Clerical rulers face crisis 25 years after Islamic revolution

IRAN: Conservative and reformist forces are locked in bitter struggle in Iran. Michael Jansen examines the struggle

As Iran celebrates today's 25th anniversary of the victory of the Islamic revolution over the Shah, the clerical government faces its greatest challenge.

A month-old confrontation between conservatives and reformists has turned into a crisis of confidence in the system of governance, rule by theologians, or vilayet-e-faqih, adopted by the Islamic Republic in 1979. The row is over the banning of one-third of 8,100 candidates seeking to stand in the February 20th parliamentary poll. Among the candidates banned are more than 70 liberal members of the outgoing parliament and a host of reformist aspirants, leaving the field open to candidates allied with the conservative clerical ruling establishment, which enjoys little support.

When Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile to Tehran on February 1st, 1979, throngs of jubilant Iranians greeted him. Few would celebrate today. Ironically, the popular revolution which brought him home was still-born because it was hijacked by clerics led by the ayatollah.

Iranians expecting a role in public life, clean government, and economic progress soon realised that the turban had replaced the crown. The emperor, who used to thwart the prime minister and curb parliament, was succeeded by the faqih, the supreme guide and the Council of Guardians who block initiatives of the elected president, veto legislation and bar candidates seeking office. The Shah's vicious Savak intelligence agency was replaced by the bully boys of Hizbullah and the Basij youth militia. The voice of the Iranian people has been stifled again, corruption is rife, and the economy is faltering.

But instead of engaging in mass protest as they did in 1978-79, Iranians are burying their frustration. Analysts expect the parliamentary election campaign, set to kick off tomorrow, will be characterised by indifference and apathy, and the turnout to be low, favouring the conservatives. This is because the reform movement has failed to create the institutions of civil society and deliver the rule of law, accountability, and economic growth demanded by the majority of Iranians, two-thirds of whom were born after the Islamic revolution.

The reform movement was launched by the President, Mr Muhammad Khatami, when he was elected by 70 per cent of voters in 1997. While he was able to ease restrictive social strictures imposed by the clerical establishment and lift limits on freedom of expression and the press, Mr Khatami was unable to secure the adoption and implementation of the main planks in his reformist platform. Although his hand should have been strengthened when the reformists and their allies won 70 per cent of parliament seats in 2000, the conservatives responded by closing down liberal newspapers, jailing progressive thinkers, and blocking any measure to democratise the political system.

Iranians eager for change blame Mr Khatami for failing to confront the opponents of reform. But Iranians should never have believed he would take on the conservative clerics. Mr Khatami is a middle ranking cleric himself. He is committed to the Islamic revolution and Iran's Islamic constitution which sets the vilayet-e-faqih above the elected presidency and legislature. His aim was always to democratise the system from within, not do away with it, the demand of the most radical of the reform deputies, intellectuals and students. Although he has repeatedly threatened to resign in response to conservative obstructionism, he has not done so. Consequently, he and the reform camp have lost credibility.

Some commentators draw parallels between the Shah and the faqih and predict the early demise of the inflexible mullahs. But this is unlikely. The conservative clerical faction is divided between ideologues, who seem to have the upper hand, and pragmatists, who could yet intervene and find a compromise with the reformists, thereby defusing the crisis. Unlike the Shah, who had few supporters towards the end of his reign, the conservatives still enjoy the backing of influential merchants and artisans and the devout members of the urban working class and peasantry.

Finally, the reformists have no leader other than the moderate president, and the mullahs will do everything to prevent the emergence of a charismatic figure who could lead a new revolt.

After a quarter of century of its existence, the tragedy of the Islamic Republic is that the conservative clerics have not allowed Iran to evolve into the world's first Islamic democracy.