The British and Irish governments will have been unsurprised by the Rev Ian Paisley's immediate reaction and fierce denunciation yesterday, and may be as dismissive of him as he of them.
They hardly thought to "insult" the democratic process by publishing proposals to which the IRA and the pro-agreement parties in Northern Ireland alike must now respond by the beginning of next week. Moreover, they regard all the outstanding issues threatening the Good Friday accord as interdependent, and hold the putting of illegal weapons beyond use "indispensable" to its security and success. On that basis alone, London and Dublin will readily rebut the DUP leader's charge that they have left the people of Northern Ireland "held to ransom by the whim of the IRA".
It is arguable, of course, that an even greater long-term threat to the agreement derives from the mounting democratic deficit of which Dr Paisley is for many unionists the embodiment. And even if the British Prime Minister and the Taoiseach find their efforts rewarded on this occasion, it remains to be seen for how long they can disregard the alienation reflected in the electoral triumphs of DUP and dissident Ulster Unionist candidates in the general election on June 7th.
The governments will be content to make this a problem for another day. As of this moment, however, neither Mr Blair nor Mr Ahern should doubt the resonance Dr Paisley's remarks will have found with many unionists across Northern Ireland. For in a very real sense they have now left the IRA to call the shots. And that fact alone denotes a significant reversal suffered by Mr David Trimble in the process of the negotiation commenced at Weston Park on July 9th. As recently as last Sunday on the BBC, Mr Trimble signalled his belief that the publication of the British government's proposals on policing, demilitarisation and the future protection of the institutions from political threat would be conditional on a prior move by the IRA on decommissioning.
"We've done our bit, and Mr Adams, it's over to you. We've jumped. You follow." That was Mr Trimble's memorable challenge to the Sinn Fein president in November 1999 when, following the Mitchell Review, the Ulster Unionist leader reversed himself and agreed to enter government with Sinn Fein without a start to IRA decommissioning.
When the "understanding" on which he did so failed to deliver decommissioning by the end of January 2000, Mr Trimble threatened resignation and forced the suspension of the institutions of government established under the agreement. Few would have believed then that he would jump alone a second time, after negotiations the following May at Hillsborough, on the strength of an IRA promise to put weapons verifiably beyond use. The rest is very recent history: the IRA's failure to make good that promise prompted Mr Trimble's resignation on July 1st, and immediately triggered the statutory August 12th deadline for the election or re-election of First and Deputy First Ministers.
Crucial was Mr Trimble's calculation that this time he must resign rather than seek a second suspension. The reasoning was simple. A second suspension would encourage expectations of a similar outcome. As one source close to him put it, "another fudge". By resigning, he raised the threshold and the stakes. For without decommissioning he knew he could not guarantee the votes to return him to ministerial office, even if he so wished (and he did not). In such circumstances, moreover, there could be no question of any unionist colleague thinking to take his place.
So he had set the stage. As Mr Blair and Mr Ahern and the other pro-agreement parties converged on Weston Park, the Ulster Unionists insisted there was nothing to negotiate and that decommissioning was the only item on the agenda. However, if the UUP embarked on that negotiation with any real sense of everybody ganging up on Sinn Fein, it seemed clear it would not survive the week. Nor did it. When the talks adjourned for the July 12th celebrations, Mr Trimble's five parliamentary colleagues reportedly met in London on the 11th and agreed their leader should not return to Weston Park. By then the penny had dropped that a much more comprehensive negotiation was under way - as was confirmed yesterday.
This time it is Mr Blair who has jumped first, although British officials made a reasonable fist of disputing this. One source insisted: "These are proposals, not firm commitments." He also validly argued that if the package was to be rejected, for example by the SDLP, and the Policing Board was consequently not established, then some of the changes in the proposed policing dispensation could not proceed as at present envisaged. Clearly, too, commitments on demilitarisation will depend on the ongoing security assessment into which movement or lack of it on arms will be factored.
That said, it is hard to imagine Mr Ahern or Mr Seamus Mallon (never mind Mr Adams) allowing the British government to resile from the substantive commitments entered upon in principle, and on which the main party leaderships have been briefed.
So Mr Trimble must wait a few days to discover whether Mr Blair and Mr Ahern have delivered for him - or dumped on him. The UUP leader has been clear thus far that deliverance requires a statement from Gen De Chastelain confirming that decommissioning - that is, the actual "destruction" of IRA weaponry - has commenced. He also appears content that "destruction" is implicit in the two governments' requirement that the issue of putting arms beyond use be resolved "in a manner acceptable to and verified by the Independent International Comm ission on Decommissioning in accordance with its basic mandate in law".
Sinn Fein sources, on the other hand, have been equally insistent that deciding how weapons should be put beyond use is for agreement between the armed groups and the commission. The 1997 legislation clearly prescribes "destruction", rendering weapons permanently inaccessible and unusable. But is it conceivable that the general might declare himself content that the objective has been met by some methodology - for example, the much-touted concreting-over of previously inspected dumps - which unionists say will not suffice?
And if he so declared, would the governments reject any such move by the IRA at the behest of Mr Trimble? Or should he be tempted to run with it, at the behest of Mr Jeffrey Donaldson or Mr David Burnside? And is it this very possibility - of an IRA gesture which falls short of unionist demands but might nonetheless satisfy the governments - which explains why Mr Blair has apparently signalled his likely preference for fresh Assembly elections as opposed to a further suspension?
There is an alternative. Having seen Mr Adams secure what he termed the "inherent and unconditional rights" of nationalists under the agreement, the IRA could decide not to risk everything to the unknown fall-out of another election, secure the settlement that exists, incline to generosity with a truly decisive shift, and allow Mr Trimble a victory, too.