"FLEXIBILITY" is the ghost at the feast in Dublin Castle this weekend.
It has become the accepted catch all term to describe a European Union set to agree on procedures to allow some member states to proceed faster towards integration than others wish to go. According to the most developed plans under discussion, they would not be prevented from doing this by national vetoes, and they would be able to use the EU's common institutions.
The Irish EU Presidency did not include such plans in the general outline for a draft revision of the treaties under consideration at the summit. This was, it says, because there is not sufficient common ground among the members to be reflected in the exact language of treaty text. The same applies to the questions of institutional balance and representation, which will only be settled at the last stages of the negotiations in six months' time.
It has not escaped attention that Ireland has vital interests at stake on both these matters. There is a fear that flexibility could marginalise smaller states, just at the point where they will probably have to concede representational weight in the EU institutions. It is, therefore, convenient from this State's point of view that these issues have not come to a head during the Irish presidency.
It is always difficult during these presidencies to distinguish the national interest from the disinterested face that smaller states traditionally put on their role, and for which Ireland has been commended on this occasion. But, looking at the map provided in the draft treaty and the conduct of the presidency, as well as at the gaps in them, it is possible to discern clearly enough some of its deeper preoccupations.
One of these was expressed at the launch of the draft treaty in terms of avoiding confrontation. Given that so much of the negotiations in the Inter Governmental Conference as well as the running agenda revolves around differences between Britain and the other 14 states, this can be read as code for avoiding confrontation with Britain.
This has been an unspoken objective of the Irish presidency and one that has on the whole been successfully achieved. It serves two purposes to preserve good relations with Britain by mediating between that state and the others, using the good offices established by Ireland's special knowledge of British affairs and to avoid giving Mr John Major advantages against his political opponents at home by falsely - or prematurely - polarising the issues.
Again, the mediocrity of the political energy flowing through the IGC talks, which has so annoyed the French Foreign Minister, Mr de Charette, cannot be attributed to the Irish presidency's lack of political ambition, but has done Ireland no harm in its relations with its large neighbour.
Mr Major has much to argue over and reject at this summit, not least concerning the main questions on which the Irish draft treaty puts forward its most radical and comprehensive ideas, on an area of freedom, security and justice in, "Europe, with free movement of "people. This reflects close contact and work with the German government, and it runs parallel to ideas put forward before this summit by the Germans and the French.
Flexibility is implicit in these proposals, which are rejected by the Conservatives, and, largely by the Labour party in Britain. It is explicit in the plans for Economic and Monetary Union, where Britain and Denmark have opt outs. It is also involved in the discussion on common foreign and security policy, where the draft treaty proposes a form of constructive abstention.
The question Britain has to face at the end game negotiations in Amsterdam is whether its multi speed flexibility proposal, in contrast to the German/French hard core model, will consign it effectively to a second tier of future integration, and whether this best suits its own as well as the Union's overall interests.
De Valera's "external association" formula springs to mind here in Dublin Castle, on the 75th anniversary of the Anglo Irish Treaty of 1921, as a means of describing this possible outcome of European treaty negotiations. Such are the ironies of history.
Needless to say, such a semi detached Britain would pose severe problems for Ireland across the span of EU policies, from EMU, to the Schengen open borders scheme, through security and defence co operation. There is also the difficulty that such a re erection of borders in Ireland would pose just as we are negotiating with the British about more North South co operation in Ireland and east west co operation between these islands.
Ireland has, therefore, a fundamental interest in seeing Britain more fully engaged in Europe, rather than, externally associated with it.
The completion of the main rule making for currency union, which looks to be the highlight of this Dublin Council, poses these questions of flexibility for Britain in a very straight manner, will see an inter connection of European negotiations and domestic politics that are unprecedented.
And not least because the validated by this deal, has yet to be sold convincingly to electorates in the main European states.
After the EU presidency, attention must return to Ireland's own interests in these respects. The level of public confusion and ignorance about the IGC, and of hostility to EU enlargement revealed in today's Irish Times/MRBI poll, demonstrates that it has to be sold to the Irish electorate as well.
There is precious little sign of a political boost for the Government from its successful conduct of EU affairs in the last six months.
