This is an important and challenging book on an area of Irish history which, surprisingly, has remained very much under-studied. It is a fine piece of scholarship based on tenacious and persistent work over many years in a large variety of archives.
The result is a detailed analysis of the history of the Cumann na nGaedheal decade in government and the four years of party turmoil following the loss of power to Eamon de Valera and Fianna Fail in 1932.
Regan provides fresh insights into the nature of the Treaty split, the leading personalities in government, the conflicts between those ministers, the clash of ideologies within the party, the evolving role of the army and its relationship to civil authority, the challenge of IRA subversion, the confusion presented by the rise of blueshirtism, and the unique leadership style of Eoin O'Duffy, who is given fair and comprehensive treatment by the author.
This book is particularly strong in its demonstration of the thesis that the faultline left in Irish public life by the Treaty split was not a neat ideological, political and social division which could easily be fitted to a political science model, be it a cleavage between Treatyite Enlightenment values and norms and anti-Treatyite Romanticism or between nationalist pragmatism and republican moralism.
Regan asserts the value of historical method simply by demonstrating its worth based on years of productive work in archives. He has thus brought to light a range of new findings which demonstrates the great political volatility of the times. He has uncovered evidence - far from conclusive - that there was a plot (and that may be too strong a word) to involve the army in a coup in 1931. There was further loose talk about taking over the state soon after de Valera came to power.
While neither initiative unseated the new civilian power, the wild talk only reinforces the extent to which the army had been thoroughly professionalised in its determined loyalty to the service of the state by 1932. Whatever the temptation to resort to rule by decree during the "red scare" (fear of left-wing IRA activities) in 1931, the democratic tradition within Cumann na nGaedheal took precedence over the much weaker countervailing authoritarian tendencies. William T. Cosgrave's government ensured that Fianna Fail could come in to power with ease in 1932.
Kevin O'Higgins is viewed by the author - in the light of the ambiguous legacy of Michael Collins - as being the most important architect of Cumann na nGaedheal. His skills as a politician are shown, as also is his strength of character during the army crisis/ mutiny of 1924. Regan reveals how O'Higgins attempted to reunite Ireland in 1926 under the British monarchy. Regan writes infelicitously about the "O'Higginsation" of the party, but we know what is meant.
I don't think that much is added to the historical record by the inclusion of a reference to the alleged relationship between O'Higgins ("clandestine adulterer" in the author's phrase) and Hazel Lavery. I also feel that the author does not provide adequate evidence for his implication that de Valera hated O'Higgins in 1927. (He cites as his only proof de Valera having written privately in February 1923 that "there is a bit of the scoundrel in O'Higgins".)
It is my view that this book is titled unfortunately "the Irish counter-revolution", which is trite and misleading. I also have some problems with the structure. However, there is much to praise in this work. it is rich and original, providing the reader with new insights into the period. For example, a fine example of Fine Gael high Toryism may be seen in Prof James Hogan's note in 1935 about his uncharacteristically polemical Could Ireland become Communist? to his fellow historian in Queen's, R.M. Henry:
Do not think I am such a reactionary as parts of this booklet seem to suggest. A work of this sort must necessarily be indifferent to subtitles. The sledgehammer method of argument is the one I adopted after long reflection on the density and thickness of the national cranium.
Eamon de Valera, unlike Fine Gael, appears to have had less difficulty in the 1930s in judging the "thickness of the national cranium".
Dermot Keogh is Professor and Head of History at University College, Cork. His book, Jews in Twentieth Century Ireland, recently won the James S Donnelly Snr prize of the American Association for Irish Studies for the best book in history or the social sciences