Ireland joined the EEC, as it then was, in January 1973. This is one of a series of articles exploring our evolving relationship with the European Union – and its past, present and future
When Ireland joined the European Economic Community 50 years ago, the implications for Irish foreign, security and defence policy were marginal in a debate which centred on economics. While opponents of EEC entry argued that membership undermined neutrality, advocates insisted that the treaties contained nothing that contradicted it.
Since then, Ireland’s position as a “neutral” in the European Union has bedevilled Ireland’s domestic politics towards the EU and has contributed modestly to some of the challenges faced by the EU in crafting its own policy. It is, in a sense, a dog that never actually barked – but growled on occasion.
On the face of it, Irish foreign policy is a perfect fit for a bloc that focuses on human rights, development and defending the multilateral order and the United Nations. Ireland’s ambivalence towards all things military was also comfortable in a Europe incapable and unwilling to provide for its own defence. Ireland’s position only rarely surfaced as an issue of controversy – and almost always in a domestic political context. The first attempts at formal European foreign policy co-operation were delayed by Ireland’s late ratification of the Single European Act in 1986. This was caused by the decision of the Supreme Court that this new field of European co-operation had not been endorsed by the Irish people in joining the EEC and required its own, specific, democratic mandate.
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This created both a precedent for Irish referendums on European treaty change and a recurring domestic political drama. Ever since, Ireland’s EU treaty debates (Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon) have each featured a seasonal pantomime surrounding neutrality and defence. Opponents have repeatedly declared the imminent death of neutrality while advocates have insisted that neutrality remained immaculate.
The defence of Ireland’s critical IT, energy, cyber and other infrastructures, as well as its skies and its territorial seas relies, essentially, on the kindness of strangers
These periodic Punch and Judy shows have had some concrete consequences. To assuage public anxiety, dedicated EU treaty protocols and formal EU council decisions have defined the parameters of Ireland’s EU defence engagement. Article 29.4.9 of the Constitution was also amended to create a cast iron constitutional barrier to Irish participation in an EU common defence.
Remarkably, these sporadic and intense domestic debates never translated into a serious national conversation on defence. Last year’s report of the Commission on the Future of the Defence Forces could confidently declare that Ireland does not possess the capacity to defend itself. Ireland has the lowest defence spending of any of the EU27 and is ranked at about 150th internationally. This means that the defence of Ireland’s critical IT, energy, cyber and other infrastructures, as well as its skies and its territorial seas relies, essentially, on the kindness of strangers.
Within Europe, Ireland’s position has been visible but has had limited impact on EU defence debates. Europe struggled to reconcile dedicated Atlanticists, led by the UK, and convinced Europeanists, led by France. The former placed an absolute premium on Nato, while the latter sought to strengthen Europe’s own defence capacity. Ireland sheltered comfortably below the radar of these debates in the 1990s and early 2000s, working in concert with other new non-Nato EU partners. Irish policy makers also presented Ireland as a constructive and active partner on defence, participating at a very low level of commitment in every new programme and structure designed to bolster the defence capacity of EU member states.
Ireland’s engagement in EU defence co-operation was validated at home as either another path to contributing to international peace and security or as a means by which the Irish military could strengthen its contribution to UN peacekeeping. There has also been some positive public attention given to high-profile Irish engagement with selected EU military operations, such as those commanded by Irish officers in Chad and Somalia and those with a well-defined humanitarian impulse such as Operation Sophia during the 2015-2018 migration emergency in the Mediterranean. However, this comparatively comfortable situation has now ended.
The basic tension over defence in Europe remains; between those that are resolutely committed to a Nato-first strategy and those that insist that Europe must bear a greater responsibility for its own security.
