THAILAND’S POLITICAL crisis abated rapidly yesterday after those leading the street protests against prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva’s government decided to back off from a confrontation with the overwhelming military force ranged against them. It is only a temporary victory for Mr Abhisit, since the protesters vowed they would return and have many valid reasons for doing so. This conflict pitches the country’s rural and urban poor against its state and military elites in a long-standing battle over the scope and functioning of Thailand’s democracy. Unless those deep social cleavages are addressed in coming months the instability will go on.
A glance at the country’s recent political chronology explains why this should be so. Following agreement on a new constitution in 1997 the newly rich businessman Thaksin Shinawatra won the elections in 2001. He was re-elected in 2005 and 2006 on a populist programme that brought cheap healthcare, village loans and improved education to millions of rural Thais, despite vehement opposition from the traditional elites which regard him simply as a corrupt upstart leading a majority unqualified for democratic life and the rule of law. They organised a military coup against him following which he was convicted of conflict of interest while in office and his party dissolved. It regrouped under his associates while he remained in exile and won yet another election in 2007.
This set the scene for the prolonged struggle by the “yellow shirt” street movement led by the Bangkok middle class and those close to the monarchy and military last year. Eventually it forced the government led by Mr Thaksin’s brother-in-law Somchai Wongsawat to dissolve. Mr Abhisit must now decide whether to call fresh elections or try to introduce reforms intended to meet some of the protesters’ other demands. That path looks fraught with difficulties, as is his determination not to have anything to do with Mr Thaksin, who remains in control of the protests and encouraged highly provocative calls for a revolutionary uprising over the last week. His “red shirt” followers are willing to maintain their protests and showed organisational skill in mobilising them, and a disciplined ability to scale it down without major violence when confronted by Monday’s display of military force and state of emergency.
These divisions penetrate every segment of Thai society, splitting families and institutions as well as expressing social and political conflict. Their rights and wrongs are often put in vividly personalised terms in an effort to sway uncommitted voters or convince King Bhumipal Adulyada to intervene on one side or the other. While the monarchy and the military are more sympathetic to the “yellow shirts”, they are fearful of making too partisan a commitment which could easily rebound on them in another election. Despite the many allegations of corruption, authoritarianism, demagogy and tax evasion levelled against Mr Thaksin, his party still commands majority support. This conflict is best seen as part of a long transition towards a more inclusive democratic society in Thailand.