LATE one evening in September 1991, Mr Mauro Rostagno was returning to the drugs rehabilitation centre he ran near Trapani, not far from the Sicilian capital, Palermo. Halfway up the lane to the centre, he was shot dead as he sat behind the wheel of his car.
Mr Rostagno ran a rehabilitation centre and was also a journalist with a Sicilian TV channel. His last broadcast had been typical. He had lambasted the Mafia, attacking it in particular for the recent killing of a Sicilian judge who had issued heavy prison sentences to mafiosi.
Mr Rostagno was becoming a problem for the Mafia and it murdered him. Nor was he, the first such killing at least five journalists have been killed by the Mafia since 1979.
It may be tempting to draw comparisons between his fate and that of Veronica Guerin. Such comparisons, though, must be treated cautiously.
Above all, the Mafia is different from Irish criminal organisations both in size and, more importantly, in its ability to infiltrate the Italian judiciary, police forces, political classes and the media themselves. Its turnover is estimated at more than $40 billion.
The fact that seven times prime minister, Mr Giulio Andreotti, is one of those accused in a Perugia trial of the 1979 murder of investigative journalist Mr Mino Pecorelli suggests something of the collusion between the Mafia and Italy's ruling elite. Similarly, it is worth noting that one of media tycoon Mr Silvio Berlusconi's closest business associates, Mr Marcello Dell'Utri, this week had an 11 hour session with Palermo magistrates keen to inquire into his alleged links with Cosa Nostra.
Whatever about the infrastructural differences between the Mafia and Irish criminal organisations, there are lessons to be learned from the Italian state's successful fight against the Mafia.
A turning point came with the killings in the space of three months in 1992 of the country's two leading Mafia investigators,
Judges Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino. Their deaths elicited such indignation that not only was new, tougher anti Mafia legislation rushed through parliament but also several mafiosi were prompted to change sides and turn state's witness.
Obviously, the role of the "supergrass" or "pentito" has been paramount in recent Italian successes such as the arrests of Boss of Bosses, "Toto" Riina, in January 1993 and of his heir apparent Giovanni Brusca last month.
Judge Falcone, however, always stressed that even without the help of the "supergrass", the Mafia could be beaten. Pointing out that much Mafia revenue is "laundered" into legitimate business, he argued that the key to combat was extensive financial surveillance, which in turn required the co operation of major financial institutions - something not always available.
Furthermore, he argued that the assets of any alleged mafioso should be frozen once, he had been arrested. Asset freezing and economic surveillance, now represent options for Italian investigators.
The 1992 legislation prompted by the Falcone and Borsellino killings did introduce important measures, notably increasing investigators' powers in relation to the time limit on Mafia investigations, to phone tapping, to search and arrest and to undercover work.
Legislation introduced at that time also greatly changed the quality of a mafioso's prison existence. For many years, most mafiosi had been held in the Ucciardone prison in Palermo, where their ability to influence prison warders saw them lead a five star hotel lifestyle.
Legislation introduced in 1992 imposed a regime of quasi isolation on convicted mafiosi, cutting then off from their power base by moving them to island prisons. Incidentally, bail is not granted to defendants on Mafia related charges.