While the Nice pro-ratification majority in the recent MRBI poll should not be taken as a firm indication of how a second referendum in the autumn will turn out, it was interesting that it provided no indication that the attempt by opponents of the treaty to rubbish a second referendum as "undemocratic" has made any headway.
In the period ahead it seems likely that steps will be taken to defuse some of the issues which, rightly or wrongly, contributed to only 16 per cent of the electorate voting for ratification of the Nice Treaty last year.
Thus the Oireachtas now seems likely to soon tackle the domestic democratic deficit which has derived from its failure to provide for adequate scrutiny of EU legislation.
And the issue of the Irish Army not participating in rapid reaction force activities, unless under UN auspices, is also likely to be clarified.
As time passes, the genuine concerns which have been raised by critics of the treaty should become more distinguished from the phoney issues which have been brought forward to frighten people into voting against the treaty.
And such weight which may be given to these genuine concerns will have to be balanced against the adverse consequences which could flow from a second and final decision to hold up enlargement by again rejecting the treaty.
The treaty is far from perfect. It is a compromise between widely-divergent positions held by different member-states on different matters.
For example, the reduction of large countries' representation on the European Commission from two to one members each has to be weighed against the possibility that, after eventual enlargement to 27 member-states, every state, both large and small, may find itself without a commissioner from time to time.
Opponents of the treaty seem to have misunderstood the role of the independent Commission for they have repeatedly complained about it being an "unelected body" which they want to bring "under democratic control".
Yet from the point of view of a small country like Ireland, the greatest safeguard we have against being pushed around by large EU member-states is that the Commission, which has a duty to act in the common interest, is independent.
For it is this independence, together with the exclusive right of the Commission to initiate Community legislation, which protects the interests of small countries like Ireland and ensures that the legislation brought forward does not reflect the interests of large states.
If the Commission were to lose that independence, our interests would be seriously prejudiced. That is why every Irish government has seen the preservation of the Commission's independence as Ireland's single most important vital interest.
Of course in its other function of implementing Community legislation, the Commission occasionally treads on Irish toes, as it does on those of other countries. Yet in this implementation role, as in its role of legislative initiative, it is vital that it retain its independence if it is to protect us from attempts by other larger countries to bend the rules of competition in their own favour.
The "enhanced co-operation" provisions of the treaty, enabling groups of countries to go ahead on their own on certain matters, while leaving it open to others to join with them at a later stage, has been criticised.
While we have benefited from this kind of provision ourselves - as in the case of the euro - it was important that such arrangements be subject to tight conditions which would prevent the enhanced co-operation procedure from being abused. I think our Government and others were extremely successful in achieving this at Nice.
Although before the Nice European Council meeting I had been concerned about this matter, in its aftermath I could not think of any more conditions which we could have sought to impose on this procedure to prevent this provision from being abused.
As for the "military" issue, the right to opt out of any rapid reaction force operation which we do not approve of is explicitly provided for in Nice Presidency Report, which establishes beyond any possible doubt that the commitment of national resources to such operations will be based on the sovereign decisions of member-states.
It is clear all this has little to do with the separate issue of the treaty which was signed at Nice for the only reference in the treaty to this matter is a brief clause eliminating the role in this matter of the WEU, an organisation with which we have no involvement.
But if, nevertheless, some people want us to take the opportunity of the Nice Treaty ratification to emphasise our freedom of action in this area, or to bind ourselves not to engage in operations unless under UN auspices, so be it.
Of course, the real issue we have to face in relation to the treaty is what the effect on our interests would be of failing to ratify it, thus blocking the enlargement of the Community. And no one should doubt that non-ratification would have precisely that effect.
For what the treaty is about is making institutional changes which the member-states have judged to be necessary to ensure the effective working of an enlarged Community of what will eventually be 30 or more states.
Thus the 15 governments judged the Parliament could not function effectively if its numbers ran well over 1,000; that, save for some key issues, such as tax harmonisation and further enlargement, to retain a veto for every state would render decision-making unworkable; and that a European Commission of 30 or more members could not work effectively.
To block the treaty which has been judged necessary by all 15 EU governments, our own included, would be suicidal. The consequences for our relations with all our partners, and the world outside Europe, would be immensely damaging.
For, given how much is at stake for the stability and prosperity of our whole continent, it would be irresponsible for our 14 partners to abandon the enlargement project. There must, therefore, be a strong probability that in this event they would feel it necessary to devise some alternative method of going ahead without us.