President Yeltsin's decisive re election proves only one thing - that, faced with the prospect of a return to power by the communists, however much their policy and style may have been repackaged, the Russian people prefer to continue on the bumpy path of reform. The same message has been signalled by international leaders, for whom the defeat of Mr Yeltsin would have opened up an intense phase of reassessment and uncertainty about the political development of Russia.
But both domestically and internationally, relief at the outcome of the presidential election is qualified by the knowledge that Russia now faces an indefinite period of change, less abrupt perhaps than would have been the case if Mr Gennady Zyuganov, the communist leader, had won, but in its way just as unpredictable. Mr Yeltsin's health, which resurfaced as an issue in the last few days of the second round campaign, raises questions about his ability to serve a full four years. Even if his illness does not incapacitate him, it may affect his judgment or his ability to resist pressure. Either of these factors could create an air of impermanence about his second term without some firm evidence to show that he is in complete command at the Kremlin.
It is by no means certain yet that Mr Yeltsin will be able to assert his authority, regardless of the state of his health. The appointment of Gen Alexander Lebed to an unprecedented position of power as head of security was probably the most decisive factor in his victory. As such, it may have been an unavoidable step. But it has altered the balance of forces surrounding the presidency, and released a new and potent energy into the power game that is unlikely to be satisfied for long with the restrictions of a subordinate office. Gen Lebed has already, less than two weeks after his appointment, hinted at his hopes of a new job as vice president. Resisting this demand will be one of the key tests of Mr Yeltsin's second term, and if he fails to do so, Gen Lebed's onward march, with some disturbingly xenophobic attributes, will not be easy to prevent.
By firing the former defence minister, Gen Pavel Grachev, and some of his own most loyal aides, Mr Yeltsin may have weakened his own power base while Gen Lebed's elevation has posed a threat to the succession hopes of the prime minister, Mr Viktor Chernomyrdin. With a further series of changes promised to make room for a more broadly representative government, including some ministers from the communist camp, and possibly the liberal, Mr Grigory Yavlinsky, the scope for political infighting between factions is likely to be increased.
What effect this will have on the reform programme will not begin to become clear until after the new coalition is formed. Mr Yeltsin made lavish and expensive promises during his election campaign, some of which will probably have to be met in the short to medium term, making the task of bringing order to the budget more difficult. The price the various elements now being canvassed for membership of the government will exact is another factor affecting reform, as is the dominance of the communists in the Duma. Compromise is inevitable if, as Mr Yeltsin stated, a place is to be found for "all those whom you (the Russian electorate) trust". But compromise can be bought at too high a cost.