UN impotence reflects that of Asian nations themselves

Leaders from the Asian/Pacific region, gathered in New Zealand, are making a last-ditch effort today to prevent a major humanitarian disaster in East Timor. But, almost regardless of the decisions taken, one conclusion appears inescapable: the United Nations has, yet again, been discredited.

The results of the internationally-sponsored referendum have been brushed aside by the Indonesian military, the UN compound has been ransacked and the blue helmets are now being hurriedly withdrawn from the province.

A deadlocked UN Security Council, a bevy of diplomats all expressing "concern" but offering to do nothing in particular and a massacre which continues unabated complete this sorry picture.

And yet, not all is lost for the international organisation.

Almost from its creation, the UN was paralysed by the East-West confrontation of the Cold War. It was therefore natural that, when communism collapsed a decade ago, hopes were high that the UN could become the truly global security institution.

These aspirations were always misplaced, for the ideological confrontation of the past only masked much more subtle and enduring divisions between member-states.

A key difference remains over respect for human rights. As long as China is still ruled by the iron fist of its communist party, a global order ensuring respect for such rights will remain a dream. And, regardless of the fact that Russia is now formally a democracy, politicians in Moscow are still dismissive of human rights concerns; ordinary Russians were distinctly unperturbed by the mass killing of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo earlier this year.

The idea that human rights are a central part of foreign policy is simply not accepted in many parts of the world. A second fundamental difference paralysing the UN is over definitions of national sovereignty.

Europeans, now accustomed to pooling their actions because they are aware of the limited powers of their nation-states, do not take sovereignty too seriously. Yet in most of Asia and Africa national sovereignty remains sacred, the only safeguard against further wars.

Innumerable schemes were put forward in the last decade with the aim of overcoming such difficulties. All have failed, mainly because they offered bureaucratic solutions to what are deep-rooted psychological and historic differences.

One proposal was to enlarge the membership of the UN Security Council, in order to reflect more equitably the world as it exists today, rather than the victorious powers of the second World War. The concept is superficially persuasive, but it could result in an even greater paralysis in times of crises.

Another proposal, repeated on the pages of this newspaper only yesterday, was to open up the secret debates of the Security Council to public scrutiny. Again, a laudable effort in theory, but one which is unlikely to eliminate back-room diplomatic deals and may actually increase the dangers of irrelevant posturing in the UN.

The biggest efforts have gone into improving the conflict-management mechanisms of the UN. Paradoxically, the UN Charter itself envisages the creation of a standing army under the organisation's command, with effective troops which could be rapidly deployed anywhere in the world. The Cold War precluded their creation in the past, but could the project be resurrected now?

The answer is an emphatic No.

An army raised and commanded by the UN Secretary-General will be regarded as a mercenary body. Since no member-state would bear direct political responsibility for such a force, everyone would frivolously call for its deployment in any small conflict around the world.

Far from being the answer to global concerns, a UN standing army would become another excuse for doing nothing. Sooner or later the UN Secretary-General would have to refuse deployments and stand accused, as he is now, for problems not of his own making.

The UN Charter does, of course, also envisage placing particular units under UN command in specific circumstances. But this is unlikely to get around the problem of the veto or other political considerations currently affecting UN operations.

Despite all these difficulties, the UN has made huge strides towards mounting effective military operations. A planning cell now operates in New York, with the aim of eliminating bureaucratic hurdles by providing a UN force with a more coherent command.

Many countries - including Ireland and Britain - are training their military to operate in a multinational environment. Some have even allocated specific units to future UN operations.

The aim here was never to pledge military units automatically, but rather to make sure that, once a decision to deploy a UN force had been taken, such a force could be mounted quickly and would include all necessary elements, including a civilian administration component which was so lacking in previous UN efforts.

Yet by far the most spectacular development has been the emergence of regional security actions. In many respects, the murders in East Timor justify international action more than the ethnic genocide in Kosovo.

East Timor was never recognised by the UN as part of Indonesia: Kosovo was an acknowledged territory of Yugoslavia for most of this century.

There was no attempt to ascertain the view of the majority of Kosovo's population before NATO undertook its action: in East Timor, an internationally-supervised referendum was recently held, and its results are clear enough. Just as in East Timor, the UN was paralysed over Kosovo by Russia and China's opposition.

However, this obstacle was brushed aside by most European and North American governments, adamant in their belief that widespread violence should not be tolerated on the European continent. There is nothing to prevent Asian and Pacific nations from repeating this example in East Timor - nothing, that is, apart from the countries of the region themselves.

The reason that an operation is not mounted now is that China's objections cannot be ignored as they were in Europe. Indonesia is far more important than Yugoslavia ever was and Australia and New Zealand (the two nations ready to dispatch troops) are not considered by any of their neighbours as truly Asian. The UN impotence in East Timor is merely a reflection of the impotence of the Asians themselves.

It is possible to argue that regional security arrangements are the antithesis of the UN concept of universality. The Kosovo war started without explicit UN approval. Nevertheless its outcome strengthened UN principles, and the Europeans relied on the organisation to bestow its seal of approval on their subsequent peacekeeping operation in the Balkans.

Various governments are now helping African states to establish their own peacekeeping missions which will never be of the same intensity as the Kosovo war, but which can at least tackle the ethnic conflicts now afflicting that continent.

Interestingly, quite a number of African states are prepared to waive their old affection for the concept of national sovereignty in return for acquiring regional stability.

The dangers in such an approach must not be underestimated: Russia, China and the US could all be tempted to use regional security arrangements as a subterfuge for their own selfish reasons. But the alternative, which consists of waiting for the UN to transform itself from the top while people are massacred, is neither moral nor conducive to international order.

The centrality of the UN for world security should be maintained, while regional organisations should provide the building-blocks of this security from below.

With time and if the concept is properly applied, the UN could acquire the common purpose and action which it currently lacks. The Europeans understood this principle when they went to war in their continent earlier this year. It is now time for the Asian leaders meeting in New Zealand to do the same.

As always, salvation for the UN lies in the hands of its own members.

Jonathan Eyal is director of studies at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies in London