THE building of the Supertram light rail system in Sheffield caused four years of fierce debate, public opposition and traffic chaos.

At the centre of the controversy was Mr Peter Gross, planning manager of South Yorkshire Supertram Ltd, the person responsible for the consultation process between the company and the Sheffield public.

"It was," he says, looking out the window of his city centre office, "a difficult three to four years, to say the least."

He smiles ruefully and settles into telling the story. It begins back in the mid-1970s, with a plan to deal with traffic congestion and the environment. Dates, further plans, the abolition of the South Yorkshire Council by the Thatcher government, the deregulation of public transport, all follow and the long, complex history rolls off his tongue, perfectly structured, told without notes.

The construction of the 26 kilometre system, which has three lines which meet in the city centre, occurred in eight phases. It began in August 1991 and ended in October 1995. In each case, the section of roadway concerned was first cleared of underground utilities - gas, telephone lines, sewages pipes and then laid with rail line.

"The main impact was in the city centre and in Hillsborough, where the streets are relatively narrow," he explains.

It was calculated that there were 3,000 frontages onto the tramway route and the residents or businesspeople in each premises were contacted and consulted prior to the beginning of the construction process. In all, over 10,000 people were involved, and records were kept of every meeting.

"We questioned people about parking, loading, access for the disabled. The information was collated and sent back to the people, so they could correct any points that were wrong. Then the information was sent to the design engineers."

For each stretch of the proposed line, colour plans were drafted showing how the area would be changed, and how traffic flow would be affected. The plans were then put on display in each neighbourhood, in manned exhibitions.

A series of meetings were held with local residents and businesspeople. "I must have attended around 500 public meetings between 1991 to 1994," he says. £1 million was spent on the consultation process.

The utilities were removed from underneath the planned route of the track so that, for instance, a gas leak would not lead to the trams being halted.

The contractors for each utility could not work at the same time, so one contractor would dig a hole, move the pipes or whatever, then fill in the hole again. Then the next contractor would come along. "So we needed temporary traffic management. To be honest it wasn't done very well. The utility contractors were working for us, but we couldn't control them." The biggest initial mistake was having a series of different traffic diversions. It was realised after a time that the best strategy was to decide on one, and then stick to it. In this way people learned the new routes, and that was that.

"If we were doing the whole thing again, we would find a way to have more control over the statutory undertakers," Mr Gross says, referring to the utilities companies.

Work on one phase of the line was held up when it was discovered that a section of the road ran over what was once a graveyard. The process of moving the pre-1880 remains took six months. "I'd advise the Dublin planners to check the size of graveyards in older maps, in case they once existed where there is now a road."

Dozens of liaison groups were set up to deal with the businesses and residents along the different sections of the line. In theory, everyone knew who to telephone if they had any problem with the construction process, or the traffic diversions operating.

The public were invited to contact Mr Gross if the system was not working to their satisfaction. "I didn't get death threats but it came close," he says.

For the laying of the lines, streets were divided down the centre and tracks laid on one side of the street while the other was left open,

In some areas the whole process took only six to nine months, but in others, such as some city centre areas and the Hillsborough area, it took two years or more.

"I am a realist. It caused an awful lot of trouble to people at times but it was the best solution we could come up with. From an engineering point of view, it all worked extremely well."

Mr John Taylor, chief executive of the Sheffield Chamber of Trade, says it is difficult to estimate how many concerns went out of business because of the Supertram construction process, rather than other factors. There was a bad recession at the time. In addition, the 1.2 million square metre Meadow Vale shopping centre opened in 1990 and about one-quarter of city centre business moved there.

Nevertheless, he says about 80 businesses went bust in the Hillsborough area because of Supertram "and a few others here and there". He would not disagree with the figure of six for the West Street area.

"But you have to remember it is the biggest transport operation to be built since the war." Mr Taylor believes that eventually Supertram will be good for business.

At present the system is getting less than half the number of passengers envisaged and is losing money. The government wants to sell it but there is an ongoing dispute about whether the central exchequer or local councils in the Sheffield area should take for Supertram's £130 million sterling debt. (The system cost £1 million to build, and came in on budget.)

What is needed, Mr Taylor believes, is a more competitive pricing system, integration with the local private bus companies, and an improved park-and-ride system, to encourage people to park their cars and take the tram instead.

When the system is running successfully, it will be good for business for those traders located along its route, Mr Taylor believes.

His advice to Dublin traders is not to keep changing the traffic management system during the process of construction, and that if the choice arises, put the emphasis on ease of access rather than ease of egress.

Mr Jeff Robertson, manager of the Orchard Square shopping centre in Sheffield city centre, has a similar view.

"The system is technically excellent, clean, comfortable, relatively fast and quiet."

The construction period was "horrendous", he says, and his centre lost about 6 per cent to 7 per cent of its "pedestrian footfall". The disruption of established pedestrian flow is now over and business is close to being back to what it was before the construction process began.

"It could be another two to two-and-a-half years before we start to see the real benefits of the systems" he says.