The sort of scenes we are now witnessing in Kosovo seem to be fast becoming a defining characteristic of the post-Cold War world.
From Rwanda, Liberia and Sierra Leone to Iraq's Kurds, Bosnia and, now, Kosovo, the mass exodus of huge numbers of people from fratricidal slaughter is like an icon of the new world order.
Its very regularity makes humanitarianism an inadequate response. If it is not to be repeated, we need urgently to think through the roots of insecurity in this new world and how to prevent the breakdown of whole societies.
NATO's action, even if it were to achieve all its aims, would have done so at the cost of sowing deeper seeds of long-term insecurity in the Balkans. Furthermore, there are disturbing imperial overtones to it.
One is the belief in the power of vastly superior force to resolve highly complex and deeply rooted social problems.
Another is the tendency, for long evident in US foreign policy, to reduce foreign actions to a crusade of good against evil, the civilised against the barbarian, identifying where possible one figure as the personification of the evil to be eradicated.
It is clear to even the most cursory observer that what we in Europe call nationalism lies at the heart of most of the major security tragedies of the post-Cold War world. Nationalism, and ethnic conflict in general, is regarded as a throwback to some pre-modern atavism, something not supposed to occur on the brink of the third millennium.
Yet it is occurring, with ever greater regularity it seems, and needs urgently to be understood as a feature of today's world. It is significant that the Spanish sociologist Manuel Castells devotes the entire second volume of his breathtaking recent trilogy on the information age to what he calls "the power of identity".
Castells regards ethnicity, and the struggle for identity based on it, as the defining characteristic of resistance to economic and cultural globalisation, especially among those who are gaining few benefits from it.
The struggle for identity may take many ugly forms, as it did in Rwanda or as it is doing today in Kosovo. The power of Castells's point is that, far from being a throwback to some ancient past, it is an integral part of the information age. A far more effective way to deal with it would be to understand the tendency of globalisation to distribute its benefits very unequally.
This strongly suggests that a more secure world will require the international community to devote far more careful attention to the issue of equality, both worldwide and within each of our societies.
This is where economic and social policies and foreign policy meet.
More than ever, the roots of the world's security problems lie in underdevelopment.
To be effective, security policy needs to intervene in this cycle long before it reaches the extreme of mass ethnic cleansing.
This, I suggest, is where the neutral states have an important role to play. Drawing on its own experience of national struggle, its recent development success and its ongoing peace process, Ireland is well placed to offer an understanding of what it requires to build stable and secure societies.
Ireland can insist that, far from an historical relic, nationalism is a deeply rooted cultural and political force with the potential to build stable societies if constructively channelled but also with a power for terrifying social destruction.
On economic development, it knows better than most the importance that flows of foreign direct investment and foreign aid, when well used, can play in providing a better livelihood for people.
It can point out that the decline in aid flows from the OECD and the fact that the great bulk of foreign investment worldwide goes to about 15 countries, serves to sow seeds of long-term social insecurity in those parts of the world which are excluded.
The difficulties of our own peace process also hold valuable lessons about how sensitive must be the attempts to coax adversaries into dialogue. The sorts of ultimatums delivered to the Serbs at Rambouillet, we could point out, would have been disastrous if used in our own peace process.
In achieving success at dialogue, it is vital to have interlocutors involved who show a sympathy to the plight of each of the sides.
Consistent support over the years in Serbia for independent media, for human rights groups, for opposition political groups could all have helped lay stronger foundations for democracy to emerge.
The implication of this argument, then, is for Ireland to become more involved in forums in which such a view of security building can be actively promoted.
For this reason, involvement in Partnership for Peace is to be greatly welcomed, but only if Ireland enters it with the confidence to promote a view of international security drawn from its own historical experience.
It is to be greatly regretted therefore that activist civil society here seems to take what amounts to an isolationist position on this issue.
Instead of lamenting Ireland joining PfP, I suggest that civil society has a vital role to play in ensuring that our officials take a strong and proactive stance within PfP and not silently acquiesce in more militaristic approaches to international security.
Peadar Kirby lectures on the MA in International Relations in Dublin City University.