"The bottom line seems clear enough to me," declared a Dublin observer at the height of Friday's drama. "Mandelson and Trimble didn't blink."
His clarity was all the more commendable given the cloud of intrigue and confusion which attended Mr Mandelson's decision to suspend the executive and other institutions of the Belfast Agreement.
At first glance it seemed obvious. Republicans were never going to await passively the blame for failure. So when Mr Adams claimed a possible breakthrough - crucially, 20 minutes after Mr Mandelson signed the suspension order - it looked like a predictable last-gasp attempt to muddy the waters.
A quick check with officials would presumably confirm there was nothing new in play - that the republican offer to which Mr Adams referred was the same as that on which the two governments had signed off their negotiation at the point of Mr Mandelson's decision.
It is well to presume nothing. Irish sources professed themselves temporarily in the dark. Was it new? They didn't know and were attempting to find out. Might it change things? Possibly. Enough, even, to have the suspension rescinded? That, apparently, was the Taoiseach's firm view as the talking continued and the uncertainty grew.
Dublin formally contributed to the doubt with two holding statements: the first regretting that Mr Mandelson had not delayed his announcement, the second confirming the Government's view that the second de Chastelain report was significant.
Informally, too, it seemed Mr Adams was not alone in raising questions about Mr Mandelson's decision, and the context in which it was made. Interviewed on Channel 4 News, the Secretary of State said he was unaware of Mr Adams's statement at the point at which he had made his own, as he was unaware also of the contents of the general's fresh report.
In the feverish atmosphere of the night - and, remember, with the implication running that something new might be in play - the questions hardly needed to be suggested.
Is it conceivable that Peter Mandelson really didn't know what was in the report? Would he (should he?) be giving television interviews while it lay on his desk unread? At the very least, knowing the UUP pressure to have suspension confirmed in time for the six o'clock news, wouldn't you think the general would have indicated a report was on its way?
Could Mr Mandelson have properly arrived at a decision without considering it, and consulting the parties about it? Given that the Taoiseach was continuing to talk to the Prime Minister, might Mr Mandelson find his decision reversed before the night was out?
Or, alternatively: had the British known all along, and simply decided to "bank" the republican bid - knowing it was insufficient to avert the threat of Mr Trimble's resignation - while regarding it as the starting point for the review which must follow suspension?
If that was the case, ventured one Irish source, Mr Mandelson might soon discover that was not the way to treat the republican movement.
Maybe people were genuinely in the dark. Perhaps it was less a case of spin-doctoring than of people spinning in confusion and doubt. However, the impression of a serious divergence between Dublin and London went unchecked throughout the long night - and has not really been corrected since.
The argument persisted through the weekend. Mr Adams says the British were fully apprised of the new republican position by lunchtime on Friday.
The British say they were unclear as to the status of various drafts and formulations throughout the day; that Mr Mandelson did not know if there would be a further de Chastelain report, or what its contents might be; and that all sides knew the timetable to which he was working.
Mr Mandelson is known for his spin-doctoring skills. It would not have made sense for him to allow the notion to build that there was something in play which might materially affect - or actually reverse - the decision he made.
Presumably, had he been in a position to do so, he would have been happy to tell Channel 4 - as he would BBC's Newsnight hours later - that the IRA offer to the general did not in his view transform the situation or provide the answers to the questions originally posed by Mr Seamus Mallon.
Maybe that sense of divergence between Dublin and London was illusion. Some commentators certainly suspect Dublin's public and private positions may not be the same; that the Taoiseach was obliged to maintain the facade of pan-nationalism, while knowing suspension was the only way to prevent Mr Trimble's resignation.
The alternative conclusion would appear to be that Dublin intended Mr Trimble's "bluff" to be called - and was prepared to risk his resignation.
In the Commons last Tuesday Mr Mandelson told Mr Mallon that if the first minister fell he would take the deputy first minister with him; that there would not be in the assembly the necessary cross-community support for any alternative ticket; and the consequence would be fresh assembly elections which, at best, would confirm the present stalemate.
There is private British irritation that Mr Mallon, having provided such clear-cut questions, resists any notion of sanction if the IRA fails to provide the answers. London, however, will admit no problem with the Irish approach - evincing understanding, rather, that "Bertie needs to handle things on his side".
The Ulster Unionists do not appear so understanding. Mr Trimble continues to hug the Taoiseach, the SDLP and the Americans close - quoting them in collective chorus demanding action by the IRA. But Mr Ken Maginnis fractured the public posture yesterday, warning Dublin's "spin machine" against promoting "a false impression about the IRA's intention on disarmament". Telling them that they had got it wrong before, Mr Maginnis said: "Reality and political pragmatism should not give way to `wish lists' or hard-won trust will be lost."
The relationship between the Ulster Unionists and the Taoiseach has been badly shaken. Unionists suspect Dublin of leaning on Gen. de Chastelain to produce a more positive report, and will be less inclined than ever to buy Dublin assessments of republican intent.
Moreover, courtesy of Mr Mallon's stark questions, they will feel less need of them. Will you decommission, and if so, when? To most unionists these questions seem capable of commanding clarity of reply.
No more the master of his own destiny than before, Mr Trimble will not be going back to the Ulster Unionist Council until he has it.