An end to the war would suit both Trump and Iranian leadership. But not Netanyahu

There are some grounds for cautious optimism

If peace talks in Islamabad break down, Donald Trump would be faced with unpalatable choices. Photograph: Farooq Naeem/AFP via Getty Images
If peace talks in Islamabad break down, Donald Trump would be faced with unpalatable choices. Photograph: Farooq Naeem/AFP via Getty Images

The two-week ceasefire deal brokered by Pakistan earlier this week has averted, for now, the civilisational death that Donald Trump threatened on Iran in an outburst that was extraordinary even by his unfathomable standards.

In response to Iran’s effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, Trump promised unimaginable destruction in Iran, including attacks on power plants and bridges. That would almost certainly amount to war crimes, something that he expressly stated did not concern him.

The ceasefire agreement provided for a two-week period in which Iran would ensure that the Strait of Hormuz would open for maritime traffic. Negotiations would also begin in Islamabad on a deal to end the conflict in its entirety. However, the widespread relief and optimism that followed the announcement of the ceasefire has been accompanied by concerns about the very wide gaps between the two sides, the danger of the ceasefire breaking down, and fears of the consequences of such failure for the region and the global economy.

In his announcement of the ceasefire, Trump declared that a 10-point framework for negotiations that was submitted by Tehran was “workable”. The framework has not been formally made public, but has been widely leaked. So has the US position, set out in a 15-point proposal.

The first point of disagreement, which has threatened to torpedo the deal almost from the outset, concerns the ongoing assault by Israel on Lebanon. Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu declared his support for Trump’s decision not to follow through on his threat of destruction in Iran almost immediately, if reluctantly. But he also asserted that Lebanon was excluded from the terms of the deal. Israel promptly launched devastating attacks on Lebanon that killed more than 300 people and injured at least 1,100. In response, Iran declared that Israel was in breach of the ceasefire deal and closed the Strait of Hormuz, with impacts that are being felt on economies around the world.

Trump’s response was that Lebanon was not included in the ceasefire deal and described Israel’s war in Lebanon in typically offhand manner as “a separate skirmish”. His vice-president, JD Vance, suggested that there had been a “legitimate misunderstanding” on the part of Iran – they thought the ceasefire included Lebanon “and it just didn’t”.

While the immediate focus is on the intertwining of Israeli actions in Lebanon with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, other deep-seated issues have similar potential to derail talks on ending the war.

Trump’s justifications for the attack on Iran have varied enormously over the course of the past five weeks. Central among these are the issues of Iran’s nuclear programme and its ballistic missile and attack drone capabilities.

The US plan requires Iran to dismantle all major nuclear facilities, end uranium enrichment and transfer its existing stockpile of uranium out of the country. US defence secretary Pete Hegseth called on Iran to hand over its stockpile of 970lb of enriched uranium, saying that Trump could still order a commando raid to seize the material. In the same press briefing, Hegseth declared that Iran would never possess nuclear weapons. All of this despite the fact that Iran had, according to the foreign minister of Oman, already agreed before the war began never to stockpile enriched uranium, while its leaders have consistently denied any intent to develop a nuclear weapon.

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The Iranians have, however, insisted on the right to enrich uranium for civilian use, under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which it is a signatory. The US plan also requires Iran to suspend the development of ballistic missiles, end the production of long-range missiles and the transfer of weapons to its allies in the region. Iran has rejected curbs on its missile programme in the past.

Nonetheless, there are some grounds for cautious optimism. Trump’s war is increasingly unpopular in the US, and his concern to declare victory in the face of all of the evidence is clear. If the talks in Islamabad break down, he would be faced with unpalatable choices. Leaving Iran in control of the Strait of Hormuz without some agreement on its reopening would be intolerable. But any military operation to take control would involve deployment of significant military force for an extended period, with potential for serious casualties.

Similarly, despite Hegseth’s wilfully optimistic prognostication, any attempt to seize Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile would be fraught with difficulty, not least because of its likely dispersal across the country.

None of this would sit well with a president who campaigned on a promise to end America’s “forever wars”. The motivations exist for Trump to come to an agreement that allows him to declare victory.

On the Iranian side also, there is an imperative to bring the war to an end on what are represented to be the regime’s terms. The very survival of the Islamic Republic in the face of assault by US and Israeli military might is an achievement. Iran’s Supreme National Security Council greeted Monday’s ceasefire announcement with a statement declaring the “good news” that nearly all the objectives of the war had been achieved.

But for Israel’s prime minister, no such motivation appears to exist. The ceasefire was followed on Wednesday by the lifting of a state of emergency that had been in place since February 28th. As a result, Netanyahu’s trial on corruption charges is due to resume on Sunday.

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If the talks scheduled to take place in Islamabad result in an end to the war, questions will remain as to what the US and Israel will have achieved over its six-week span. In a televised address last week, Netanyahu justified Israel’s support for the ceasefire on the basis that Iran had effectively been defeated. Domestic opponents see things differently. Yair Lapid, leader of the opposition Yesh Atid (There is a Future) party, which has 24 seats in the Knesset, was scathing, describing the war with Iran as a “diplomatic disaster” with the worst possible outcome – a regime in Tehran that was undefeated, a nuclear threat that had not been removed and Hizbullah missiles “aimed at every home in Israel”.

For the US, regime change in Tehran has not been secured. Indeed, the likelihood is that it is now the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and more radical regime elements who are in charge. On the Iranian nuclear file, little has been accomplished that was not already on the table for negotiation – or in the 2015 deal under which Iran agreed to limit its nuclear activities in exchange for reduced sanctions, a deal abandoned by Trump in May 2018 during his first term in office.

Vincent Durac lectures in Middle East politics in the University College Dublin school of politics and international relations