How much damage has been done to Anglo-Irish relations by the failure to resolve the problem of decommissioning? Right now, the primary aim of the British and Irish governments is to be seen to act, preferably together, to rescue what can be salvaged of the peace process. But in the longer term, failing some last-minute intervention of a supernatural nature, it could take quite some time to rebuild trust between London and Dublin.
There is already a glaring and dangerous rift between the two governments on how to deal with the present situation. The Taoiseach is desperate to avoid any suspension of the political institutions and has said that any such move would be "a disaster". He is clearly concerned that a loss of confidence in the new political dispensation could lead to a vacuum that might, as past experience has shown, be filled by violence. Even if this worst-case scenario seems a bit melodramatic - most participants do not see a return to serious violence as an immediate threat - Mr. Ahern fears that any suspension will damage the fledgling institutions and make it even more difficult to rebuild them.
Peter Mandelson believes that a suspension of the institutions is now virtually inevitable. He fears that David Trimble would not survive a vote within his own party, and that his resignation as First Minister would lead to a significant hardening of attitudes in the broader unionist community. It is not yet clear whether Seamus Mallon would also resign his post as Mr Trimble's deputy, but if that were to happen it could also have a serious effect on nationalist opinion in Northern Ireland.
On the surface, relations between Irish and British ministers remain relatively cordial. Both sides appear to agree that there was no guarantee or firm pledge from the republican movement on the handover of arms at last autumn's meetings with George Mitchell. However, the British government backs the UUP view of the existence of "a clear understanding" that there would be some movement by the IRA which would enable John de Chastelain to deliver a much more positive report.
There is now a feeling on the British side that Bertie Ahern and the Government of this State have failed to deliver on their side of this "understanding", i.e. some concrete gesture by the IRA. The Taoiseach has seemed remarkably confident that this would happen. Last weekend senior Government officials, including one snatched from the talks on a new national agreement, were despatched to Belfast to put more pressure on Sinn Fein. Right up to the last moment, apparently, these officials were confident that the Provos would "give something". The publication of Gen de Chastelain's report was delayed in the hope that his would happen.
The line now emerging on the British side is that Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness have been frank throughout this period in saying that there would be no handover of weapons. Sinn Fein was told, equally starkly, that if a handover did not happen, the institutions set up under the Belfast Agreement would be suspended. It may be that they believed the British government would not collapse the executive once it was up and seen to be working. Senior Sinn Fein spokesmen hinted at this recently in the US. If this was the case, it was a serious miscalculation.
The first priority now for the British is to be seen not to break faith with David Trimble. At one level, this is the only politically honourable thing to do. Both Tony Blair and Peter Mandelson worked extremely hard to persuade and/or bully the UUP leader to "jump first". Some people believe that the main reason Mr Mandelson was sent to Northern Ireland to replace Mo Mowlam last year was to win Mr Trimble's confidence and cajole him into leaping, alone, over the cliff.
But politics is not only about being seen to behave honourably. It is also necessary for the British government to back Trimble if there is to be any hope of preserving moderate unionist support for the Belfast Agreement. He may not survive as leader of the UUP, but if Tony Blair and Peter Mandelson were seen to abandon Trimble now, his closest aides would almost certainly go with him. Any chance of putting the Executive back together under a new UUP leader would be lost, possibly for decades to come.
This strategy may be successful in steadying nerves on the UUP side and gaining time for a review. But Peter Mandelson must know that it could also lead to a loss of confidence on the nationalist side. Sinn Fein can argue, with some justification, that it has fulfilled all its obligations under the Belfast Agreement and that, once again, the unionists are being allowed to exercise a premature veto on progress.
Some of its spokespersons are already saying that this crisis has been deliberately engineered by the unionists to drive Sinn Fein into a corner and deprive its elected representatives of power. The British government, they suggest, has connived in this conspiracy.
The fear must be that this interpretation of events could gain credibility in the nationalist community. The Belfast Agreement has given nationalists a new confidence that they have an equal place within the Northern Ireland body politic. They have seen their elected representatives - the SDLP as well as Sinn Fein - take their places in a devolved, power-sharing executive. Now many of them may be tempted to conclude that nothing has really changed. Not since l974, not since l922.
Events have a way of overtaking politics or, more correctly, any lack of politics in Northern Ireland. Developments such as the British government's endorsement of the Patten report or, more recently, the acquittal of Pte Lee Clegg, sour the atmosphere and exacerbate the suspicions that are never far from the surface. The most important task now is to keep confidence alive at grassroots level so that, whatever the serious difficulties facing this particular stage of the peace process, the way ahead will be through politics. That means the two governments must get back on the same track.