The events of the last few days illustrate two different concepts of war-making.
On the one hand, there's the American preference for both large-scale and detailed planning before big operations. A concept of operations is arrived at, then manpower, weaponry and supplies are assembled. Information is collected and transformed into intelligence; psychological operations (psyops) are prepared. Orders are drawn up. Air strikes are used to soften up defences. When everything is ready . . . boom - a coordinated attack goes in. This case (simply supporting the Northern Alliance) showed that the system could be flexible. Some steps could be telescoped, some (such as heavy-weapon supply) deferred.
In Afghanistan, the US military was under pressure from impatient media and politicians. It had been hinted that the Northern Alliance would get familiar Russian equipment and ammunition, paid for by the US. Delivery depended on the capture of Mazar-i-Sharif.
American special forces and, more recently, British troops, are on the ground. Indicating bombing and air-strike targets, giving tactical guidance and advice to Northern Alliance commanders and arranging reception of air-drops would have been their main tasks. If the US intends to use the Northern Alliance for the ground fighting, their concept is working, too well perhaps. Control may be difficult; there are ugly stories from Mazar-i-Sharif and Bamiyan. Aligning military and political progress in Kabul may be impossible. However, Gen Franks, the US commander, is said to have requested 3,000 marines (for airborne assaults).
The Taliban, on the other hand, tried something beyond their strength and the characteristics of guerrilla forces. Bullying civilians, especially women, is easier than fighting. Guerrilla effectiveness depends on flexible tactics and mobility. They must not get tied down defending positions. When they do, they are open to devastating blows by air and ground forces. The Taliban stayed too long Mazar-i-Sharif and were pounded by air attacks.
It appears their ground defences were also inadequate. The depth and all-round fields of fire, which care and foresight would have provided, were missing. Single lines of trenches, without support lines, were death traps. When the Northern Alliance appeared at Mazar the Taliban started to move - too late. They fled under air attack. Can they now fight an effective guerrilla war?
Col E. D. Doyle is a former Army Director of Signals who has spent much of his career in operations.