An alternative does exist to the US unilaterally burying the present Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty so it can pursue a national missile defence.
It is this: the Bush administration proposes only a defence against a limited missile attack by rogue nations or terrorists. Russia has indicated a willingness to negotiate the current defensive prohibitions in the ABM treaty - provided that changes are coupled with reductions in the numbers of offensive missiles. That is the alternative that should be pursued.
The Russian military wants to reduce its strategic missile force because of high costs of maintenance and military manpower. We can reduce our offensive missile force, but these reductions should be considered in connection to negotiating amendments to the ABM treaty. There's no need, while reducing our nuclear forces (even if unilaterally), to abandon the clear benefits that derive from the treaty's provisions for verification, transparency and confidence-building negotiation processes.
For almost 30 years, the ABM treaty has preserved strategic stability and kept the peace by restricting strategic ballistic missile defence systems. Those restrictions, in turn, have ensured that both Washington and Moscow could retain confidence in their respective retaliatory capability.
It appears that both the US and Russia plan to maintain sizeable numbers of strategic nuclear weapons for the indefinite future. So mutual deterrence is an inescapable element of a stable relationship between the world's two major nuclear powers, whether they see each other as strategic partners or potential adversaries.
The concept of mutual deterrence is less a function of policy than of the reality that both Russia and the US will continue to have enough strategic weapons to destroy each other many times over. If mutual deterrence is to remain with us, it's essential that an amended ABM treaty remain with us as well. It's the key to maintaining stability between the two largest nuclear forces.
Thus, an amended ABM treaty remains as relevant to peace and security today as it was 30 years ago. It ensures that the relationship of mutual deterrence is stable and predictable. Burying the treaty instead of negotiating amendments would only create a less stable and less predictable deterrent relationship.
The Russians and Chinese have already said they intend to maintain their retaliatory capabilities. They state unequivocally that their response to a unilateral abrogation of the ABM treaty would be to build up their nuclear stockpiles, a reaction that would significantly decrease international stability.
The administration has hoped to minimise this reaction by unilaterally reducing the number of US strategic weapons. While such plans would not harm the international security environment, they are unlikely to affect the actions of Russia and China to maintain their retaliatory capability.
It's not sufficient to contend that Russia or China can't afford offensive increases. They might try. Thus, the US would sacrifice stability without cause. There's no substitute for the predictability, transparency and irreversibility that come with formal arms reduction agreements. We shouldn't take the risk that missile defence, to be effective, will impose such high costs that we'll have to divert substantial resources from other national security needs.
We cannot let our country drift into a period of isolationism or unilateralism. We are the strongest country in the world, ethically, economically and militarily. The Senate was right in questioning the Kyoto accord, hastily signed up to by vice-president Gore, and President Bush is right in pursuing a course of amending these accords.
The biological weapons protocol initiated by the Nixon administration can and will be brought into line through strong negotiations. We can have a revised form of multilateralism in which all partners share not only in results but also in costs and resources.
We are at the threshold of great opportunities if we use our position as world leader with the skills and abilities we possess. There's no reason to abandon the clear benefits of the ABM treaty. We can have those benefits and at the same time pursue appropriate alternatives.
Melvin Laird served for four years in the Nixon administration