THE ISRAELI academic was blunt about the European Union's role in the Middle East peace process. He told a group of visiting EU journalists that the Union should confine itself to funding the Palestinians and not imagine it could play a political role.
The answer is galling to EU diplomats and foreign ministers, but telling. Although by far the largest donor of aid to the region or places like Rwanda, the Union's political influence is tiny. Little wonder that Mr Richard Holbrooke, President Clinton's roving ambassador, complained that the EU had slept through the Aegean crisis between Turkey and one of its own members, Greece. Other leaders complain they do not understand the rotating presidency system and would like "one telephone number for the EU".
By common consent the Union's common foreign and security policy (CFSP) lacks credibility, coherence, and continuity. Hence the challenge for the Amsterdam summit. But the question really is whether there is a political will on the part of the larger member states to subsume their foreign policies into the Union's. The answer, as the French, Germans and British regularly demonstrate, is no. Changing the treaty to make decision making easier will hardly change that reality.
The new treaty is likely to replace the current definition of CFSP - "all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence" - with the Irish compromise formula: "all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, in the perspective of a common defence.
And it provides that "questions referred to in this clause shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace making".
To carry out such tasks the EU will use the Western European Union (WEU), borrowing military assets from NATO: those like Ireland who are not WEU members are assured of a right to participate in the management of any missions in which they are involved.
The Dublin emphasis has been, with other neutrals, on a positive assertion of our willingness to contribute to peacekeeping, and, more controversially, peace enforcing. But Ireland remains opposed to any commitment to an automatic guarantee to come to the defence of other EU states if they are attacked.
Other states ask why we are not prepared to share in the defence of this common enterprise, but the argument is largely settled, for this treaty at least. What is not settled is the Dutch presidency proposal to include a reference to "the objective of gradual integration of the WEU into the Union" and six countries have submitted proposals for a protocol setting out a time scale for such a merger.
Ireland and the neutrals will strenuously resist this, as will Britain, which sees the move as undermining NATO.
Provision is also made for cooperation between member states in the field of arms production and procurement, although Ireland is still seeking to amend this to include a reference to controlling arms sales.
While most decisions will still be taken by consensus, in order to bypass the veto the treaty will provide a new decision making mechanism.
Heads of government at the European Council will be able to agree, by unanimity, common strategies, whose implementation in detail can be carried out by qualified majority (QMV) by ministers.
But member states will retain an "emergency brake" veto on, the implementation of joint actions "for important and stated reasons of national policy".
The overall result is a formula which can appear to satisfy both the veto and the QMV lobbies. However, sceptics like the Irish representative on the IGC, Mr Noel Dorr, suggest that the definition of a strategic decision may be seen as leaving too much scope for later decisions by QMV - unwilling to write a blank cheque, states may then be reluctant to use the procedure.
When decisions are taken by the traditional consensus approach the new treaty will also provide for the possibility of "constructive abstention".
This will allow states who do not wish to be part of an action but are also reluctant to veto it, to abstain while the action proceeds. If abstentions amount to more than a third of the weighted votes of the Council, a decision will be deemed not to have passed.
A new CFSP coordination and representational role is to be given to the top civil servant in the Council of Ministers, its Secretary General. This Mr/Ms CFSP is very much the creation of the French, although they would have preferred if the post went to a substantial international political figure (such as a former French prime minister).
The Commission is also to be closely associated with the Union's diplomatic efforts, with a new troika being created consisting of the country holding the presidency, the Commission, and the High Representative. The presidency may also be assisted by the next country in line for the job.
