Recurring violence in the summer of 1970 led the newly elected Conservative government to consider declaring Northern Ireland an independent entity, left to sink or swim as best it could.
According to Cabinet papers released by the Public Record Office in London yesterday, Mr Edward Heath's government was deeply concerned about escalating violence during the "marching season".
On June 23rd, 1970, the new prime minister told his Cabinet that his government's commitment to the integrity of Northern Ireland could not be doubted. A new Conservative administration should calm Protestant apprehensions, reduce tension and "present us with an opportunity of making a fresh start, which we should exploit to the full".
By July 9th, however, a secret briefing note from the Cabinet secretary, Sir Burke Trend, to Mr Heath, was using a different tone with regard to Northern Ireland. The Cabinet secretary told Mr Heath that, broadly speaking, there were only two options open to the government.
One was "to wash our hands of the whole business, which would mean in effect declaring that Northern Ireland was no longer part of Her Majesty's dominion but was an independent entity which must be left to sink or swim as best it could".
Recognising the major constitutional and political implications of such a move, Sir Burke observed that one certain fact would be an attempt by Dublin to take control of Northern Ireland and an appalling new civil war would break out.
This solution, therefore, had always been rejected. Nevertheless, it might become necessary for this government to consider it again, if only to reject it once more, he said.
The second option was a form of direct rule from London with the suspension of the Stormont parliament and the transfer of legislative authority to Westminster.
The growing crisis in Northern Ireland during the summer of 1970 prompted a British embassy official in Dublin to inform the Foreign Office in London of his strong impression that the then Taoiseach, Mr Jack Lynch, and minister for external affairs, Dr Patrick Hillery, were terrified their government would fall and civil war would break out. Any deterioration of the situation in Northern Ireland caused by the annual Orange parades could topple Mr Lynch's government, the official warned.
In a secret memo, dated July 6th, 1970, the official also noted that arms searches in Catholic areas, particularly the Falls Road, were seen as a serious hazard for Dublin and therefore should be balanced with similar operations against the UVF.
The following day, July 7th, Mr Lynch wrote to Mr Heath urging the implementation of reforms in Northern Ireland and the cancellation of Orange parades. Expressing his concern that parades through sensitive areas in Northern Ireland were provocative, Mr Lynch told Mr Heath he did not believe those parades fell into any reasonable definition of the exercise of normal civil rights.
A series of memos exchanged between the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in May and June of 1970 discussed the searches of ships in an anti-gun running operation off the coast of Northern Ireland. The MoD accepted the FCO view that with the recent pressure on Dublin, searches of ships, including Irish-registered vessels, should only be carried out in the event of specific intelligence or strong suspicion.
The memos revealed that several Irish ships searched were not, in fact, specifically carrying illegal arms, but were included in a general search in UK territorial waters through which they were passing. It was suspected that arms were being smuggled into Ireland and the sweeps were arranged to coincide with similar measures on land by the RUC and British army.
The Irish ambassador to Britain, Dr Donal O'Sullivan, expressed his concern over the searches in a meeting in June with the British foreign secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home. The ambassador was told that London could not have its hands tied on the issue, but Dr O'Sullivan asked if it would be possible to inform Dublin in advance of the searches. He made the point that evidence of gunrunning activities should be acted upon promptly and expressed the hope that Sir Alec would not allow anyone to suspect that Dublin was asking that he pull his punches when evidence of gun-running was discovered.