Whether they like it or not, the Iraqi people are in the middle of Donald Rumsfeld's big experiment in high strategy, writes Col E.D. Doyle.
When Donald Rumsfeld became US Secretary of Defence two years ago there had been much discussion about the "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA) and its successor term, "Defence Transformation".
What do these terms mean?
American writers in the late 1990s, academic rather than military, were sometimes hard to follow, probably because they were writing as these new developments were appearing.
Prof Lawrence Freedman, head of the Department of War Studies at King's College, London, led the discussion, such as there was on this side of the Atlantic. His Adelphi Paper 318, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (1998), remains a model of clarity and comprehensiveness.
He wrote: "The RMA depends on the interaction between systems that collect, process, fuse and communicate information and those that apply military force". This is why it is often called the "system of systems". Improved missile and bombing accuracy is part of it.
With some considerable oversimplification one could say that information technology enables troops at all levels to use intelligence more rapidly and decisively than ever before. The time between "sensor and shooter" is greatly reduced. Information from satellites, human observers and ground target indicators gets to a pilot's cockpit display or missile-launching position in "real time" (as things happen). As recently as the Kosovo campaign that was not the case.
Rumsfeld is a competent man. He grasped the implications of the RMA and saw their wider import. He wrote that it was "about more than building new high-tech weapons - although that is certainly part of it. It is also about new ways of thinking and new ways of fighting."
He saw that the "predictable threats" of the Cold War were over. The doctrine that the US should maintain "two massive occupation forces" capable of fighting two "major-theatre wars" more or less simultaneously and "of marching on and occupying the capitals of two aggressors" was modified.
It was decided to emphasise "deterrence in four critical theatres, backed by the ability to swiftly defeat two aggressors at the same time, while preserving the option for one massive counteroffensive to occupy an aggressor's capital and replace its regime".
The target states would be uncertain as to which would get the regime change, so preserving the deterrence. Dropping the second occupation concept made resources available for other "lesser contingencies".
The old question basic to defence planning had been "What are the threats?" It was replaced by a "capabilities-based" one - and one more usual in lower-level US military thinking in military operations. "What is the enemy capable of?" rather than "What is he likely to do?" In this case national-level strategy is focused on how the US might be threatened and what is needed to deal with such threats rather than on from whom or where an attack might come. "We need to examine our vulnerabilities."
There is more, much more, and it can be read in Foreign Affairs (May-June 2002). Rumsfeld may be thought a frightening man, but he is undoubtedly an able, articulate one, sure of his own and America's mission in the world.
There was some grumbling from senior officers (reportedly because they were not in on the discussions). How much of that was innate resistance to change and the scrapping of familiar mind-sets cannot really be assessed by an outsider. But the low retiring ages in the US forces soon move dissenters on.
They may say "We told you so" if the attempt to take Baghdad and effect regime change runs into really serious difficulties but the cliché "it's early days" applies. This writer cannot see the US settling for anything less than victory in this case. The extra 100,000 troops, announced for Iraq on Thursday night, indicates that. Whether they like it or not the Iraqi people are in the middle of a big experiment in high strategy.
Let us look at the emergence of high-tech weaponry in the past 11 years and see the effects on government policies in the bigger countries.
After the end of the Cold and Gulf Wars there were many demands for a "peace dividend". Many people thought the need for high military expenditure was gone. Many countries did cash their peace dividends - closing military bases, reducing armed force strengths, postponing new weapons production and procurement. This was done in the early 1990s. The US also made cuts.
Problems appeared again. The former Yugoslavia required peacekeeping troops. Somalia, Cambodia, Angola, Central America and Mozambique required attention. The end of the Cold War allowed many problems to surface.
The favourable resonance of "peacekeeping" and a hope that the requirement might help to maintain troop strengths made some general staffs take an interest in peace support operations - a broader and more descriptive term than "peacekeeping". There was also a genuine professional interest in this new (to many) military activity.
It goes without saying that information links may be a weakness of the RMA. They must be continuous, secure and "all-weather workable". There must be considerable redundancy - back-up links that automatically and uninterruptedly replace any failures. They must be "seamless", with no delays in transferring between radio, radar and line links or headquarters. None of this is cheap. The danger of "hackers" and cyber-attacks on information networks and guidance systems has been mentioned by Rumsfeld.
Rumsfeld was the guiding force on the committee set up to examine whether the US needed a national missile defence (NMD) system. Unsurprisingly, it was found necessary, even though the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with Russia would have to be terminated to install an NMD system. There was much less opposition than was expected. The Russians acquiesced, and the ABM Treaty is gone. The NMD system is being built and will, no doubt, be integrated into the RMA in due time.
For the US a new generation of military equipment was due after the Gulf War. This was delayed, but it gave the armaments industry more time to improve things such as Tomahawk missiles, stealth aircraft and electronic countermeasures.
The air attacks on the guns above Sarajevo, together with counter-battery fire (artillery firing on artillery) quickly silenced the Bosnian guns and ended the long misery of Sarajevo's inhabitants. There had been 40 months to prepare this, and it was not America's fault it was delayed.
The Kosovo campaign took longer than expected and showed several deficiencies in guidance for air-to-ground missiles. There has been considerable time since. Much experience was gained by the US Air Force and the RAF in attacking Iraqi air defences (almost weekly) since.
How has the "system of systems" worked so far? The cruise missiles - at $1 million each - are hitting Baghdad. The destruction is widespread, but the civilian casualties have been low, except in one case. There has been nothing like the shelter deaths of 1991. The public relations personnel are stressing the care taken with targeting.
It will be interesting to know the effects of the sandstorms on satellite surveillance. The "Defence Transformation" is getting a full trial.