpreted as a major political defeat for Bush. It would also encourage the French and the Germans to criticise the US operation publicly and this, in turn, may embolden the Russians to create some mischief as well. Conversely, if British troops do take part in an offensive on Iraq, other European countries would either be tempted to be involved as well, or at least abstain from any public criticism; this was the history of the coalition-building process for the war in Kosovo and for the operations in Afghanistan last year.
The snag for the Americans is that for the first time since he came to power, Tony Blair, the man who placed the military at the heart of Britain's foreign policy, is in serious difficulties over Iraq.
For years, many influential members in Blair's Labour Party were privately shocked by what they saw as the Prime Minister's slavish following of any US policy but had to keep quiet. After all, it was impossible to criticise a decision to stop ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia and even more difficult to fault Blair's personal determination to fight the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Iraq, however, remains a different proposition and one on which Blair's critics are determined to make a stand.
The reasons are partly psychological: this is a war which, in the eyes of the British left, was started by the hated Margaret Thatcher and Bush the father, supposedly to defend oil-rich Arabian sheiks; the idea that a Labour Prime Minister should continue this project infuriates many. There is also a practical argument: this is a confrontation without a clear strategy and without an evident, realistic outcome, and it happens to coincide with a more general backlash against Blair within his party.
Blair added to his difficulties by failing to understand such crucial differences between his previous successful campaigns and the military adventure facing Britain now.
Initially, he assumed that the Iraq crisis could be handled in his traditional manner: direct consultation with the Americans and the secret promise of troops without even consulting the British public. But it quicklybecame apparent that this method no longer works. Both serving and retired British officers now criticise the military options, and at least one of Blair's cabinet ministers has threatened to resign. The British Prime Minister is, therefore, in a bind; the only way out is to persuade public opinion of the necessity of this war by claiming that all diplomatic options have been exhausted. The Americans, for their own reasons as well as in order to help the British, are likely to oblige.
Everything therefore points out to an intensive diplomatic phase in the months to come. This is unlikely to change the outcome which is still a war probably at the end of this year but may well change public perceptions both in Europe and the US. For, as Bush himself knows only two well, while a success in battle does not guarantee re-election, a military failure guarantees electoral defeat. The US administration is likely to be much more careful than the bluster currently emanating from Washington may lead us to believe.
Dr Jonathan Eyal is Director of Studies at the Royal United Services Institute in London