WHAT can one now say on the 40th anniversary of the Suez Crisis? We have not yet got all the information on the extraordinary "Affair" of 1956 as the documents released in 1986 were incomplete.
Consider the admitted facts: Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser wanted aid to build a dam on the Upper Nile to augment irrigation and electrical power. Britain and the US set tough conditions for supporting the project, but Nasser accepted them. However, the British and Americans then withdrew support because, among other thing, of Egypt's recognition of China, its import of Eastern bloc arms and the US-Jewish lobby.
Profits from the Cahal Company were about £39 million per year of which Egypt got about £800,000. Its shareholders, pilots and senior staff were largely British and French. Egypt's nationalisation of the Canal Company - not the canal, as is sometimes said - to pay for the High Dam caused outrage in Britain and France despite many companies being nationalised in these countries. According to the Crown lawyers, the nationalisation of the company was legal. One rarely reads that Nasser guaranteed, and paid, full compensation. His prestige rose in the Arab world. And against Anglo-French predictions, the Egyptians ran the canal efficiently, thus depriving, the allies of a casus belli.
British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, and his Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, had long resented Nasser's rise to power. And Eden, who hated Britain's decline, became obsessed with destroying Nasser.
In collusion with France and Britain, Israel agreed to invade Egypt across the Sinai Desert. This would be considered a threat to the canal and an Anglo-French force would invade to "separate the combatants" and occupy the canal. Nasser and his government would be toppled.
Elaborate efforts were made to cover up the discussions and the collusion with the Israelis. A page was removed from the Downing Street visitors' book to conceal the visit of French emissaries. However, the subsequent discovery of housekeeping records showing the French names highlights the muddled ill-luck of the whole affair.
The Israelis, taking all the initial risks and likely to get all the blame if they were let down by their allies, were particularly suspicious of the British. The Labour Opposition wavered, but then came down firmly against the attack.
The US president, Dwight Eisenhower, was kept in the dark. Mountbatten wavered, but opposed the operation, especially the proposed naval bombardment. He knew Port Said, a densely populated city with many tenements. He told Eden what flat trajectory 6-inch naval shells would do to its people. "We'll be plastered round the world as assassins and baby killers." However, his resignation was refused.
This complex man, for all his faults, firmly planted the concept that Egyptian lives mattered - and thus saved many of them. The 15-inch guns seem not to have been used. Warning leaflets and broadcasts may also have saved some lives.
The Israelis invaded Egypt on October 29th and reached their objectives by November 5th. Two hundred and forty Anglo-French planes pounded Egyptian airfields and Port Said. Nasser blocked the canal. A naval bombardment preceded an amphibious landing at Port Said. On that day, as troops advanced along the canal, a ceasefire was ordered.
American warnings had been ignored until a run on sterling forced Britain to seek US financial support. It was refused and the war stopped.
We now know Eden had no coherent political aim for the operation.
Lord Carver, in War Since 1945, commented: "The outstanding politico-military lesson is an old one: that one should clarify one's aim before one embarks upon a military operation; ruthlessly and objectively dissect and analyse where it will lead one, what is to be gained from it, and what one will be faced with when it is over. The Suez affair is the supreme example of failure to subject policy to such an examination.
In all 3,000 Egyptians were killed, 1,100 in Port Said about 800 of them civilians. The British lost 22 killed, and the Israelis 200. British accounts rarely mention civilian casualties.
Some points appear true:
. Eden wanted Nasser killed and ordered his assassination.
. The leader of the Opposition in Britain did not get the customary confidential advance notification of the operation.
. The necessary public support was not secured. Huge demonstrations against the war shook Eden's nerve.
Both Eden and Selwyn Lloyd lied to parliament about collusion and foreknowledge of the Israeli attack.
. Eisenhower did not believe that nationalising the Canal Company justified war.
President Eisenhower was accused"of deceit and pre-occupation with re-election. But the memo of a presidential conference on October 29th, 1956, shows why Americans admired and trusted him. Condemning the Israeli aggression, he said: "I don't care in the slightest whether I am reelected or not
Britain drew the lesson that it was no longer the power it had been, able to use war as an instrument of policy or expansion. It could no longer act without the support of the US.
The Israelis dragged their feet and took months to leave the Sinai. Their occupation of the Gaza Strip was marked by well-attested brutality. Even Gen Dayan admitted there was looting.
The French shrugged off the debacle. They had not wavered. The Suez operation did not appear to do much damage to French confidence or morale. They had Algeria and Vietnam on their minds.
The first UN Peacekeeping Force - a Canadian initiative took over as the British and French departed.
Days before he resigned, Eden wrote a remarkable memo accepting Britain's reduced position and suggesting drastic naval and army cuts. He wanted closer relations with Europe. Perhaps this is why this memo was withheld in 1986, and then made available three years ago.