Europe’s security environment has deteriorated radically. Russia’s brutal invasion, occupation and annexation of parts of Ukraine and its ongoing murderous war has destroyed Europe’s established security order. The last five years have seen increased European ambition in the realm of defence. Beginning in 2016, this has since encompassed a new EU-based review process for national defence planning and budgeting, a reinforced agenda for the European Defence Agency and the creation of a new EU military headquarters. Also, the launch of the €8 billion European Defence Fund, agreement on a €5 billion European Peace Facility (which disbursed €1 billion in military assistance to Ukraine in 2022), agreement on a new “strategic compass” and the continuing extension of Permanent Structured Co-operation (PESCO) – within which Ireland is only fully engaged in one out of a total 60 defence-related projects.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has overturned decades, in some cases centuries, of national defence and security policy in Europe. From Germany’s decision to nearly double defence spending to Finland and Sweden’s decisions to join Nato, the very baseline of European defence debates has shifted. The UK’s exit from the EU in 2016 also changed the EU’s internal dynamics. And yet the basic tension over defence in Europe remains; between those that are resolutely committed to a Nato-first strategy and those that insist that Europe must bear a greater responsibility for its own security. For some, Russia’s war has underlined the irrelevance of the EU to territorial defence and security and returned the United States to a paramount place in European defence. For others it only reinforces arguments that the EU must spearhead a revolution in Europe’s approach to defence and to the security of its neighbourhood. Where does Ireland stand – or sit – in this debate?
Tt appears as if Irish conceptions of its own defence and that of Europe were shaken by the Ukraine crisis, but they have not been unsettled
The invasion of Ukraine came soon after the publication of the Commission on the Future of the Defence Force’s report. Across Government and Opposition benches came forthright denunciations of the Russian war and declarations that Ireland was in no way neutral in respect of Russian aggression. There has been no political hesitancy in supporting EU sanctions and Ireland has made a leading contribution in the accommodation of Ukrainian refugees.
Ireland, however, contributed only non-lethal military aid to Ukraine as its share of an initial €1 billion EU defence aid package. In sum, it appears as if Irish conceptions of its own defence and that of Europe were shaken by the Ukraine crisis, but they have not been unsettled. Multiple opinion polls published in the aftermath of the Russian invasion showed most Irish people supporting a continuation of neutrality, opposed to Nato membership and only narrowly in favour of deepening defence co-operation within the EU. Profound challenges to this orthodoxy are, however, on the horizon.
The scattered pieces of Europe’s security puzzle are only beginning to reassemble. Certainly, the centrality of Nato to European defence has been reasserted, but the EU’s pursuit of defence capability will only accelerate further. We know, from Ireland’s track record, that it can happily reconcile its “traditional military neutrality” with ongoing and even deepening EU defence co-operation. Ireland is always free to contribute the bare minimum.
The landscape, however, is now very different. The clue to Ireland’s challenges is first to be found in Finland and Sweden’s decisions to join Nato. The non-aligned club within the EU has lost its largest and most significant members. Only Ireland, Austria, Cyprus and Malta remain as non-members of Nato. This means that the overlap between EU and Nato membership is reinforced, and that EU defence and security policy will be increasingly shaped as a function of wider Atlantic alliance debates.
The choices for Ireland then are either to veto an EU common defence, to accede to its creation but opt out, or to support it and participate
The second point relates to solidarity within the EU. Ireland was successful in appealing to the EU for support in the face of Brexit and its threat to peace and security on this island. The other member states rallied round and continue to hold a line on EU-UK negotiations which have imposed real economic costs on individual states. If Russia’s threat to other EU partners is maintained, how can or will Ireland respond to calls for that solidarity to be returned? There is no explicit quid pro quo here, but it can hardly escape attention that the tradition of Irish military neutrality flies in the face of any expression of real EU solidarity in response to the threat of war. The foreign policy equivalent of sending “thoughts and prayers” to EU partners facing such threats is hardly credible.
The third point is the prospect of an actual EU common defence. The European Union has promised itself the goal of a full-blown “common defence”, ie a mutual security guarantee such as Nato provides. This, of course, is the provision which the Irish Constitution specifically blocks. Again, Ireland (and others) may continue to fly under the radar as EU Atlanticists and Europeanists battle over whether such a “common defence” is a feasible, credible or even desirable prospect. At the same time, as Europe comes to terms with its radically new security environment, it is not inconceivable that these differences might be bridged; either reconciled by ever closer EU-Nato relations or occasioned by some crisis in transatlantic relations following the next US election.
The choices for Ireland then are either to veto an EU common defence, to accede to its creation but opt out, or to support it and participate. It is at this point that tough choices present themselves. Calls from Tánaiste Micheál Martin and others to reflect on Irish neutrality in this new European context are therefore important and necessary.
The question is whether the Irish body politic, 50 years after it first tried to reconcile these questions, will be any better prepared for the consequences of making such a choice.
Prof Ben Tonra of the UCD School of Politics and International Relations is head of international relations and a Geary Institute Fellow
